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[T he delegation of broad and undefined discretionary power from
the legislature to the executive branch [and independent adminis-
trative agencies] deranges virtually all constitutional relationships
and prevents attainment of the constitutional goals of limitation on
power, substantive calculability, and procedural calculability.'
Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion
may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice,
either reasonableness or arbitrariness.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies, whether we approve or not, have become
1. Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Ad-
ministrative Power, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 295, 296 (1987). See generally THEODORE J.
Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed. 1979).
2. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3
(Illini Books ed. 1971).
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the primary institutions for creating and implementing governmental
policy. Understanding how the administrative process operates and the
nature of both substantive and procedural constraints the law imposes
on the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies has become an
essential part of the modern lawyer's repertoire. This article is designed
to assist lawyers in keeping themselves abreast of recent developments
in the complex and diverse area of administrative law by providing an
overview of administrative law decisions8 by the Florida appellate
courts during the survey period."
3. Cases concerning the Workers' Compensation system generally are not ad-
dressed in this article, because its administrative hearing system is not subject to the
Florida Administrative Procedure Act. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(l)(c) (1991) [hereinafter
"the APA"] ("A judge of compensation claims shall not, in the adjudication of work-
ers' compensation claims, be considered an agency or part of an agency for the pur-
poses of this act.").
4. As in past years this article perhaps errs on the side of comprehensiveness.
Most of the cases discussed do not, in and of themselves, raise some new and/or impor-
tant development in administrative law. However, I continue to firmly believe that such
a comprehensive approach is justified because each appellate court decision augments
our knowledge of how the courts are interacting with administrative agencies, and thus,
is valuable.
Most of the decisions discussed in this article appear in volumes 554 to 583 of the
Southern Reporter, Second Series. Earlier articles on Florida administrative law have
appeared in a variety of books and law reviews. See, e.g., FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE (The Florida Bar 3d ed. 1990); ARTHUR J. ENGLAND & L. HAROLD LEVIN-
SON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE MANUAL (1979); Johnny C. Burris, The
Failure of the Florida Judicial Review Process to Provide Effective Incentives for
Agency Rulemaking, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 661 (1991) [hereinafter Burris IV]; Patri-
cia A. Dore, Florida Limits Policy Development Through Administrative Adjudica-
tion and Requires Indexing and Availability of Agency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
437 (1991) [hereinafter Dore III]; Patricia A. Dore, Seventh Administrative Law Con-
ference Agenda and Report, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 703 (1991) [hereinafter Dore II];
L. Harold Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act After 15 Years, 18
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 749 (1991); Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and
Judicial Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 767 (1991); Johnny C. Burris, Ad-
ministrative Law, 1989 Survey of Florida Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 583 (1990) [herein-
after Burris III]; Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law, 1988 Survey of Florida Law,
13 NOVA L. REV. 727 (1989) [hereinafter Burris II]; Johnny C. Burris, Administrative
Law, 1987 Survey of Florida Law, 12 NOVA L. REV. 299 (1988) [hereinafter Burris I];
Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. UL. REV.
965 (1986) [hereinafter Dore I]; Murray H. Dubbin & Samuel J. Dubbin, Administra-
tive Law: .Access to Review of Official Action-Standing Under the Florida Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815 (1981); Joseph Z. Fleming & David
L. Mallory, Administrative Law, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735 (1979); Arthur J. England
& L. Harold Levinson, Administrative Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749 (1977); L. Har-
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. The Delegation Doctrine5
"There is no doubt that the development of the administrative
agency in response to modern legislative and administrative need has
placed severe strain on the separation-of-powers principle in its pristine
formulation." Most courts at both the federal and state levels early on
abandoned their efforts at rigorously enforcing separation of powers re-
quirements in the context of delegation of authority to administrative
agencies. However, Florida courts resisted this course. In Askew v.
Cross Key Waterways,7 the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed a com-
mitment to rigorously enforce the delegation doctrine through a very
formalistic approach to these issues. The decision in Cross Key cast
considerable doubt on the validity of many statutory delegations of au-
thority to administrative agencies.8
However, beginning in 1981, Florida courts gradually abandoned
the formalist approach to the delegation doctrine outlined in the Cross
Key decision that threatened the constitutional validity of many ena-
bling statutes which delegated substantial authority and discretion to
administrative agencies. The courts, while never formally abandoning
the Cross Key philosophy on delegation issues, nonetheless functionally
old Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975
Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617 (1975); L. Harold Levinson, A Comparison of
Florida Administrative Practice Under the Old and the New Administrative Procedure
Acts, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.-72 (1975). See generally A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RULE MAKING (1986) (an excellent general discussion of state administrative law
issues); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1978-84) (five vol-
ume set offering one of the most comprehensive overviews of administrative law).
5. This constitutional doctrine traditionally has been labeled the non-delegation
doctrine. This clearly is a misnomer, as courts, contrary to the result suggested by the
label, almost never find the delegation of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial authority, or
the aggregation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in one administrative
body to be constitutionally flawed. The non-delegation doctrine designation occurred
because strongly worded dicta in early United States Supreme Court cases which ad-
dressed these issues indicated a hostility in principle to such actions by Congress, even
though the delegations in these cases were held constitutionally sound. In keeping with
legal reality, rather than myth, I have labeled this section "The Delegation Doctrine,"
rather than "The Non-Delegation Doctrine." See Burris I, supra note 4, at 302 n.15.
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 280-81 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
7. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
8. See Burris I, supra note 4, at 304-07.
[Vol. 16
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adopted a pragmatic approach to delegation issues similar to that used
in the federal courts.9
Under the pragmatic approach, which has been imposed under the
Cross Key rubric, the critical inquiry in delegation cases is "whether
the statute contains sufficient standards or guidelines to enable the
agency and the courts to determine whether the agency is carrying out
the legislature's intent."10 The degree of specificity required will vary
with "the subject matter dealt with and the degree of difficulty involved
in articulating finite standards."" The courts found that a substantial
degree of flexibility and uncertainty should be tolerated so that the leg-
islature can delegate authority to an administrative agency "with the
expertise and flexibility needed to deal with complex and fluid condi-
tions .. .which . ..make direct legislative control impractical or in-
effective . . .[and] make the drafting of detailed or specific legislation
impractical or undesirable. 1 2 Standardless delegation of authority to
an administrative agency will not be condoned, but it takes very little
in the way of direction from the legislature for a statute to move from
the standardless category to the category of constitutionally sufficient
minimum guidance. While courts continue to ritualistically refer to the
Cross Key decision, the nature of the inquiries made under the delega-
tion doctrine are now pragmatic, designed to assure in a minimalistic
fashion that the legislature and not administrative agencies are making
fundamental policy decisions. 8 The net result has been a decline in the
use of the delegation doctrine to declare statutes unconstitutional.",
9. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (the first modern statement of the "intelli-
gible principle" approach to delegation issues); Amalgamated Meat Workers v. Con-
nally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). But see American Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Dono-
van, 452 U.S. 490, 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rigorous application of
the delegation doctrine would require holding these statutes an unconstitutional form of
delegation); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
10. Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 815, 819
(Fla. 1981).
11. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 918.
12. Jones v. Department of Revenue, 523 So. 2d 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
13. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 730-31; Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, &
F, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699 (Fla. 1991) (Overton, J., concurring).
14. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 585-87; Burris II, supra note 4, at 729-30;
see also Burris I, supra note 4, at 302-12.
Of course, a different result may be achieved if the attempted delegation was
1991]
5
Burris: Administrative Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
In fact, the process of abandoning or ignoring the requirements set
out in the Cross Key decision has progressed to the point that during
this survey period only one case was decided which involved a signifi-
cant discussion of whether a delegation of authority to an administra-
tive agency was unconstitutional. 15 In Young v. Broward County,' 6 the
viewed by the court as concerning the relatively rare circumstance of a power which
was not delegable. See Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S699. The first part of the opinion
in Chiles treated budget cutting as a matter which must be decided by the legislature;
but in the latter part of its opinion, the court apparently qualified its earlier position by
indicating that if it was a possibility for the legislature to adopt sufficiently detailed
guidance for the exercise of budget cutting authority, then the Administrative Commis-
sion could exercise some delegated authority in this area. Id.
In Barry v. Garcia, 573 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), the court con-
sidered whether the Ad Hoc Independent Review Panel of the City of Miami was prop-
erly delegated the power to issue subpoenas. The Panel was created by the City Com-
mission of the City of Miami for the purposes of investigating the relationship between
the police department and the Overtown area, and was directed to report its findings to
the City Commission. Id. at 933. The City Commission resolution creating the ad hoc
panel granted it the power to issue subpoenas.
Two individuals were subpoenaed by the Panel, but refused to testify or appear
before the Panel. The Panel petitioned the circuit court to hold these individuals in
contempt unless they could show cause why they should not be so found. The circuit
court "found that as a matter of law, the Ad Hoc Independent Review Panel did not
have the authority to issue subpoenas and to compel attendance of witnesses to its
proceedings." Id. at 934. The City of Miami Charter provided that the Commission or
any committee thereof are the only bodies authorized by the Charter to exercise the
investigative subpoena power. Id. at 937; City of Miami Charter § 14. It was clear that
any investigative subpoena could be issued either by the body carrying out the investi-
gation or by a court, but if the investigative body wished to enforce its subpoena, then
it must apply through the courts for an order concerning the matter. Because the City
Charter did not currently authorize anyone other than the City Commission or a com-
mittee composed of City Commissioners to exercise the subpoena power, the City Com-
mission acted inappropriately in delegating this power to the Ad Hoc Independent Re-
view Panel. Garcia, 573 So. 2d at 938. "Generally, a city commission, which is a
legislative body of a city, possesses no power to delegate their authority as prescribed in
their charter. Municipal officials can only act in accordance with an express grant in
their charter and not any implied grant of power." Id. at 939. Therefore, the Ad Hoc
Independent Review Panel had no power to issue a subpoena, and accordingly, the
circuit court properly determined that it could not enforce any subpoena issued by the
body with a contempt citation. See generally Florida Administrative Practice § 1.9-.12
(The Florida Bar 3d ed. 1990).
15. Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699, was decided too late for a full discussion in
this survey article. Five other cases briefly alluded to delegation doctrine matters. See
State v. Carswell, 557 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (A statute did not
violate the delegation doctrine by incorporating by reference existing federal standards.
The court did note in dicta, however, that any attempt to incorporate by reference
[Vol. 16
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court addressed the issue of whether the Broward County ordinance
regulating when the Broward County Animal Control Division may de-
clare a dog to be vicious and order it destroyed involved an invalid
delegation of authority.17 The court concluded the ordinance could not
be characterized as creating a circumstance where the administrative
agency could engage in arbitrary decision making. The ordinance pro-
vided sufficient guidance to the administrative agency, because the or-
dinance contained an adequate definition of what constituted a vicious
dog. 8
However, Chief Judge Hersey in his dissent, while not directly
mentioning it, apparently followed both the letter and the spirit of the
Cross Key decision when noting the ordinance was constitutionally
flawed. The ordinance was flawed because the choice of which penalty
may be :imposed after a determination that a dog was vicious as a re-
sult of one attack, humane disposal or an opportunity for the owner to
properly provide for adequate security, was "vested solely in the unbri-
dled discretion of the individual who, from time to time, may hold the
post of Director of the Animal Control Division of Broward County."' 19
Such a delegation of unbridled discretion was a violation of the delega-
tion doctrine, because it left the fundamental policy choice of what was
the appropriate response to the problem to the administrative agency. 0
future changes in the federal standards would violate the delegation doctrine.); St.
Johns County v. Northeastern Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 642 (Fla. 1991);
Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Blizzard v.
W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); cf. Barber v.
State, 564 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (vesting the prosecutor
with the discretion to choose among competing statutory provisions in a criminal case
was not an invalid delegation of discretion to the executive branch).
16. 570 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
17. The court noted in dicta that the ordinance also did not violate any other
tenets of constitutional law such as the due process of law guarantee. Id. at 310.
18. See Young, 570 So. 2d at 309; see also St. Johns County v. Northeastern
Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 642 (Fla. 1991); Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d
1045, 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Blizzard v. W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d
1237, 1239, (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
19. Young, 570 So. 2d at 310-11 (Hersey, C.J., dissenting).
20. There [wa]s absolutely no guidance in the ordinance, no standards or
guidelines to control the discretion of the director of animal control as to
whether, after a first bite, a dog owner [wa]s to be given the opportunity to
confine his dog and to provide security as required in one section of the
ordiEiance, or, whether the owner [wa]s simply to be advised that the dog
will be disposed of under another section of the ordinance.
Id. at 310 (Hersey, C.J., dissenting). See Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 918-21;
1991]
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B. Separation of Powers: Prohibiting the Usurpation of
Functions
Florida courts have, for now at least, ceased to rigorously apply
the delegation doctrine, but they remain particularly attentive to sepa-
ration of powers concerns in other contexts. In addition to providing the
foundation for the delegation doctrine, the separation of powers doc-
trine also prohibits one branch of the government from invading the
core powers of another branch. 21 This principle was illustrated in sev-
eral cases during the survey period concerning whether the core judicial
functions were improperly delegated to nonjudicial officers.
In Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v.
Bonanno,22 the court held, in part, that the legislature could delegate to
a hearing officer the power to make an initial determination of the
amount of just compensation to be paid for citrus trees destroyed dur-
ing the citrus canker eradication program, as long as this determination
was subject to judicial review. The court noted that the ultimate deter-
mination of whether just compensation was paid for private property
taken by the government was a core function of the judiciary. There-
fore, by providing a right to judicial review of the initial determination
made by a hearing officer, the legislature exercised its constitutional
power to provide for a means of determining just compensation without
improperly invading the core of judicial functioning.2
In this area the issue of appropriate delegation does not always
involve another branch of government invading a core judicial function.
On some occasions it is the judiciary that delegated its powers. In
Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699.
21. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 699; Locke v.
Hawkes, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716 (1991). The government also cannot delegate its
police powers to a private party. Such action is beyond the legislature's authority,
whether done by statute or contract. See P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo, 549 So.
2d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
22. 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
23. Id. at 28-29. Further, in Lampley v. State, the court noted that the initial
determination of whether a person was mentally incompetent and should be hospital-
ized was a core judicial function which could not be delegated to an administrative
agency. 555 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see Bentley v. State, 398
So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). However, once the initial determination of
incompetency and involuntary hospitalization had been made by the appropriate court,
then a hearing officer may determine whether the involuntary hospitalization should be
continued. Lampley, 555 So. 2d at 1245; see Liebman v. State, 555 So. 2d 1242 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
[Vol. 16
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Bradley v. State,24 the court reaffirmed 25 that trial court delegation to
the probation and parole officer of the power to determine the appropri-
ate amount of restitution owed by a criminal defendant was an imper-
missible delegation of a core judicial function. 6 The determination of
all elements of a sentence for a defendant involves the exercise of judi-
cial power which may not be entrusted to an executive branch
employee. 7
The issue of whether the legislature invaded judicial core functions
can be a particularly vexing one in the area concerning the distinction
between substantive law making and matters of practice and proce-
dure." The former is within the legislative power sphere while the lat-
ter is within the scope of the judicial power. In Haven Federal Savings
24. 581 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
25. See Hamrick v. State, 532 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
26. Bradley, 581 So. 2d at 246; see also Weckerle v. State, 579 So. 2d 742, 743
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 1.12 (The Flor-
ida Bar 3d ed. 1990).
27. "However, once the court has rendered its decision, it may assign the per-
formance of ministerial details necessary to the implementation of its decision to an
executive branch employee." Burris III, supra note 4, at 590 (emphasis added). cf.
Citizens of Florida v. Wilson, 567 So. 2d 889, 892 (Fla. 1990) In Wilson, while ex-
pressly disapproving of the process, the court nonetheless held that the Public Service
Commission, in delegating some authority to staff to draft a revised supplemental ser-
vice rider, did not inappropriately forfeit its statutory duties, because it properly set
forth the conditions which it expected to see in the revised supplemental service rider.
567 So. 2d at 892. Thus, the staff was merely carrying out a ministerial task to see that
these conditions were met in the revised supplemental service rider. The court found
that all of the conditions which were set forth for approval of the revised supplemental
service rider were addressed by the staff, so they did not exceed the scope of the minis-
terial duties which had been assigned to them. Id.
28. Cf. Jarrell v. State, 576 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (The
court, in dicta, noted that a statute which imposed mandatory consecutive sentences for
some offenses was not an unconstitutional invasion of the core judicial function by the
legislature.). The legislature is also prohibited from usurping the authority of the exec-
utive branch. In Chiles v. Public Service Commission Nominating Council, 573 So. 2d
829, 832-33 (Fla. 1991), the court noted that the Public Service Commission was a
legislatively created entity exercising legislative powers, and the statute governing the
selection of individuals to fill unexpired terms on the Public Service Commission did
not encroach upon the governor's constitutional appointment powers in such cases. See
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(f); Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 16 Fla. L. Weekly
S699 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald, J., dissenting) (In part, the argument was over whether
budget reductions required by a shortfall in revenue was a legislative or executive
function.).
9
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and Loan Ass'n v. Kirian,29 the court found that a statute requiring the
severance of counterclaims for a separate trial in a foreclosure action
concerned a procedural matter.30 The court noted that practice and
procedure matters concern the method of conducting litigation, not the
establishment or regulation of rights or elements of a cause of action.8 1
The court held that the procedural aspects of the statute were unconsti-
tutional to the extent they were inconsistent with rules adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court which made severance of a counterclaim a
matter within the trial judge's discretion.32
Of course, these same principles prohibit the courts from exercis-
ing the core functions of other branches, but the precise lines of what
constitutes core functions has not always been clear. This is especially
so in light of the substantive law-practice and procedure dichotomy.
In State v. Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n,33 the court observed that
the separation of powers doctrine did not "preclude[] the judicial
branch from addressing the constitutionality of the acts of the other
branches" of government.3 4 The court noted that no special policy rea-
sons, based upon separation of powers concerns, existed for excluding
appropriation legislation from the power of the judiciary to determine
the constitutionality of legislation. 5 In Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,36 the
29. 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991).
30. The court rejected the argument that this statute concerned substantive
rights, because it offered greater protection to mortgage lenders. The court found no
evidence that the legislature believed it was substantially altering the rights of the
mortgage lenders. Rather, the legislative history demonstrated that this statute was
adopted as a mere administrative convenience for the mortgage lenders. Id. at 733; see
FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1989).
31. Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 732.
32. Id. at 732-33; accord Curenton v. Chester, 576 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (following Milton v. Leapai, 562 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)); In Re Adoption of a Minor Child, 570 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (harmonizing a statutory time limit with the Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure); Milton v. Leapai, 562 So. 2d 804, 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (time
frame established in settlement offer statute was procedural, and encroached on the
Florida Supreme Court's rule making authority).
33. 580 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 620.
35. Id.; see Chiles, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S699. But see In re Order on Prosecu-
tion of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Cir. Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130,
1136 (Fla. 1990) (strongly asserting that judicial review of appropriation statutes
should be limited to law making procedural issues, and not reach the merits of the
appropriation decisions.); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v. Brooke,
573 So. 2d 363, 368-71 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (expressing great doubt about
[Vol. 16
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court further noted that the common law process of evolving tort reme-
dies in light of new experiences and circumstances did not impermissi-
bly invade the legislative function of regulating the elements of causes
of action.37
C. Accountability: Was the Agency Acting Within the Scope of
Its Authority
The general rule is that administrative agencies may not exercise
any powers not expressly delegated to them, nor exceed the scope of the
authority delegated to them by the legislature. If administrative agen-
cies exceed their limited authority or powers, then their actions are ul-
tra vires, However, the courts have recognized that there are some lim-
ited circumstances when an administrative agency can successfully
claim some implied powers not explicitly provided for in the enabling
statute. ]During the survey period, the courts consistently rejected such
claims and reinforced the limited scope of this exception due to the
possibility that it could be used to impermissibly enlarge or modify the
scope of authority delegated to an administrative agency.38 As the
the courts reviewing budgetary decisions the legislature delegated to the executive
branch). cf. Florida Assoc. of Counties, Inc. v. Department of Admin., 580 So. 2d 641,
644 & n.9 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting any strong presumption that non-
contemporaneous interpretation of constitutional provisions by implementing legislation
was constitutionally correct).
36. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
37. Id. at 283-84.
38. The implied power argument cannot be used to expand the scope of authority
delegated to an administrative agency. It can only be "used to provide additional pow-
ers for implementing agency policy in an area already clearly within its delegated area
of authority. Burris III, supra note 4, at 594; see Rabren v. Department of Professional
Regulation, 568 So. 2d 1283, 1288-89 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that
while the statute does not specifically authorize the Board of Commissioners to adopt
policy through its exercise of adjudicatory power, it is an appropriate implied power
incident to its authority to enter orders as part of its disciplinary actions.). But see
Willner v. Department of Professional Regulation, 563 So. 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (The court noted that an order containing a requirement of a
payment of $60,000 to the Department of Legal Affairs for Consumer Protection Ac-
tivities was an unlawful administrative penalty. While the Department of Professional
Regulation was delegated authority by the Florida legislature to impose conditions on
any grant of probation, it was a "general grant of authority to the ... Department of
Professional Regulation, lacking in sufficient specificity to evince a legislative intent to
authorize . . . [the Department of Professional Regulation] to exact monetary penal-
ties as conditions of probation." (emphasis in original)).
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court noted in Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil
Co., 9 when an administrative agency files an untimely response to a
petition, the hearing officer cannot use his or her discretionary author-
ity to grant or deny permission to file an untimely response as a means
of sanctioning the agency for failing to strictly adhere to the rules.'0
Hearing officers have not been delegated authority to impose such sanc-
tions in any case other than enforcement of discovery orders or "failure
to comply with the pleading requirements of the statute."' 1 Even the
power to impose sanctions in the case of discovery orders was limited."2
Hearing officers cannot dismiss a petition or otherwise functionally de-
prive a party of its right to a hearing as a means of enforcing a discov-
ery order.'
In Cataract Surgery Center v. Health Care Cost Containment
Board," the court held that the administrative rules" proposed by the
Health Care Cost Containment Board concerning the "collection of
data from freestanding ambulatory surgery centers"' 6 were an invalid
39. 577 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
40. The court stated:
[N]o statutory authority, either expressly or reasonably implied therefrom,
empowering DOAH to set a jurisdictional time limitation on the right of
an agency to respond to a petition for fees and costs. To the contrary, we
consider that the division's power to permit a late-filed response is reasona-
bly implied from the very statutes that rule 221-6.035 referenced as au-
thorizing its adoption: Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1989), specifically
subsection (1)(b)4, authorizing parties "to respond, to present evidence
and argument on all issues," and sections 57.111(4)(c) and (d), allowing a
state agency against which a small business party has prevailed to oppose
an application for attorney's fees and costs by affidavit, and requiring the
hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application.
Clearly the two statutes, which the rule was designed to implement, imply
that the agency shall be given a fair opportunity to defend against an ap-
plication for fees and costs. We find nothing in the statutes reasonably
suggesting that if an agency fails to comply with the time limitations re-
quired for its response, a summary final order, regardless of any mitigating
circumstances, must thereafter be entered.
Id. at 992.
41. Id. at 993.
42. Id. at 992-93.
43. Id. at 993.
44. 581 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
45. The challenged proposed rules were 1ON-6.002-06. See FLA. STAT. §
120.54(4) (1989) (permits challenges to proposed rules as ultra vires acts); FLA. AD-
MIN. WEEKLY 1378-83 (March 23, 1990).
46. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360.
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exercise of the authority delegated to it by the legislature. The Board
claimed that the proposed rules were designed to enable it to collect the
data necessary for advising the legislature and the Governor on what
impact the shift from institutional to ambulatory care was having on
health care costs. 47 The court noted that "[a]ny attempt by an [admin-
istrative] agency to extend or enlarge its jurisdiction beyond its statu-
tory authority . . . [must] be declared . . . invalid." '48 In order to as-
sure tha.t administrative agencies do not exceeded its delegated
authority the courts must independently evaluate an administrative
agency's claim that it was acting within the scope of its delegated au-
thority." In reviewing the statutes to determine the scope of an admin-
istrative agency's authority, the courts must look not only at the spe-
cific statutory sections cited by the administrative agency, but also at
the whole statutory scheme which the administrative agency was dele-
gated authority to administer.5 0
The court characterized the rule making authority delegated to the
Health Care Cost Containment Board as limited to where other specific
sections of the statute "confer such rulemaking power."'" The court
47. i'd.; see FLA. STAT. §§ 407.03, .07-.08 (1990).
48. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1361.
49. See Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360-61 (characterizing the judi-
cial review process as only slightly different from the usual deferential approach to an
administrative agency's interpretation of its enabling statute); Burris III, supra note 4,
at 590-94.
50. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360-61. In doing so, the court assumes
it is authorized to examine other statutory sections not noticed in the rule making pro-
cess as the source of the administrative agency's rule making authority for the proposed
rule. This opens up the possibility that a defective notice of a proposed rule, because it
failed to state the appropriate source of statutory authority, could be saved by the court
noting the appropriate statutory section during the judicial review process and declar-
ing the defect in the notice to be harmless error.
51. Id. at 1361. Compare FLA. STAT. § 407.03(1) (1989) ("Adopt, amend, and
repeal rules respecting the exercise of the powers conferred by this chapter which are
applicable to the promulgation of rules.") with Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306
So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an agency
may "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act," the validity of regulations promulgated there-
under will be sustained so long as they are reasonably related to the pur-
poses of the enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious."
Although not explicitly considered by the court, the APA provision that "[n]o agency
has inherent rulemaking authority" may have influenced how the court read these stat-
utory provisions. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(15) (1989).
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rejected the claim that the Board was granted general rule making au-
thority in all areas addressed in its enabling statute. The court also
rejected the Board's claim that other statutory provisions 52 authorized
it to promulgate these information gathering rules. The court found
that when those statutory provisions were read in conjunction with the
rest of the enabling act" it was clear the legislature intended that these
information gathering provisions should apply only to hospitals and
nursing homes. 4 The court observed that the only time any meaningful
mention was made of ambulatory care facilities in the statute was in
the section of the statute that required the Health Care Cost Contain-
ment Board to report to the legislature and the governor on the impact
the shift from institutional to ambulatory care may have on health care
costs. Without more than this mere mention of ambulatory care facili-
ties, the court "decline[d] to infer that an [administrative] agency may
require detailed and expensive reporting from any business which may
have information relevant to the agency's purpose in situations where
the agency is given no other regulatory authority, and where there is no
specific legislative authority to require the collection of such data." 55
Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Board
of Professional Land Surveyors5 concerned the issue of whether a pro-
posed rule was within the scope of authority delegated to an adminis-
trative agency by the legislature. 5' The Board of Professional Land
Surveyors proposed rules designed to establish a uniform system for
determining the ordinary high water line or mark used in determining
the "demarcation between privately-owned uplands and sovereign sub-
merged lands."'5 8 After a hearing was held, the hearing officer entered
a final order finding "most of the contested rules invalid but concluding
that certain specified rules constituted a valid exercise of the Board of
52. FLA. STAT. § 407.03, .07-.08 (1989).
53. See FLA. STAT. §§ 407.02, .025, .05, .09 (1989) (information gathering con-
cerning hospitals); FLA. STAT. §§ 407.30-.34 (1989) (information gathering concerning
nursing homes).
54. "Chapter 407 provides a detailed framework of regulation and reporting re-
quirements for hospitals and nursing homes, but there is no indication of legislative
intent to allow the [Health Care Cost Containment Board] to exercise jurisdiction over
freestanding ambulatory surgery centers." Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1362.
55. Id. at 1363.
56. 566 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
57. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1989) (permits challenges to proposed rules as ultra
vires acts).
58. Board of Professional Land Surveyors, 566 So. 2d at 1359.
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Surveyors' delegated legislative authority."59
The court held that all of the proposed rules were ultra vires acts,
because they exceeded the statutory authority delegated to the Board
of Professional Land Surveyors by the legislature. The legislature dele-
gated to the Board the power to promulgate rules concerning the mini-
mum technical standards designed "to ensure that surveys are accu-
rately measured, complete, and of sufficient quality in those respects to
provide legally defensible real property boundaries." 60 The legislature
never delegated to the Board of Surveyors the power
to define any . . . fixed point [such] as the ordinary high water line
or to circumscribe thereby the legal consequences that flow from
the fixing of such a point. The determination of rights of parties to
a riparian boundary dispute is instead a matter subject ultimately
to judicial resolution under all applicable law. 1
The Board was limited to promulgating rules which assured that the
boundary lines for riparian property are properly recorded by survey-
ors. The Board was never delegated the authority to promulgate these
proposed rules, even if they did precisely recodify the case law concern-
ing the drawing of a line between privately owned land and sovereign
submerged land.62 It is clear, in light of the limited scope of authority
delegated to the Board, that the court correctly concluded that this was
a classic case of an administrative agency acting beyond the scope of
its delegated authority."
59. Id. The hearing officer held that some of the rules were an invalid exercise of
delegated authority, because "they did not precisely restate or embody the case law of
Florida relating to the scope of sovereign submerged land ownership and the concept of
ordinary high water line." Id. at 1360. Conversely, those few rules which the hearing
officer found to be a valid exercise of delegated authority were an accurate restatement
of the decisions of Florida courts concerning the determination of the ordinary high
water line. Id.
60. Id. at 1361 (emphasis in original).
61. Board of Professional Land Surveyors, 566 So. 2d at 1361.
62. Id. The court specifically noted that it was not passing on the hearing of-
ficer's determination of whether the administrative rules properly or improperly re-
stated the case law in Florida concerning where the ordinary high water mark should
be located. Id.
63. "If an [administrative] agency has exceeded its grant of rule making author-
ity or if the rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law imple-
mented, such infractions are among those requiring a conclusion that the proposed rule
is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." Id. at 1360.
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In Browning v. Department of Business Regulation,64 the court
held that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mo-
bile Homes had exceeded the scope of its delegated authority in at-
tempting to enforce contractual recision agreements between a devel-
oper and purchasers. 65 The Division was authorized by statute to seek
and enforce cease and desist orders, impose civil penalties and invoke
other appropriate remedies as authorized by Florida Statutes chapter
498.
In this case, the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums
and Mobile Homes had successfully entered an order compelling the
developer, Browning, to offer all purchasers a right of recision:
It is apparent . . . that once the developer has made an agreement
to rescind with the purchaser, the applicable provisions of Chapter
498 denominate the purchaser as the proper party to resort to court
action to enforce the agreement for recision. The prevailing pur-
chaser is protected against the expense of attorney's fees and litiga-
tion costs incurred in such action. Chapter 498 does not contain
authority for the Division to file suit in court to compel the con-
summation of an agreement for recision made between the pur-
chaser and the developer, and to so construe its provisions would
exceed the authority delegated to the Division by statute. [Admin-
istrative a]gencies do not have the inherent power to enforce pri-
vate consumer remedies unless that authority is clearing apparent
from the statutes.66
Nothing in the final judgment indicated that the Division "ha[d] au-
thority to compel consummation of the recision agreement on behalf of
a lot purchaser after he accepted Browning's offer to rescind. Nor could
the judgment validly have so provided, as such a provision would ac-
64. 574 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
65. The court stated:
[T]he only issue we must decide is whether the trial court, on an applica-
tion to enforce judgment by its contempt proceedings, is authorized to
compel the developer to refund the purchase price to the rescinding pur-
chasers or whether each purchaser must personally seek enforcement
before the court once they have accepted the developer's offer to rescind.
Resolution of this issue depends on the nature and extent of the remedy of
recision upon which the [administrative] agency order and, consequently,
the final judgment was entered in this case.
Id. at 192.
66. Id. at 193.
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cord to the Division powers beyond that authorized by statutes. '67 In
this case, Browning complied with the administrative order. He did so
by "offering recision and entering into private recision agreements with
those accepting that offer, enforcement of these private agreements re-
mains up to the purchaser as authorized in [section] 498.061." 68 Ac-
cordingly,, the circuit court did not have authority to grant the Division
of Florida, Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes' request that
the court use contempt powers to enforce the recision agreements
reached between Browning and the purchasers. 9
In Schiffman v. Department of Professional Regulation,0 the
court held that the Board of Pharmacy exceeded its delegated authority
when it attempted through a nonrule policy to permanently bar Schiff-
man from petitioning for reinstatement of his license as a pharmacist.7 1
The court relied upon Beam Distilling Co. v. Department of Profes-
sional Regulation,2 which interpreted a similar statute that regulated
the licensing of nurses, in reading the statute as having only delegated
67. Id. at 194. The court noted that if the Division of Florida Land Sales, Con-
dominiums and Mobile Homes was concerned that the developer would not comply
with the recision agreements, then it should have required the developer to establish a
trust fund for that purpose. Id. at 194 n.2.
68. Browning, 574 So. 2d at 194.
69. Id. The court noted that,
the circuit court in this case was empowered to decline enforcement of any
conditional penalty imposed by the . . .[Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums and Mobile Homes'] order that it found was inappropriate
in view of the circumstances shown to exist at the time the matter came
before it, including changes that occurred since the administrative order
had been entered.
Id. The circuit court had the power to do this, because it was expressly authorized by
statute to determine whether the penalty imposed was appropriate. Such is not the case
when an administrative order is being reviewed by an appellate court. Compare FLA.
STAT. § 120.69(5) (1989) with FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1989). When the circuit court
exercised this power, then the standard of judicial review for an appellate court was
"whether the [circuit] court abused its discretion under the circumstances shown by
the evidence." Browning, 574 So. 2d at 195. Clearly, the circuit court had the authority
to determine whether Browning still had the means to carry out the recision imposed
by the administrative order.
The court also noted that in appellate review of a contempt citation order issued to
enforce an administrative order, the decision of the circuit court to impose or deny the
contempt request should only be overturned when it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 195.
70. 581 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
71. See infra notes 259-97 and accompanying text (discussion of nonrule policy
issues).
72. 5.30 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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to the Board of Pharmacy the power to regulate pharmacist licensing
for the purpose of protecting the public from those who are not quali-
fied to practice the profession. This legislative purpose was not fur-
thered by permanently banning a rehabilitated and qualified individual
from seeking reinstatement of his license. The court made it clear that
any attempt by the Board of Pharmacy to impose such a sanction,
whether by nonrule policy or by administrative rule, would be an act
beyond its delegated authority.73
In Department of Natural Resources v. Wingfield Development
Co.,74 the court considered whether the Department of Natural Re-
sources rules75 concerning what constitutes "under construction" were
a valid exercise of delegated authority.76 The administrative rules pro-
vided that a project was considered under construction as long as there
was continuous physical activity on the project and no period of inactiv-
ity longer than six months. The court found that these requirements
imposed by administrative rules were an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority.77 The statute specifically exempted from the re-
quirements associated with a coastal construction control line any pro-
ject under construction prior to its establishment. The statute permitted
the Department of Natural Resources to make a determination of
whether a project was under construction only once-at the time it es-
tablished the coastal construction control line. The statute did not au-
thorize the Department to continually reexamine the question of
whether an exempt project was under construction. Because the admin-
istrative rules, especially as interpreted by the Department, authorized
such a continual process of review, they were an ultra vires exercise of
delegated authority that "enlarge[d] and modifie[d]" the scope of au-
thority delegated to the Department by the legislature. 78 The legisla-
ture must act before the Departure can impose such a scheme on ex-
empt projects.79
73. Schiffman, 581 So. 2d at 1379.
74. 581 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
75. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.16B-33.002(56), .004(1) (1991).
76. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 197. The court also considered a nonrule
policy issue. See infra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
77. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 197.
78. Id. at 198; see FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(c) (1989).
79. Judge Schwartz argued, in his dissent, that the term "under construction," as
used in the statute, envisioned an ongoing process of review to determine if the exemp-
tion from the coastal construction control line permit requirements was justified. He
concluded that the legislature could not have intended for the statute to allow a con-
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The decisions in Puckett Oil Co., Cataract Surgery Center, Board
of Professional Land Surveyors, Browning, Schiffman, and Wingfield
Development Co. are examples of courts independently evaluating the
question of whether administrative agencies have appropriately limited
themselves to those powers specifically delegated and reasonably im-
plied from the statutory scheme.80 The non-deferential approach to ju-
dicial review in this area is designed to assure that the ultra vires doc-
trine does not become as ineffective a check on the exercise of
discretion claimed by administrative agencies as the delegation doctrine
has on the scope of discretionary authority the legislature can delegate
to administrative agencies. 8'
D. Procedural Due Process"2
The constitutional guarantee of procedural due process is designed
to assure that the government does not arbitrarily deprive a person of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. This is accom-
plished by requiring the government, in many cases, to provide an indi-
vidual with an opportunity for a hearing to determine the validity of
the government's decision. 3
The initial issue in all cases involving procedural due process
claims is 'whether a constitutionally protected liberty or property inter-
est is at stake which requires some type of hearing. If no such interest
is at stake, then procedural due process requirements do not constrain
the government's ability to act. The process of identifying a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest is a relatively easy task, because it
usually involves a determination of whether a fundamental right such
tractor to remain secure in its exemption by "merely begin[ning] construction on the
day before the line . . . [was] fixed, cease [construction] the day after, and wait, pre-
sumably for decades, until it secure[d] financing to complete the structure." In re-
jecting this absurd result the Department of Natural Resources merely interpreted the
statute in a reasonable manner. The court should defer to such a reasonable interpreta-
tion. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 199 (Schwartz, J., dissenting); see infra 576-83
and accompanying text (discussion of when courts should defer to an interpretation of
a statute adopted by an administrative agency).
80. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
81. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 590-94.
82. See generally FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 1.21-1.46 (The Florida
Bar 3d ed. 1990)
83. Of course the government may statutorily grant hearings in cases when none
would be required by the Florida or United States Constitutions. E.g., FLA. STAT. §
120.54(3), (4) (1989).
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as freedom of speech or privacy is at stake in the governmental decision
making process." However, determining whether a constitutionally
protected property interest exists is more complex, because it turns on
whether state laws or procedures recognize a property interest of con-
stitutional magnitude:
Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. [T]hey
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits. 85
On this basis, state law or governmental conduct only creates a
constitutionally protected property interest when the Roth/Sindermann
mutuality of expectation test is satisfied: 86 "To have a property interest
in a [governmental] benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it. '' 87 "A legitimate entitlement is established (1) by the state's uni-
lateral promise of benefit in its laws or administrative rules or (2) by
the conduct of the state and the individual which creates 'mutually ex-
plicit understandings that support . . . [the] claim of entitlement.' "88
In two cases during the survey period, Florida courts apparently used
these principles in finding there was or was not a constitutionally pro-
tected interest at stake. What was remarkable about these cases was
not their outcomes, but rather, that the courts did not make explicit
reference to these well-established principles in resolving the issues in
84. Burris I, supra note 4, at 323 n.167. However, in some circumstances even
the determination of whether a constitutional protected liberty interest was at stake can
be difficult, because the degree of deprivation may not be sufficient to persuade the
court that an invasion of a constitutionally protected liberty interest occurred. Compare
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) with Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
85. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1972) (patterns of conduct between the parties can
establish a constitutionally protected property interest); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
86. Roth, 408 U.S. at 564; Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 593.
87. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
88. Burris III, supra note 4, at 595 (quoting Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601.).
This standard is not always easily satisfied. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976).
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this area. 9
In Spiegel v. University of South Florida,90 the court found that
the University of South Florida's contract with Dr. Spiegel, providing
that he was to be Chair of the Department of Orthopedics and Reha-
bilitation, was sufficient to create a constitutionally protected property
right.9 1 The court noted that his removal from that position might well
stigmatize him and harm his reputation and ability to obtain employ-
ment in other places. The court considered this to be an infringement
on his constitutionally protected liberty interests.92 Therefore, he was
entitled to a hearing prior to being deprived of this benefit. The court
ordered him reinstated as Chair of the Department, but left the door
open for the University to try to remove him after it gave him notice
and an opportunity to be heard.9"
In Man Poyck v. Dugger," the court recognized that a prisoner
had a constitutionally protected liberty interest" "in not being arbitrar-
ily removed from the general prison population," '96 and placed in a high
security cell under twenty-four hour lockdown status.97 Because Van
Poy, in his habeas corpus petition alleged that no administrative hear-
ing was ever held, the court held that the trial court must hold an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine whether the prison officials acted arbi-
trarily in placing Van Poyck in special confinement or whether it was
done for legitimate penological reasons. 8
89. See Florida Sugar Cane League v. State, 580 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
90. 555 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
91. 1d. at 429.
92. 1d.; see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (constitutionally
protected liberty interest at stake in cases of reputational injury). But see Paul v. Da-
vis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (such harms will not be assumed to exist, they must be al-
leged, and if disputed, proved).
93. Spiegel, 555 So. 2d at 429-30.
94. 582 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
95. The court also recognized that the conduct of the prison officials could consti-
tute an unconstitutional form of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 109.
96. Id.
97. Because Van Poyck was sentenced to death for murdering a correctional of-
ficer while aiding in a prison escape, the relevant prison population was death row.
However, death row prisoners were not normally subject to the special administrative
treatment Van Poyck was receiving. Id.
98. See Id. at 109-10. The right to such a hearing is dependent on state law
creating constraints on the discretion of prison officials in making such decisions. If
there are none, then there is no need to hold a hearing. See Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976).
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If the court finds there was a constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest at stake, it must determine whether the procedural
protections, if any, provided by the state were constitutionally suffi-
cient. Perhaps the relatively few cases addressing the threshold issue of
whether a constitutionally protected interest was at stake, and the con-
clusory analysis applied by the courts when ignoring these established
doctrinal inquiries, can be explained by the fact that courts and the
State of Florida generally are willing to concede the existence of such
an interest, and focus primarily on whether the procedural process of-
fered was constitutionally sufficient."' The nature of the constitutionally
mandated procedural due process protection will vary depending on the
context. In Mathews v. Eldridge,10° the Supreme Court formally
adopted a balancing approach to this question:
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of
the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be af-
fected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and the proba-
ble value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.101
During the survey period, the courts decided only a few cases concern-
ing the constitutional adequacy of the procedure provided by the state.
Again, as in other survey periods, "[w]hat is remarkable about these is
not the results in each instance, but the fact that the courts ignored the
Mathews v. Eldridge paradigm for deciding such questions."102
Clearly, if no hearing was held, either pre- or post-deprivation, of
a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, then a violation
99. The decline in the number of cases which raised significant procedural due
process issues could also be attributed to the limited success such claims have had in
the appellate courts at both the state and federal levels. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW,
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 30 & n.80 (1985).
100. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
101. Id. at 334-35.
102. Burris III, supra note 4, at 597. See, e.g., Florida Sugar Cane League v.
State, 580 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Conservancy, Inc. v. A.
Vernon Allen Builder, Inc., 580 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); J.B.
Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 580 So. 2d 621, 624 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process has oc-
curred.10 3 But if an emergency exists, then a post-deprivation hearing
may be all that procedural due process requires.1 04 In Garcia v. Depart-
ment of Professional Regulation,"0 5 the court summarily concluded
that the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, governing the
emergency suspension of professional licenses,10 6 on their face did not
violate the constitutional requirements of procedural due process.07
While not explicitly stated by the court, this result occurred because in
light of the emergency, the APA'06 offered an adequate post-depriva-
tion remedy.
Procedural due process further requires that a party receive ade-
quate notice of the charges so he or she may prepare a defense.' 0 9 In
Willner v. Department of Professional Regulation,'" the court noted
correctly that an administrative agency may not impose fines or other
sanctions, for violations which were not charged in an administrative
complaint."' The court failed to explicitly set forth the reasons why a
procedure which did not provide notice was constitutionally and statu-
torily defective, but it is clear that the APA"2 and the due process
clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions require such
notice."'
Procedural due process also requires that a party have an opportu-
nity to present his or her defense to an impartial decision maker.1 4 In
Ridgewood Properties, Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs,"5
103. See Brevard County v. Hammel, 575 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
104. See e.g., North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
105. 581 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
106. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(9), .60(8) (1989).
107. Garcia, 581 So. 2d at 961.
108. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1989).
109. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
110. 563 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
111. The court also noted that any attempt by an administrative agency to im-
pose an enhanced fine structure for violations which occurred prior to the date that the
new fine structure became applicable was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States and Florida Constitutions. Id. at 806; see U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 10; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
112. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(2) (1989).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
114. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; see Burris I, supra note 4, at 330-31.
115. 562 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1990); see Burris III, supra note 4, at 596-97 (brief
discussion of the decision by the First District Court of Appeal in this case).
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the Florida Supreme Court considered a certified question from the
First District Court of Appeal of whether it is "a violation of a party's
due process rights in an administrative hearing for the head of a de-
partment to appear as an expert witness when that same department
head later enters the final order in the case?"11 The Department of
Community Affairs notified Ridgewood Properties that it must submit
a required impact statement for approval before proceeding with a
planned office park development on a piece of property in Maitland,
Florida. Ridgewood Properties responded that it did not need to file the
required impact statement for two reasons."' At the administrative
hearing, the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs testi-
fied as an expert witness. He was the only witness for the Department
of Community Affairs. The hearing officer relied upon his testimony in
the recommended order to resolve disputed factual issues. The Secre-
tary adopted as the final order essentially all of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the hearing officer's recommended order.
The supreme court acknowledged that aggregation of functions in
administrative agencies meant that the judicial model for an impartial
decision maker in administrative hearings need not be followed. The
aggregation of functions was not constitutionally fatal to an adminis-
trative agency head performing the role of impartial decision maker in
most cases." 8 However, this was anything but a normal case. The court
characterized the role played by the Secretary of the Department of
Community Affairs as that of "prosecutor, witness, and ultimate judge
of the facts and the law. Most significantly, . . . [the] Secretary...
necessarily passed upon his own evidence." 9 To approve the hearing
116. Ridgewood Properties, Inc., 562 So. 2d at 322.
117. First, "the development rights in the land had vested prior to the passage of
the [Development of Regional Impact] Statute" so this new statutory requirement
should not govern the development of the land. Id. Second, the Department of Commu-
nity Affairs' policies concerning when a landowner must file a development regional
impact statement for approval were unpromulgated rules found in a series of letters to
other developers, and were invalid because they had never been adopted as administra-
tive rules, as required by the APA. Id. at 322-23 & n.2.
118. Combination of "the fact-seeking and judicial functions in the same office
does not automatically violate due process." Id. at 323. Nor would such a combination
violate the principle of separation of powers. See, e.g., McDonald v. Department of
Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Florida Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 129 So. 876 (Fla. 1930).
119. The court noted that the Secretary of the Department of Community Af-
fairs had "signed the notice of violation," "was in charge of the attorneys prosecuting
the alleged violation," "was the Department's only witness in its case in chief," "re-
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officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law, he had to conclude that
his own testimony was competent and substantial. 120 Even with the best
of intentions, this can hardly be characterized as an unbiased, critical
review. "12 1 Rather, it was clear the Secretary had a predisposition to
reject the contravening evidence and this deprived him of the attributes
of an impartial decision maker as required by the procedural due pro-
cess clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions. As a gen-
eral rule, if the head of an administrative agency testified at the hear-
ing about a disputed material issue of fact, then the recommended
order must be reviewed by a neutral third party, not the head of the
administrative agency nor one of his employees.2
1. Access to Transcripts of Administrative Hearings
One final aspect of due process touched upon during the survey
period concerned the availability of hearing transcripts. The APA pro-
vides that an administrative agency must maintain an accurate and
complete account of all testimony and other evidence that makes up the
record in a formal administrative hearing. 23 In two cases during the
survey period, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether an indi-
gent party in an administrative hearing had a statutory or constitu-
tional right to a free transcript of the hearing so that he or she could
seek judicial review of the decision by the administrative agency. 2 4
Gretz v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission12 5 con-
viewed the hearing officer's findings," and "issued the final order." Ridgewood Proper-
ties, Inc., 562 So. 2d at 323.
120. The Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs testified at the
hearing over objections, and his testimony provided the only basis for finding compe-
tent, substantial evidence to support the position ultimately adopted in the final order,
rejecting the contravening evidence offered by the opposing party. Id. at 324.
121. Id.; see also McIntyre v. Tucker, 490 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
122. Ridgewood Properties, Inc., 562 So. 2d at 324 & n.4. The APA provides
that when a head of an administrative agency has been disqualified from performing
this review function, then the governor should appoint an individual not associated with
the administrative agency to serve as a substitute decision maker. Id. at 324; See FLA.
STAT. § 120.71 (1989).
123. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.57(l)(b)(6), (7) (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2)(b)
(1989) (nature of the record in an informal hearing).
124. Without a record, judicial review of an administrative order is, in most
cases, precluded. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(4) (1989).
125. 5,72 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1991).
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cerned whether administrative rules126 which required a person seeking
unemployment compensation to pay a fee for the preparation of a tran-
script so that he or she could seek judicial review of the administrative
agency's order was a valid exercise of the authority delegated to it by
the legislature. The court found the rules were invalid because they
were contrary to a provision in the enabling statute governing the un-
employment compensation system.1 27 The court read the statute as
prohibiting the Unemployment Appeals Commission from charging
fees for any service it provided. 2 This was very broad language
designed to assure that claimants had adequate access to the unemploy-
ment compensation system. 29 The court reasoned that the duty im-
posed on administrative agencies by the APA to make transcripts avail-
able to a party upon request at no more than the actual cost of
reproducing such transcript,130 and the enabling statute which provided
that Unemployment Compensation Appeals Commission may not
charge a fee for its services,18 1 established the actual cost of a tran-
script for claimants in an unemployment circumstance as zero.132
In Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 33
the court considered the issue of whether a statute or the Florida Con-
stitution required that an indigent party in a non-criminal administra-
tive hearing was entitled to a free transcript of the administrative pro-
ceeding so that he or she could seek judicial review of the
administrative order. " Prior to 1980, the courts interpreted Florida
Statute section 57.081 as not granting an indigent party a right to a
free transcript in either a judicial, civil, or an administrative proceed-
ing.185 In 1980, the legislature amended this statutory provision; how-
126. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. 38E-3.003(2), .009(3) (1991).
127. Gretz, 572 So. 2d at 1385; see FLA. STAT. § 443.041(2)(a) (1987).
128. Whether the service was mandated by statute or voluntarily undertaken did
not matter. Both were covered under the statute. Gretz, 572 So. 2d at 1386.
129. Id.
130. FLA. STAT. § 120.571(1)(b)(6) (1985) (currently codified as FLA. STAT. §
120.57(1)(b)(7) (1987)); see Gertz, 572 So. 2d at 1386.
131. FLA. STAT. § 443.041 (1985).
132. Gertz, 572 So. 2d at 1386. "It is illogical to assume that the legislature
prohibited charging the claimant for some fees in order to facilitate their ability to
obtain judicial review, but intended to allow charging of a fee that would essentially
prevent the claimant from pursuing that review." Id.
133. 573 So 2d 320 (Fla. 1991).
134. Id. at 321-22; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (due process); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21
(access to courts); FLA. STAT. § 57.081 (1985).
135. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 322; Harrell v. Department of Health & Rehabilita-
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ever, the exact effect of the amendment was unclear.18 6 The court
found that the purpose of the statute was to assure that any indigent
person before an administrative agency received the services of the jus-
tice system without charge. The obligation of an administrative agency
to maintain a complete record of a proceeding'8 7 was one of those at-
tributes of the justice system which section 57.081(1) meant to be
available without charge.'3 8 "Thus, . . . [administrative] agencies must
supply transcripts, and as indigents, the petitioners are entitled to re-
ceive them without charge."' 8 9
Concerning the due process claim, the court noted in dicta that
there was no reason to read the Florida Due Process Clause differently
from that in the United States Constitution. The United States Su-
preme Court in Ortwein v. Schwab,140 found that requiring an indigent
person to pay a modest filing fee was rationally related to off-setting
the expense of operating a court system, and as such, it was not a viola-
tion of due process. The Florida Supreme Court saw no reason to dis-
tinguish between the payment of a modest filing fee and payment of
the cost of a transcript. Thus, the court concluded that the indigent
parties who had received an evidentiary hearing on their claims without
cost would not "be constitutionally entitled to be furnished with a free
transcript to assist in the prosecution of their appeals.""' Essentially,
this dicta invited the legislature to reconsider its statutory policy, by
making it clear that there was no constitutional requirement compelling
the current policy.
tive Servs., 361 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bower v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
136. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 322.
137. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(7) (1989).
138. The court believed this was a different rationale from Gretz which it read as
limited to those circumstances where the legislature, by statute, had established the
value of the service rendered in providing a transcript was zero. Smith, 573 So. 2d at
323.
139. Id. But see id. at 325 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The court also noted that this meant indigent parties seeking judicial review of
an administrative hearing order had greater rights than when they were appealing from
a trial court judgment in a civil case. The court noted that this disparity was a matter
of legislative concern. Id.
140. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
141. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 324; see id. at 325 (McDonald, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The court also noted that filing fees, or the costs incident to
seeking judicial review such as preparing a transcript, would not be unreasonable re-
straints on the access to the courts. Id. at 323; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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Justice Ehrlich agreed with the majority's conclusion concerning
the reading of section 57.081, but dissented from the majority's conclu-
sion that there was no constitutional guarantee that an indigent party
was entitled to a free transcript of an administrative proceeding so that
he or she could seek judicial review of the administrative agency's or-
der. 142 He noted that there was a critical distinction between the fed-
eral constitutional requirement of due process and the due process
guarantee found in the Florida Constitution. The Florida Supreme
Court has consistently held that when the legislature chooses an admin-
istrative decision process, it must also include a right to judicial review
in order to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. 4 Be-
cause judicial review of an administrative order can occur only if the
transcript of the appropriate portions of the administrative hearing are
available, the transcript becomes a necessary element of access to the
judicial review process. An indigent person would be functionally pro-
hibited from seeking judicial review unless there was a constitutional
guarantee to a transcript of the proceedings; the majority erred in not
so holding.' 44
142. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 325 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
143. Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Scholastic
Systems, Inc. v. Leloup, 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974)).
144. Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ehrlich
also believed that the right of reasonable access to courts guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution would be denied if an indigent party did not have a transcript of the ad-
ministrative proceeding made available at no charge. Without the transcript, an indi-
gent party is deprived of any meaningful form of judicial review. When an indigent
party wanted to seek judicial review but could not because of the cost of obtaining a
transcript of the administrative hearing, then an unreasonable burden was placed on
his or her right of access to the court system. Because the judicial review process pro-
vided for under the APA is the first opportunity for the individuals participating in an
administrative process to have access to the courts, if they are deprived of a free tran-
script, they are deprived of all access to the courts. Such is not the case when individu-
als have access to a trial court as an initial matter, and the sole question is whether
they should have access to an appellate review process. In such a case, the individual
has had access to a court under the Florida Constitution, but in the case of an adminis-
trative hearing, such initial access does not occur until the appellate process. Id. at 326
(Erlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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E. Standing 45
1. Formal Administrative Hearing
There continues to be a substantial amount of litigation over
whether a party has standing to invoke the APA formal hearing pro-
cess." 6 Perhaps this is explained by the fact that standing constraints
permit administrative agencies, and sometimes others, to avoid many
difficult substantive issues.147 Whatever the reason for the continued
litigation of these issues, the test for judging when a person is entitled
to a formal hearing is well-settled. 4 8 The two part test set forth in
Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation"9
for resolving standing issues remains the standard used by courts in
determining whether a person has standing to request a formal hearing
145. See generally Dore I, supra note 4; Dubbin & Dubbin, supra note 4; Burris
III, supra note 4, at 601-06; Burris II, supra note 4, at 742; Burris I, supra note 4, at
334-43. In City of Destin v. Department of Transportation, the court held, in part, that
the question of standing to invoke a formal hearing under the APA can be waived by
an administrative agency failing to object on that basis in a timely fashion. 541 So. 2d
123, 127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
146. Any question concerning standing may be waived if a party failed to prop-
erly preserve the issue for judicial review. See Florida Assoc. of Counties, Inc. v. De-
partment of Admin., 580 So. 2d 641, 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Friends of the
Hatchineia, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 580 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (by implication).
147. Cf Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1267 v. Benevolent Assoc. of
Coachmen, Inc., 576 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam). In Amal-
gamated, the court concluded that the Florida Public Employees Relation Commission
improperly permitted the Benevolent Association of Coachmen, Inc. to initiate a com-
plaint against Broward County's Division of Mass Transit concerning the collection of
a special assessment from employees' wages. The court reached this decision, because
the Association of Coachmen failed to allege, establish, or approve that it was being
harmed, or that its members were being harmed by the alleged unlawful special assess-
ments. The court noted that while the record in this case properly established the spe-
cial assessment was in fact illegal, because the action was brought by a party who
lacked standing, the decision of the Florida Public Employees Relation Commission
must be reversed. Id. at 380.
148. A party is entitled to a formal hearing under the APA if "the substantial
interests cf a party are determined by an agency . . . whenever the proceeding involves
a disputed issue of material fact." FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989). The formal hearing
requirement does not govern student disciplinary action in the state universities. FLA.
STAT. § 120.57(5) (1989).
149. 406 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 1359
(Fla. 1982).
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under section 120.57. This test requires that a party,
must show (1) that he will suffer injury in fact which is of suffi-
cient immediacy to entitle him to a section 120.57 hearing, and (2)
that his substantial injury is of a type or nature which the proceed-
ing is designed to protect. The first aspect of the test deals with the
degree of injury. The second deals with the nature of the injury. 10
After a person has established that he or she standing, then he or she
must also allege and prove that there is a disputed issue of material
fact to resolve before an administrative agency is required to hold a
formal hearing. 151 Two cases which applied this test in determining
standing issues during the survey period are worthy of special note.
Town of Palm Beach v. Department of Natural Resources152 con-
cerned the decision by the Department of Natural Resources that no
permit was needed for the 2000 Condominium to carry out its plan for
trimming and maintenance activities of salt water resistant dune vege-
tation on property located seaward of the coastal construction control
line.15 3 The two adjacent property owners'" and the Sierra Club 55
challenged this decision, and petitioned for a hearing under section
120.57 to resolve the dispute. The Department of Natural Resources
denied the petition, holding that these parties "lacked standing to re-
quest a formal hearing because they had failed to show a substantial
interest in the outcome of the hearing . . .[as they] had failed to show
how they were affected by the Department [of Natural Resources'] de-
termination of its jurisdiction." 56
150. Id. at 482.
151. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989). If there is no disputed material factual issue,
then the person is entitled only to an informal hearing. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2) (1989).
152. 577 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
153. Id. at 1384-85. Finding a lack of jurisdiction was premised on the determi-
nation that the planned activities did not "involve excavation or removal and destruc-
tion of native salt resistant vegetation." Id. at 1385. The court rejected this reading of
the scope of the jurisdiction of the Department of Natural Resources. Id. at 1385-86.
154. The Town of Palm Beach and Mr. Darwin both alleged that they owned
property which would be adversely effected by the trimming and maintenance activities
of salt water resistant dune vegetation by 2000 Condominium. Id. at 1385.
155. The Sierra Club alleged that its members used the beaches adjacent to the
property, were interested in preserving beaches, and that the trimming and mainte-
nance activities of salt water resistant dune vegetation would adversely effect these
interests. Id.
156. Town of Palm Beach, 577 So. 2d at 1385.
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The: court held that the Department of Natural Resources erred in
concluding that these parties lacked standing to invoke the section
120.57 hearing. The court applied the Agrico Chemical Co. two part
test. The court found that the first element, whether the necessary de-
gree of injury in fact was alleged, was satisfied because the denial of
jurisdiction would allow the planned trimming and maintenance activi-
ties to immediately go forward without any further governmental re-
view or permits at either the state or local level, 15 7 which allegedly
would result in an adverse impact on the adjacent property and the
beach areas themselves. 158 The court found that the second element,
whether the nature of the alleged injury was within the zone of interest
protected by the statute, was satisfied, because the statutes and admin-
istrative rules were designed to protect the beaches and dunes from
harm, which was exactly what the parties alleged was about to hap-
pen.' 59 The court noted that given the scope of the jurisdiction granted
the Department of Natural Resources by the legislature, the determi-
nation of whether the Department of Natural Resources properly found
it did not have jurisdiction in this case was dependent on disputed fac-
tual issues which a section 120.57 hearing could resolve. 60°
While the test in Agrico Chemical Co. generally governs standing
issues in some circumstances, the statutorily designated status of a per-
son or entity will confer standing even if the requirements of Agrico
Chemical Co. could not be satisfied. In Phibro Resources Corp. v. De-
partment' of Environmental Regulation,'6' the court reversed the order
157. Id. at 1387-88.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1388. The court distinguished Town of Palm Beach from Grove Isle,
Ltd. v. Bayshore Homeowners' Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
rev. denied, 430 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1983), where the court held that a party lacked
standing to challenge an administrative agency's determination that it lacked jurisdic-
tion, when the injury alleged would arise from completion of the project, not the ad-
ministrative agency's decision. The court read the decision in Groves Isle, Ltd. as lim-
ited to circumstances where the actual activity which was alleged would cause injury,
would be subject to further state or local review or permit requirements. Only in such
cases did the denial of jurisdiction have such an attenuated relationship to the alleged
injury so that the party would lack standing. However, such was not the case in Town
of Palm Beach, because the court found that the denial of jurisdiction would allow the
planned trimming and maintenance activities to immediately go forward without any
further governmental review or permits on either the state or local level. 577 So. 2d at
1387-88.
160. Id. at 1386.
161. 579 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (modified on denial of motion
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of the Department of Environmental Regulation denying Phibro Re-
sources and Solomon, Inc."' a formal administrative hearing concern-
ing consent orders which the Department of Environmental Regulation
intended to enter into with Mobil and Conserv.
Three different corporations, Mobil, Phibro Resources, and Con-
serv, operated a facility at different periods over several years. In 1985,
the Department of Environmental Regulation notified them "that pol-
lutants exceeding levels permissible in class II groundwaters had been
detected" at the facility.16 In 1989, the Department notified Phibro
Resources that it "intended to enter into consent orders with Conserv
and Mobil" concerning liability for the remedial measures needed at
the facility.1 4 Phibro Resources requested a formal hearing on the ade-
quacy of these consent orders. The Department held that Phibro Re-
sources lacked standing, because it "had failed to show a substantial
interest sufficient to warrant the initiation of a section 120.57 proceed-
ing in that it had neither demonstrated injury in fact of sufficient im-
mediacy to warrant a hearing, nor . . . shown that its affected interest
was of the type or nature . . [the statute] was designed to protect."'"
The Department claimed that any injury allegation was specula-
tive for two reasons. First, Phibro Resources would suffer no injury un-
less three contingencies occurred: 1) the consent orders, at some un-
known time in the future, would fail to resolve the pollution problems;
2) the Department would seek to hold Phibro Resources liable at that
point; and 3) the Department would succeed in doing so. Second, any
defenses or objections that Phibro Resources could raise to the consent
orders could be asserted at a hearing held after the first two contingen-
cies had occurred.' 6" The court observed that the Department's position
would be correct but for the fact that it did not properly understand
the nature of the proceeding at the time of its decision. Phibro Re-
for rehearing en banc). On rehearing, the court refused to withdraw its opinion, even
though the parties had reached a settlement of all the issues and requested a voluntary
dismissal while the rehearing petition was pending. Id. at 125.
162. Solomon, Inc. was the corporate parent of Phibro. The court held that the
request by Solomon, Inc. for a hearing was not untimely filed, and even if it was, that
there was no prejudice to any party in permitting it to file a petition for a hearing
twenty-one days late. Id. at 124; see infra notes 313-328 and accompanying text.
163. Philbro, 579 So. 2d at 119.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 120.
166. Id. But see id. at 125, 126-27 (Barfield, J., dissenting) (finding that this
offered more than adequate protection of Phibro's interests).
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sources was not seeking access to the administrative process. It was
already a party, because it,
was made a party to the proceeding by statute, in that it was
served with a written notice of a warning which specified the provi-
sion of the statute and rule alleged to have been violated and the
facts alleged to constitute a violation. [Both the statute and admin-
istrative rules] provide that a person served with a notice of viola-
tion . . . shall be entitled to a section 120.57 administrative hear-
ing, within twenty days following service of notice; otherwise the
person's right to an administrative hearing shall be deemed
waived.1 1
7
Having been designated a party, Phibro Resources did not need to
demonstrate that its interests would be "determined in the proceeding
(the execution of the two consent orders), so long as the interests of a
specific party or parties were there determined." 1 8 Clearly the consent
orders would determine the interests of Mobil and Conserv, and there
was no reason for holding that Phibro Resources, a party, lacked stand-
ing.6 9 Further, because the consent orders assumed there was the pos-
sibility of future liability for Phibro Resources, the orders "had the po-
tential of affecting the substantial interests of Phibro [Resources]. '' 17°
The Department of Environmental Regulation thus erred in concluding
to the contrary.17 1
167. Philbro, 579 So. 2d at 122. The court specifically rejected the claim by the
Department that the notice of violation had no impact on Phibro Resources Corpora-
tion's substantial interests. The notice served as a warning and triggered the time
frame for requesting an administrative hearing.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 123. The court noted that the claimed interests were not just potential
economic injury. It included potential administrative and criminal liability for any
wrongs it may have committed. As such, it had a real interest in assuring that the
consent orders provided an adequate means for "stem[ming] further migration of con-
taminated groundwater" from the facility. Id.
171. The court suggested, in a portion of the opinion deleted on rehearing, that if
the Department of Environmental Regulation wanted to proceed with its consent orders
without implicating the interests of Phibro, then it should dismiss the notice of violation
against Phibro with prejudice, or provide it with an "unconditional release from any
future liability." Philbro, 579 So. 2d at 124; see id. at 125.
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2. Standing in Other Contexts
a. Certificate of Need
The decision in AMISUB v. Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services 17 concerned whether a hospital located in another dis-
trict could challenge the certificate of need decision by the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services for an adjoining district.17 3 The
statute provided: "Existing health care facilities may initiate [proceed-
ings challenging the issuance of a certificate of need] upon a showing
that an established program will be substantially effected by the issu-
ance of a certificate of need to a competing facility program within the
same district."' 4 The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices rejected AMISUB's challenge to the certificate of need issuance
in the adjoining district, because AMISUB's health care facility,
Northridge Medical Center, was physically located in another district.
AMISUB admitted its facility was located in another district, but
claimed that it operated a program in both districts because its facility
was located near the line dividing the two districts. Because of its loca-
tion, the Center in fact functionally served patients from both districts,
and therefore should have been considered an established program in
both districts.
The court rejected this claim for the following reasons. First, the
purpose of this statute was to limit the number of health care providers
who could challenge certificate of need decisions. The court believed
the reading of the statute suggested by AMISUB would be contrary to
this statutory purpose, as it would expand, not limit, the circumstances
under which a health care facility would have standing to challenge a
certificate of need decision.
Second and more importantly, the court noted that an administra-
tive agency's interpretation of a statute which it was primarily respon-
sible for administering was entitled to great weight. It should not be
overturned by a court unless the interpretation is "clearly errone-
172. 577 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
173. The court also rejected the request by the Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services for an award of attorney's fees for pursuing a frivolous appeal of the
administrative order. The court found that the appeal was not frivolous, because it was
not so devoid of merit on the face of the record that there was little or no prospect of
success. Id. at 650.
174. FLA. STAT. § 381.709(5)(b) (1989).
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ous."'17 5 Both the hearing officer and the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services had interpreted the statute as not authorizing a
challenge to a certificate of need just because a facility in an adjacent
district may have its patient pool diminished. The court considered this
"a permissible interpretation of the statutory language."'1 6 As such,
the interpretation adopted by the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services was not clearly erroneous; rather, it was reasonable.
Third, the court found that the definition of "program" used in the
statute should be that ordinarily and commonly used, because neither
the legislature nor the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices had given it a special definition. Under the ordinary definition of
"program," AMISUB's Northridge Medical Center would not qualify
because it was not physically performing procedures anywhere within
the adjacent district. 7 Therefore, Northridge Medical Center did not
have standing to contest the certificate of need decision by the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
St. Joseph Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,17 8 concerned the issues of whether the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services properly denied St. Joseph Hospital's re-
quest for an administrative hearing on a certificate of need application,
and whether the order granting such a certificate of need for Fawcett
Memorial Hospital for the same district, after St. Joseph Hospital was
denied its opportunity to participate in the proceeding, was appropriate.
The court agreed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services that St. Joseph had failed to timely apply for a certificate of
need, and thus, had waived its right to be a part of the decision process
concerning Fawcett Memorial Hospital. St. Joseph Hospital attempted
to intervene very late in the process concerning Fawcett Memorial Hos-
pital's application. 17 The court found that St. Joseph Hospital also
175. AMISUB, 577 So. 2d at 649.
176. Id. at 649-50; see infra notes 576-83 and accompanying text.
177. Id. at 650.
178. 559 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
179. Id. at 596. St. Joseph Hospital did not petition to intervene until after the
certificate of need controversy concerning the 1987 batching cycle had reached a settle-
ment among those parties which had originally participated in the process. Id. at 596-
97. Having been denied permission to intervene, St. Joseph Hospital then filed a re-
quest for a. comparative review of its application for certificate of need with that of the
Fawcett Memorial Hospital certificate of need application. The Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services denied this request as untimely, because it was not an ap-
plication which occurred during the same batching cycle. Id. at 597; FLA. STAT. §
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lacked standing to intervene in the Fawcett Memorial Hospital certifi-
cate of need decision process, because it did not have a current pro-
gram which would compete with the one to be granted to Fawcett Me-
morial Hospital. 180 Further, the court noted that even if St. Joseph
Hospital was entitled to intervene because its substantial interests were
effected by the certificate of need decision process, it waived such an
opportunity by not attempting to intervene until well after the parties
came to an agreement and the case was being remanded to the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services for implementation of the
settlement terms concerning the issuance of certificates of need for the
1987 batching cycle.1 81
b. Declaratory Statements
In Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Professional Regu-
lation,' the court considered whether optometrists had standing to in-
tervene in a declaratory statement proceeding conducted before the
Board of Opticianry. The petition for a declaratory statement con-
cerned whether an optician was permitted to use a Titmus Vision Tes-
ter to check a consumer's visual acuity with and without corrective
381.709(5)(b) (1987).
The court found that this decision was correct, and that the letter of intent to
participate in the certificate of need batching cycle sent by St. Joseph Hospital was
insufficient to constitute an application for that batching cycle. St. Joseph, 559 So. 2d
at 597. The court noted that while the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices did fail to properly publish the fixed need pool for the 1987 batching cycle, it did
make available to all applicants the information concerning the fixed need pool cycle
for purposes of determining whether it was appropriate to apply for a certificate of
need and the likelihood of success in the comparative review process. Given this infor-
mation, any applicant could have determined whether it was appropriate for it to apply
for the 1987 batching cycle. Id. at 597-98. The failure of St. Joseph Hospital to apply
during this batching cycle could not be excused because of the failure of the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services to make these determinations for it. Id. at
598.
180. Id. St. Joseph Hospital engaged in the treatment of general cardiac
problems. This did not create a sufficient competing program which would be substan-
tially affected by the issuance of a certificate of need to Fawcett Memorial Hospital for
a cardiac catherization program. Id. In so concluding the court clearly was indicating
that the first element in the Agrico Chemical test was not satisfied. See supra notes
146-60 and accompanying text.
181. St. Joseph, 559 So. 2d at 598.
182. 567 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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lenses. 188 Optometrists petitioned to intervene in this declaratory state-
ment proceeding, and also sought a formal hearing under APA section
120.57(1). The Board denied the request to intervene, holding that the
optometrists did not have standing, because there was no allegation
that their substantial interests were going to be affected by any resolu-
tion of the declaratory statement request.184
The court reversed the Board's decision, holding that in order to
have standing to intervene in the declaratory statement proceeding, a
person must satisfy the Agrico Chemical Co. two-part test. 185 The
court found that the optometrists had standing to intervene in the de-
claratory statement proceeding and to request a formal hearing under
section 120.57. The court relied on Florida Medical Ass'n v. Depart-
ment oJ Professional Regulation86 because it presented an almost
identical battle between professions concerning the scope of their exclu-
sive practice areas, except that in this case it was set in a declaratory
statement context. The court agreed with the optometrists that but for
the declaratory statement, patients would be required to seek their
counsel in order to have the Titmus Vision Tester administered. Thus,
the first element of standing was satisfied by demonstrating a sufficient
degree of injury in fact. The second element of standing, the zone of
interest requirement, was also satisfied by the allegation that the legis-
lature intended for only licensed optometrists to administer such a test,
because it was instrumental in the process of prescribing or treating
diseases or ailments of the human eye, which opticians were prohibited
183. Id. at 931.
184. Id. at 932.
185. The elements of the test are that the person has "suffer[ed] injury in fact
which is of sufficient immediacy to entitle him to a [section] 120.57 hearing, and...
that . . . [the] injury is of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed to pro-
tect." Id. (quoting Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 406 So.
2d 478, 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1982));
see supra text accompanying notes 146-60.
186. 426 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In Florida Medical Ass'n,
the first element of the standing test, necessary degree of injury in fact, was satisfied
when it was alleged that the proposed rule would potentially deprive a professional
category of patients who now would have the option of seeking treatment through an-
other profession. The court also found that the second element of the standing test, the
zone of interest requirement, was satisfied because an allegation was made that the
legislature had determined that the authority to prescribe drugs was exclusively within
the scope of a licensed physician's authority and that it should not be carried out by
any other, including optometrists. Id.
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from carrying out.' 8 7
3. Intervention in the Administrative Decision Process by
Third Parties
Manasota-88, Inc. v. Agrico Chemical Co.188 concerned the issue
of when a third party could intervene in a case where a default permit
was issued by the Department of Environmental Regulation for the
mining of phosphates within state wetland areas.' 89 Agrico Chemical
filed a permit application with the Department of Environmental Regu-
lation requesting permission to mine phosphates within state wetland
areas. The relevant statutes provided that such an application must be
ruled upon by the Department within ninety days after the application
was submitted.9 0 If the Department failed to do so, then it must issue
a default permit. However, the Department of Environmental Regula-
tion may later impose conditions to assure that the project was properly
managed for purposes of mitigating any adverse impact on state
wetlands.
Manasota-88, Inc., a third party, attempted to intervene in the ad-
ministrative process associated with issuance of the default permit. The
court held that the Department properly determined that Manasota-88,
Inc. could intervene in the permit process even though the permit was
187. Florida Optometric Ass'n, 567 So. 2d at 932-33. The court distinguished
this case from Florida Society of Ophthalmology v. Board of Optometry, 532 So. 2d
1279 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988), based upon the fact that in that case there was no
allegation that an exclusive area of practice at stake. Thus, the zone of interest aspect
of the Agrico Chemical standing test was not satisfied. Florida Optometric Ass'n, 567
So. 2d at 933.
188. 576 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
189. The court also addressed several other issues. First, the court noted that the
decision of the Department of Environmental Regulation was supported by substantial
competent evidence; and there was no factual error committed by the Department of
Environmental Regulation in this case. Second, the court noted that Manasoto-88, Inc.
was not denied any procedural rights when the hearing officer denied its motion for a
continuance in order to study the modified mitigation plan submitted by Agrico Chemi-
cal Company. The hearing officer granted Manasota-88, Inc. an additional three weeks
to study the plan as modified and to submit any additional evidence concerning the
feasibility of the modified plan. Manasota-88, Inc. failed to offer any such evidence. Id.
at 782-83. Third, because Manasota-88, Inc. did not request a stay, the project had
gone forward during the appellate process, and even if an issue was presented in terms
of denial of procedural rights, it was moot as soon as the wetlands in question in fact
no longer existed. Id. at 783.
190. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(2) (1989).
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issued by default. The court concluded that it was impossible for a
third party intervenor to act before the Department gave notice of its
intent concerning a permit application. This point was the first opportu-
nity any third party intervenor had to respond to the Department's de-
cision to issue a default permit. As such, it was the only appropriate
point in time to file for intervention. It was, in fact, the only point
where a third party had an opportunity to intervene in the process.' 91
Further, once an intervenor had properly filed a response to the notice
of intent to issue a default permit, a hearing must have been held to
resolve any disputed factual issues concerning what mitigative steps
should be taken. 192
We do not agree with Agrico [Chemical Company's] position that
a default permit issues automatically without further [administra-
tivel agency inquiry. Nothing in the statute prevents [the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation] from holding a hearing to de-
termine reasonable mitigative conditions necessary to protect the
interest of the public and the environment, prior to which we need
the default permit. The party who finds conditions placed on de-
fault permit owners are unreasonable, may resort to the appellate
process for relief.18
Thus, it i.s the process of determining the mitigative conditions in which
the third party intervenor may participate either informally or in the
context of a formal hearing."
F. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
"As a general proposition, where an administrative remedy is pro-
vided by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the court will act."' 9 5 Generally, this is not a jurisdictional re-
191. An administrative agency must provide an affected person, "within a speci-
fied time after some recognizable event in investigatory or other free-form proceeding,
[to request] formal or informal proceedings under section 120.57." Capeletti Bros. v.
Department of Transp., 362 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 368 So.
2d 1374 (Fla. 1978); see FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 2.30 (The Florida Bar
3d ed. 1990).
192. Manasota-88, Inc., 576 So. 2d at 783.
193. Id.
194. Clearly, the default decision had already been made. The third party may
not intervene in that decision process. Id. at 784.
195. Halifax Area Council v. City of Daytona Beach, 385 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla.
1991]
39
Burris: Administrative Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
46 Nova Law Review [Vol. 16
quirement, 196 but rather, a prudential one, 197
designed to assure: (1) that courts do not stray from their limited
role of judicial review in the administrative process; (2) that agen-
cies have an opportunity to perform the duties delegated to them
by the legislature; and (3) that agencies have the initial opportu-
nity to correct any errors that occurred during the administrative
process.198
During the survey period, the courts decided several cases applying
these considerations.
A classic application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is Department of Revenue v. Brock.'"9 Brock concerned a
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). If the legislature clearly has left the selection of the judicial
process to the parties, then there is no requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. See Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 580
So. 2d 267, 273 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that when the legislature pro-
vided for two independent means of seeking a remedy for erroneous administrative
agency action, suit in the appropriate circuit court or administrative hearing, there was
no requirement that a party chose one or the other means). cf. Van Poyck v. Dugger,
582 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that when a prisoner ex-
hausted all of his administrative appeals, then the trial court must hold a hearing on
his habeas corpus petition in which he alleged prison officials acted arbitrarily in plac-
ing him in a high security cell under 24 hour lockdown status).
196. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
197. See Howlett v. Rose, 571 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting
that exhaustion of state administrative remedies was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But see Park v. Dugger, 548 So. 2d 1167, 1168
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was
a jurisdictional prerequisite to a circuit court having jurisdiction to issue a writ of man-
damus); Leonard v. Morgan, 548 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (not-
ing that exhaustion of administrative remedies may be required where the legislature
has given an administrative agency exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the matter
initially).
198. Burris I, supra note 4, at 344. Because the exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement is prudential, courts may waive it in appropriate cases. One ex-
ception to this requirement occurs when the case involves constitutional issues which an
agency cannot address in its administrative proceeding. Mann v. City of Oakland Park,
581 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (noting that when a
party alleged that an administrative system was unconstitutional on its face, exhaustion
of administrative remedies should not be required before a court may appropriately
exercise jurisdiction); see also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Fuller, 551 So. 2d 1210, 1212-
13 (Fla. 1989); FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 7.3 (The Florida Bar 3d ed.
1990).
199. 576 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
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suit brought by the Florida Hotel and Motel Association and three ho-
tel operators in circuit court to enjoin the Department of Revenue from
"collecting gross receipts tax on all local and long distance telephone
services separately billed to their tenants." 200 The Department of Reve-
nue interpreted the statute which provided that "charges made by a
hotel and motel . . . or local telephone service or toll telephone service,
when such charges occur incidentally to the right of occupancy of such
hotel or motel"' 20 1 shall be exempt from the gross receipt statute, as not
applying to any such charges which are separately billed, because they
are not incidental to the right of occupancy.202 After the circuit court
suit was filed, the plaintiffs in this case also filed a challenge to the
proposed rule which was to codify this interpretation 03 The rule chal-
lenge was ultimately unsuccessful and was dismissed. 20 4 Even though
the plaintiffs had pursued the administrative remedy of the rule chal-
lenge, the circuit court, after the rule challenge had been administra-
tively dismissed, permanently enjoined the Department of Revenue
from collecting the gross receipts tax on "telecommunication service
from operators of transient rental facilities."20 1 After this decision, the
plaintiffs dismissed their appeal from the administrative order which
dismissed their rule challenge. 0
This was a fatal mistake, as the court held that the circuit court
did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the Department of Revenue's policy.
The court noted that the purpose of the prudential requirement of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies was "to assure that an [adminis-
trative] agency responsible for implementing a statutory scheme ha[d]
a full opportunity to reach a sensitive, mature, and considerate decision
upon a complete record appropriate to the issue.1207 This goal would be
accomplished when 1) the administrative agency was permitted to fully
develop a factual record upon which it could then exercise its adminis-
trative discretion, and 2) the administrative agency, charged by the leg-
islature: with primary responsibility for administering a statutory
scheme, had a full and fair opportunity to initially resolve the issues.2 0 8
200. Id. at 849.
201. FLA. STAT. § 203.012(2)(b)(3) (1989).
202. Brock, 577 So. 2d at 849.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 850.
205, Id.
206. Id.
207, Brock, 577 So. 2d at 850.
208. Id.
19911
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The court noted that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not an
absolute requirement. In some cases, such as when there was no factual
dispute and it was alleged the administrative agency exceeded its dele-
gated powers by acting in an ultra vires manner, exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies was not required.
However, this exception did not apply in this case, because
whether the administrative agency appropriately exercised its delegated
discretion depended upon factual determinations made by the adminis-
trative agency. It was appropriate in this circumstance to require ex-
haustion of administrative remedies "[a]lthough statutory construction
[wa]s ultimately the provence of the judiciary, it should not be under-
taken without first giving the [administrative] agency an opportunity to
explain its interpretation and to create a record in an administrative
form. ' 20 9 In such a case, it was clearly inappropriate for the circuit
court to preempt the normal judicial review process associated with the
administrative rule challenge process. The plaintiffs should have pur-
sued the judicial remedies associated with the administrative rule chal-
lenge rather than continuing to press their suit in the circuit court. 210
Marks v. Northwest Florida Water Management District"1 ' is also
a classic case of how a party who failed to avail himself of the adminis-
trative hearing process lost the right to judicial review of an adminis-
trative order. Marks sought judicial review of an administrative order
which held that he had performed repair work on a dam without the
necessary permits. Repairs were needed because the dam was in an
unsafe condition which created a risk of catastrophic failure. After re-
ceiving notice of the administrative complaint Marks failed to request a
hearing under section 120.57(1) of the APA. Having heard nothing
from Marks, the Northwest Florida Water Management District en-
tered a final order directing him to either pump out the water behind
the dam and cease using the dam for retaining water, or obtain the
appropriate permits and repair the dam. Marks claimed that the ad-
ministrative order was remedial in nature, and that Florida law re-
quired a complaint for a remedial order be served upon the owner of
the property. Marks also claimed he was not the owner of the
property. 12
The Northwest Florida Water Management District claimed that
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 566 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
212. Id. at 47; FLA. STAT. § 373.436 (1989).
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the administrative order was a corrective one. In the case of corrective
orders, the administrative complaint must be served upon the alleged
violator."' The court refused to take judicial notice of the property
records concerning the dam which were offered to prove Marks' asser-
tion that he was not the property owner. If Marks wished to assert this
factual defense, then he should have invoked the administrative hearing
process. Having failed to invoke this process, he waived his rights to
challenge the factual conclusions reached by the Northwest Florida
Water Management District. 1' While the court never explicitly char-
acterized the case as concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the net effect of its decision was to hold that Marks failed to raise a
factual issue with the appropriate administrative agency, and was
therefore precluded from raising the same issue in the courts.
If an administrative agency was acting strictly in an advisory ca-
pacity, then exhaustion of administrative remedies will not be required,
because none of the policy reasons for requiring it are present. In Ujcic
v. City of Apopka,21 5 the court held that before bringing suit under the
Whistle-Blower's Act, a police officer was not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies before a review board. This result was accept-
able because any decision of the review board would be advisory and
non-binding on the city or the police officer, and the proceedings before
the circuit court are de novo, with no need for an administrative hear-
ing to develop a record for judicial review.21 6
The courts have made it clear that a person need not exhaust his
or her administrative remedies under section 120.56 which provides for
rule challenges before raising the validity of a rule in the other admin-
istrative proceedings. United Health, Inc. v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services 17 involved a challenge by long term health
care providers to the validity of the administrative rule authorizing a
rate freeze for the services they provide. The Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services denied the long term health care providers
both a formal and informal hearing under the APA,2 18 claiming that
213. Marks, 566 So. 2d at 47; FLA. STAT. § 373.119 (1989).
214. Marks, 566 So. 2d at 47.
215. 581 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
216. Id. at 220; accord Hill v. Monroe County, 581 So. 2d 225, 226-27 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court also noted that Ujcic should be permitted to amend his
complaint to include the allegation that the exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not necessary in this case. Ujcic, 581 So. 2d at 220; see also Hill, 581 So. 2d at 227.
217. 579 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
218. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1), (2) (1989).
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the only method available to challenge a rule is through the APA rule
challenge provision in section 120.56.219
The court held that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services erred in not holding a hearing, because the long term health
care providers have substantial interests which were "affected by [the
administrative] agency action . . . [, and] seek monetary relief which
is not available in a section 120.56 proceeding. '220 The court noted that
nothing in the APA required the long term health care providers to
exhaust the rule challenge process before proceeding with a request for
a section 120.57 hearing. 21 If a rule challenge was the appropriate fo-
rum for resolving some of the issues raised in the petition for a section
120.57 hearing, then it may be filed, and the section 120.57 hearing
stayed until it was resolved.222
In Lloyd Citrus Trucking v. Department of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Service,2 3 the court interpreted Florida Statute section 601.65
which provides:
If any licensed citrus fruit dealer violates any provision of this
chapter, such dealer shall be liable to the person allegedly injured
thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of
such violation. Such a liability may be enforced either by proceed-
ing in an administrative action to and before the Department of
Agriculture and pursuing such actions with ultimate termination if
desired, or by filing of a judicial suit at law in a court of competent
jurisdiction.2 24
The court read this statute as providing that a party had a choice of
either pursuing an administrative process or direct access to the courts,
but not both. "The statutory wording is clear. The legislature described
the kind of remedies only. Once Lloyd Citrus pursued its chosen
219. United Health,Inc., 579 So. 2d at 342-43; FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1989).
220. United Health, Inc., 579 So. 2d at 343.
221. Id.; accord J.B. Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 580
So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (The court noted that a party may
challenge the validity of a rule in an administrative agency enforcement proceeding.
There was no requirement in such a case that the party must file a separate rule chal-
lenge in order to exhaust administrative remedies.).
222. United Health, Inc., 579 So. 2d at 343. The court also noted that any other
approach was impractical given the time frames for filing a petition requesting a sec-
tion 120.57 hearing. Id.
223. 572 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
224. FLA. STAT. § 601.65 (1979).
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course, suit in circuit court to resolution, the Department was without
jurisdiction to hear the matter .... ,,22' Lloyd Citrus correctly con-
cluded that the only way it could preserve its opportunity to pursue the
administrative hearing process was by dismissing its lawsuit prior to its
ultimate resolution. 26 However, where the voluntary dismissal of the
lawsuit occurred ten years after it was filed, but before any ultimate
resolution of the issues by the circuit court, the administrative remedy
was foreclosed, apparently based upon estoppel principles.2 27
In Board of Regents v. Armesto,22 8 a circuit court granted the re-
quest of a Florida State University law student for a permanent injunc-
tion enjoining Florida State University from falsely charging the stu-
dent with violations of the Student Code of Conduct. The injunction
was granted by the circuit court because of alleged improper conduct
by Florida State University in conducting its investigation of the
allegations. 29
The district court of appeal noted that primary jurisdiction doc-
trine requires that "circuit courts . . . abstain from exercising their eq-
uitable jurisdiction over administrative proceedings where adequate ad-
ministrative remedies have not been exhausted. An exception exists
where threatened agency action is so egregious or devastating that ad-
ministrative remedies are either too little or too late. ' 280 The law stu-
dent alleged that the nature of irreparable injury which she would suf-
fer was that The Florida Board of Bar Examiners "might refuse to
admit her to practice even if she were acquitted [of the allegedly false
charges] at the University hearing."' 23' The court characterized this al-
leged irreparable injury as mere speculation, and insufficient to
"demonstrate that her administrative remedies were inadequate" where
she had the right to request that the charges be dismissed and to de-
fend herself in a fair university hearing concerning the matter.23 2 "The
possible [collateral] consequence[s] ...[are] not a basis to bypass the
administrative process. ' 233
225. Lloyd Citrus Trucking, 572 So. 2d at 978.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 979.
228. 563 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
229. Id. at 1080-81.
230. Id. at 1081.
231. Id.
232. Id. The court found that the allegation of the likelihood of false charges
being filed was not supported by sufficient evidence. Id.
233. Armesto, 563 So. 2d at 1081.
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The court also rejected the due process challenge to the adminis-
trative process provided by Florida State University, because the alle-
gation was not a facial attack on the structure of the administrative
hearing process, but one concerning how it was going to be applied to
her particular circumstances. It is well established in Florida that such
an allegation is insufficient to warrant bypassing the administrative
process. In such a case, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is
appropriate so that the administrative agency has the first opportunity
to resolve the disputed issue. 34
G. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Res judicata principles are designed to conserve the resources of
administrative agencies, courts, and the parties by precluding needless
relitigation of issues.2"5 In Nelson & Co. v. Holtzclaw, 236 the court
noted that administrative orders issued by judges of compensation
claims "are subject to the same principles of res judicata as applied to
judgments of courts. 237 In discussing prior precedent in the area, the
court noted two items of interest. First, res judicata principles were
designed to prevent relitigation of issues over which there was likely to
be little change over time. Second, res judicata principles did not pre-
clude relitigation of issues where there was a likelihood of change over
time.
In Massie v. University of Florida,8 the court noted that the in-
terests of justice on a few occasion might require a court to abandon
the traditional rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. An appel-
late court has inherent power to correct its own prior erroneous deci-
sions in order to prevent injustice, even when this involves review of an
administrative hearing decision which has become final after appropri-
ate appellate review. This discretion must be exercised only in the most
unusual circumstances, and is not as a matter of right, merely a matter
of grace.23 9 When a court finds that such circumstances exist, its "duty
in reviewing worker's compensation cases to administer justice under
the law outweighs its duty to follow an earlier decision of the court in
234. Id. at 1081-82.
235. Nelson & Co. v. Holtzclaw, 566 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
236. 566 So. 2d 307.
237. Id. at 308.
238. 570 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
239. Id. at 974-75.
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the same case when, due to an error in reviewing the evidence, doing so
resulted in . . . injustice to a party."2 " The court concluded, after re-
viewing the record, that the deputy commission was presented with "a
legally sufficient petition for modification . . based on a complete ab-
sence of evidence to support [an essential] finding of fact [and] []which
absence of evidence [was] now conceded by the deputy commissioner
"9241.
Thus, the court in Massie recognized that in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, it is possible to overturn a prior appellate ruling affirming
an administrative agency's decision. It is limited to the very unusual
circumstances of when the earlier decision was based upon erroneous
factual premises, and the trier of fact confessed that there were no
facts in the record to support his conclusion which was critical to the
decision he ultimately reached in the case. 2
III. GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE
The Public Records 248 and Sunshine " statutes are designed to as-
sure that the public has access to the decision making processes and
records of governmental institutions.24 5 As a result of these statutes, the
operation of Florida governmental institutions is open to public scru-
tiny. In response, the courts have rigorously enforced the requirements
of these statutes.
During the survey period, one interesting case, News-Press Pub-
lishing Co. v. Lee County,2" was decided concerning the Sunshine
240. Id. at 975.
241. fd. at 977; see id. at 977-78 (Ervin, J., concurring).
242. Cf Full Circle Service, Inc. v. Department of Agric., 556 So. 2d 757, 758
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that when a case was remanded after judicial
review to the administrative agency, it did not permit parties to re-litigate issues which
were properly decided by the court initially).
243. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.14 (1989); see also FLA. STAT. § 120.53(3) & n.1
(1991) (text of subsections (2) and (4) as of March 1, 1992); FLA. STAT. §§ 120.532-
.533 (1991).
244. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1989).
245. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 120.53, .55 (1989) (APA provisions requiring public
access to orders and rules, public notice of administrative agency meetings, and the
subject matter to be discussed).
246. 570 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
One very significant case was decided too late for discussion in this survey article.
Locke v. Hawkes, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716 (1991). The decision in Locke may signifi-
cantly limit the power of the legislature to impose the requirements of the Sunshine
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Statute. The Sunshine Statute provides that official action taken by
state and local agencies must occur only at "public meetings open to
the public at all times" unless the Florida Constitution provides other-
wise.247 In News-Press Publishing Co.,24 the issue was whether the
mediation process entered pursuant to a circuit court order could be
lawfully closed to the public. The statute authorizing court sanctioned
mediations specifically provided that any party or person participating
in the proceeding may, as a matter of right, prevent the disclosure of
any communication made during the proceeding.249 On this basis,
News-Press Publishing Co. involved court sanctioned mediation be-
tween two governmental entities concerning where a bridge should be
located. Because of the nature of these entities, negotiations would oth-
erwise have been covered by the Sunshine Statute and open to the pub-
lic. However, the court ordered mediation statute presented a situation
where the mediation would be closed to the public. The court avoided
resolving the broader issue about this conflict between the Sunshine
Statute and the court mandated mediation statute by specifically noting
that court sanctioned could not result in any final settlement if the par-
ties choose not to send anyone to the mediation conference with the
authority to make such a decision. The court held that given "the nar-
row scope of the mediation proceedings in this case . .. [it did not
result in] a substantial delegation effecting the decision-making func-
tion of any board, commissioner, agency, or authority sufficient to re-
quire that this mediation proceeding be opened to the public."25 The
decision in News-Press Publishing Co. clearly indicates that the Sun-
shine Law would require, when governmental parties do send author-
ized representatives capable of making binding decisions upon govern-
mental entities to the mediation process, that the mediation be open to
the public.25'
Statute on other constitutionally created institutions. This decision is not final because
the court has granted a motion for reconsideration.
247. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1989). The purpose of the law is to insure that shap-
ing of public policy by governmental institutions occurs in the public realm. Courts
have generally interpreted the statute very broadly in order to allow full achievement of
its purpose.
248. 570 So. 2d 1325.
249. See FLA. STAT. § 44.302(2) (1989).
250. News-Press Publishing Co., 570 So. 2d at 1327.
251. The decision in Locke, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716, indicates that possibly the
legislature could not require the courts to open the mediation conference to the public.
If the mediation process is open to the public, then it may result may limit the effec-
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IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
In order for an administrative agency to escape the requirements
of the APA, the agency must be excluded from coverage pursuant to
the terms of the APA, 5 ' or expressly excluded from APA coverage by
a subsequent statute. 53 Courts are reluctant to find that such an ex-
press, subsequent statutory exemption was created, and will not imply
one in order to further efficiency or conservation of the limited re-
sources available to an administrative agency. To do so would under-
mine the legislative commitment to general administrative process and
structure for all administrative agencies, imposed through the APA.254
As the court noted in Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation,5 one of the primary goals of the
APA was "to expose policy errors in an [administrative] agency's free-
form routine, and to subject agency heads 'to the sobering realization
[that] their policies [may] lack convincing wisdom.' "258 To this end,
the legislature used a strong process oriented approach2 5 in the APA
to govern the exercise of administrative agency power, by guaranteeing
that the public and/or effected persons would: 1) receive notice of ad-
ministrative agency proposed actions; 2) have an opportunity to present
contrary points of view and evidence; 3) receive an adequate statement
of the facts and policy reasons supporting the administrative agency's
final action; 4) have an adequate opportunity for judicial review of ad-
ministrative agency actions; and 5) receive notice of and access to past
administrative agency policy decisions .25 Further, if an administrative
tiveness of court mandated mediation where governmental entities are involved. See
generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1981).
252. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.50 (1989) (exclusion of courts and legislature);
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1)(c) (1989) (exclusion of judges of compensation claims). The
decision in Locke, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716, re-opens the question of whether the legis-
lature may impose the requirements of the APA on constitutionally created govern-
mental institutions. Compare Locke, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S716 with McDonald v. De-
partment of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 577-78 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
253. FLA. STAT. § 120.72(l)(a)-(b) (1989).
254. See Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation,
580 So. 2d 267, 273 n.6 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
255. Id. at 267.
256. Id. at 271 (quoting McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin. 346 So. 2d
569, 583 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
257. See, e.g., Burris IV, supra note 4, at 667-68; Levinson, supra note 4, at
750-55, 765; Maher, supra note 4, at 770-98.
258. Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc., 580 So. 2d at 271.
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agency was exempted from the APA, then, unless the legislature cre-
ated an alternative administrative process, the courts would have to de-
termine what procedure the administrative agency would have to follow
to exercising its delegated authority. This judicial decision process
would involve the constant resolution of constitutional issues concerning
procedural due process and separation of powers.
A. Rules Versus Orders
While it is relatively clear that the legislature preferred that ad-
ministrative agencies develop public policy through the rule making
process,2" the courts permitted administrative agencies to develop
many controversial and important public policy positions via the adju-
dicatory process. 6 0 The net result has been that administrative agen-
cies can create legally binding policy of general applicability by either
using their rule making authority or by properly developing policy posi-
tions in adjudicatory proceedings." 1 The former process' results are
259. There are primarily two processes which administrative agencies can
use in developing legally binding public policy-rule making and adjudica-
tion. In theory, administrative agencies should use the rule making process
to establish legally binding public policy of general applicability. The adju-
dication process to determine the substantial interests of parties under the
relevant statutes and administrative rules and only incidentally to develop
legally binding public policy . . . . The distinction between these two
means for exercising administrative agency authority to develop public pol-
icy was diminished in the APA by providing in some cases for additional
procedural protection during the rule making process. In cases where these
procedural protections are invoked during the rule making process it would
closely resemble adjudication. Despite the procedural convergence of rule
making and adjudication there still was a general consensus that adminis-
trative agencies, at least in theory, should prefer the rule making process
over adjudication as the means for developing public policy, because the
rule making process was designed to maximize public participation and
fairness through its notice, hearing, and publication requirements.
Burris IV, supra note 4, at 665-66; see FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1989). But see Dore II,
supra note 4, at 708-09 (legislature never made its preference for the rule making
process sufficiently clear in the statute). Any dispute about whether there was a legisla-
tive preference for rule making as compared to nonrule policy making has been re-
solved in favor of rule making. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1) (1991) (required rule making;
effective March 1, 1992).
260. See McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (leading case supporting concept of nonrule policy making); Bur-
ris IV, supra note 4, at 673; Dore II, supra note 4, at 710-11.
261. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So.
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promulgated as administrative rules and found in the Florida Adminis-
trative Code. The latter's results are characterized by the courts as in-
cipient rules or nonrule policies,262 because they are developed in the
case by case adjudicative process through a series of orders. These re-
sults are generally found in the Florida Administrative Law Reporter
or administrative agency files. 68
To date, a substantial amount of litigation concerning whether the
nonrule policy was properly documented and supported in the adjudica-
tory record has occurred. 6 This continual relitigation of the validity of
nonrule policies is a waste of the limited resources of the administrative
agencies, the courts and private parties, because many, if not most, of
the nonrule policies should have been adopted through the more cost
efficient rule making process. 66 Several cases during the survey period
demonstrated the perils of an administrative agency relying on nonrule
policy.
Rabren v. Department of Professional Regulation2 66 concerned an
order issued by the Department of Professional Regulation dismissing
the administrative charges against Rabren, a licensed pilot. The court
affirmed the dismissal of the charges against Rabren and reversed the
finding that certain docking facilities in the Tampa Bay area were
ports.2  Florida statutes required that vessels which were not exempt
or which drew less than seven feet of water "shall have a licensed pilot
on board when entering or leaving ports of this state," '268 and that it
was improper for a pilot licensed in the State of Florida to delegate his
or her responsibilities to any person who he or she knew or should have
known was not qualified "by training, experience, or license to perform
them." '269 This latter statutory provision clearly prohibited a state li-
2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Burris IV, supra note 4, at 677-85.
262. See Burris IV, supra note 4, at 670 & n.36.
263. See id. at 693-96; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 120.53-.533 (1991); Dore III,
supra note 4, at 450-54.
264. See, e.g., Ganson v. Florida Dep't of Admin., 554 So. 2d 516, 520 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989). In Ganson, the court noted that if administrative agencies chose
to rely upon nonrule policy, then when a hearing was held, a "record foundation for the
policy decisions in its orders, by expert testimony, documentary opinion or other evi-
dence appropriate in form to the nature of the issues involved" must be offered. Id. The
court found that the administrative agency had failed to do so in this case. Id.
265. Burris IV, supra note 4, at 696-97.
266. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter Rabren I1].
267. Id. at 1284.
268. FLA. STAT. § 310.141 (1987).
269. FLA. STAT. § 310.101(1) (1987).
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censed pilot from delegating his or her responsibilities to a pilot who
holds only a federal license. Any violation of this section may result in
a reprimand, fine, suspension, or revocation of license. °
Based on this statute, the Board of Pilot Commissioners accused
Rabren of assigning pilots, who held only a federal license, to shift two
vessels from one port to another in the Tampa Bay area when a state
licensed pilot was required. Rabren admitted that these events had oc-
curred. 17 1 However, he claimed that the shifts involved transfers within
the port of Tampa Bay, and, relying upon Rabren v. Board of Commis-
sioners,272 that such actions did not require a state pilot. The hearing
officer agreed, holding that while the Tampa Bay area may functionally
consist of four ports for purposes of the statute, it was actually consid-
ered one port. Thus, any shifting of vessels between the ports located
within the Tampa Bay area did not require the presence of a state li-
censed pilot, because such shifting did not involve a vessel leaving and
entering the Tampa Bay port area.27
The Board of Pilot Commissioners reversed the decision of the
hearing officer, finding that as a matter of law the hearing officer had
erred. The Board concluded that the statute had been misinterpreted
by the hearing officer, because the shifting of a vessel between ports in
the Tampa Bay area was an act that involved leaving one Florida port
and entering another, which required a state licensed pilot.27 ' In an-
nouncing this policy, the Board functionally adopted a nonrule policy
interpreting the statute.
The court noted that the Board of Pilot Commissioners had the
270. Rabren 1H, 568 So. 2d at 1285. The Board of Pilot Commissioners was dele-
gated the authority by the Florida legislature to enforce Florida Statutes Chapter 310.
FLA. STAT. § 310.185(1) (1987).
271. Rabren 11, 568 So. 2d at 1286.
272. 497 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 508 So. 2d 13
(Fla. 1987) [hereinafter Rabren 1]. The court held that the Board of Pilot Commission-
ers had exceeded its delegated authority in promulgating a rule which required a state
pilot on board when a vessel was shifted from one docking facility to another while in
port, because the Florida House of Representatives had rejected a similar provision as
part of Chapter 310. However, in that case, the court noted that the Tampa Bay area
included four ports, and that the rule might well have been a proper exercise of dele-
gated authority when a vessel is shifted from a docking facility in one port to another
facility in another Tampa Bay area port. Id. at 1249; see Rabren II, 568 So. 2d at
1285-86.
273. Rabren 11, 568 So. 2d at 1287.
274. Id. The Board of Pilot Commissioners completely accepted the hearing of-
ficer's factual conclusions set forth in the recommended order.
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authority to promulgate nonrule policy through adjudicatory orders.
Whether to adopt certain public policy positions through the rule mak-
ing or adjudicatory process was within the scope of discretion delegated
to the Board of Pilot Commissioners by the legislature. However, when
an administrative agency chooses to rely upon nonrule policy adopted
in an adjudicatory context, the adjudicatory record must provide ade-
quate support for that policy, both in law and fact. In this case, be-
cause the parties chose not to make the factual records available to the
court on appeal, there was no such factual basis for the nonrule policy
before the court. Further, the court noted that the order failed to "offer
an explanation or justification for the policy. 12 75 The Board of Pilot
Commissioners' finding that these facilities in the Tampa Bay area
were each ports under the statute was a bare assertion unsupported by
any factual predicate.
Similarly, in Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America v. De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services,2 7 7 the court noted:
[W]lhen an [administrative] agency seeks to validate its action
based upon a policy that is not recorded in rules or discoverable
precedents, that policy must be established by expert testimony,
documentary opinions, or other evidence appropriate to the nature
of the issues involved and the agency must expose and elucidate its
reasons for its discretionary action.27 8
In this case, the court found that the nonrule policy was merely stated
as a bare assertion during the course of the administrative hearing . 79
275. Id. at 1289.
276. "If the [Board of Pilot Commissioners] wishes to avoid rulemaking and opt
for policy development through adjudication, then it must accept the procedural safe-
guards that apply in formal hearings . . . ." Id. at 1290.
277. 559 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
278. Id. at 667-68 (citing St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs., 553 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
279. See also Bajrangi v. Department of Business Regulation, 561 So. 2d 410,
415-16 (Ma. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In Bajrangi, the court noted that the testimony
concerning the usual penalties, which apparently were based upon informal guidelines
that did not appear in any statute or administrative rule and were not adequately docu-
mented as nonrule policy, cannot constitute a basis for rejecting a hearing officer's
decision. id. The error committed by the administrative agency was that it failed to
provide actual testimony which would prove the factual predicate necessary for the
adoption of such a nonrule policy. The witness just testified in a conclusory fashion that
this was the usual penalty. Id.
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The nonrule policy was not discoverable in any administrative agency
precedent. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services also
failed to adequately document the nonrule policy during the course of
the administrative hearing by providing expert testimony, documents
and other evidence to support its nonrule policy. Without adequate doc-
umentation to support the nonrule policy, the decision of the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services was not supported by com-
petent substantial evidence. Further, it may well be that it was
inconsistent with prior administrative agency practices, a deviation
from which has not been adequately explained on the record.2
80
In Schiffman v. Department of Professional Regulation,281 the
court concluded that the decision of the Board of Pharmacy imposing a
permanent revocation of license was an invalid nonrule policy, because
it lacked adequate evidentiary support in the administrative hearing
record. 282 The Board of Pharmacy was authorized by the legislature to
adopt administrative rules concerning revocation of a license. 2 3 The
Board of Pharmacy did not adopt administrative rules and relied upon
nonrule policy developed in the adjudicatory hearing process. While the
Board of Pharmacy was free to chose to develop its policies concerning
sanctions in this manner, it may not do so without establishing the fol-
lowing requirements in each order: 1) an explanation of the nonrule
policy; 2) adequate factual support in the record for the nonrule policy;
and 3) an explanation of how the nonrule policy was within the scope
of the administrative agency's delegated authority.28" In Schiffman, the
Board of Pharmacy failed to provide any policy reasons justifying the
nonrule policy which it applied. 288 Further, the order of the Board of
Pharmacy was unclear, because one part of the order could be read as
finding that Schiffman would never be eligible for reinstatement, while
another part of order could be read as indicating that he may be eligi-
ble for reinstatement if he offered some, albeit undefined, evidence of
rehabilitation. Such an internally inconsistent order was not an ade-
quate explanation of the nonrule policy. 86
280. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 559 So. 2d at 668. The court
remanded the case for further action in light of its opinion. See FLA. STAT. §
120.68(12) (1989).
281. 581 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
282. Id. at 1376.
283. See FLA. STAT. § 465.016(4) (1989).
284. See Schiffman, 581 So. 2d at 1377; Burris IV, supra note 4, at 676-77.
285. Schiffman, 581 So. 2d at 1377.
286. Id. at 1378.
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In Beverly Enterprises-Florida v. Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services,28" the court held, in part, that the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services acted improperly in altering its
nonrule policy without adequately supporting it in the administrative
hearing record. 88 The court found that when an administrative agency
takes a position adverse to the party's understanding of the administra-
tive agency's prior position in a matter, then the agency has effectively
denied the party's request for action. When a party requested a formal
administrative hearing in response to this decision, then the hearing
must be de novo in nature to the extent that it addressed the formula-
tion of the new administrative agency nonrule policy and was not a
review of' any action taken earlier based upon pre-existing administra-
tive agency nonrule policy. 89 The court found that the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services had abandoned its prior interpreta-
tion of the statute during the course of this proceeding without offering
sufficient support in the evidentiary record or a reasonable explanation
for its shift in policy. 9
However, one case suggested that in some circumstances the
courts might compel an administrative agency to adopt its policy posi-
tions through the rule making process. In Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Wingfield Development Company,2 91 the court considered
whether a letter from the Department of Natural Resources requiring a
287. 573 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
288. Id. at 23.
289. Id.
290. Id. The court stated:
When an [administrative] agency seeks to validate agency action based
upon a policy that is not recorded in rules or discoverable precedents, that
policy must be established by expert testimony, documentary opinions, or
other evidence appropriate to the nature of the issues involved and the
agency must expose and elucidate its reasons for its discretionary action.
The agency may apply incipient or developing policy in a section 120.57
administrative hearing, provided the agency explicates, supports and de-
fends such policy with competent, substantial evidence on the record in
such proceeding. [Whenever an administrative agency's] policy does not
simply reiterate a legislative mandate and is not readily apparent from a
literal reading of the statutes involved . . . [it is] required to show the
reasonableness and factual accuracy of its policy [in the administrative
hearing record].
Id. at 22-23 (quoting in part St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 553 So. 2d at 1354 (citation
omitted)).
291. 581 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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developer to make periodic reports on construction progress, not cease
making significant construction progress on any part of the project for
a period of six or more months and complete the resort project within
two years or lose its exemption from the modified coastal construction
control line permit requirements for those parts of the resort project
located seaward of the modified line was a valid exercise of administra-
tive discretion. 92 These constraints on exempt status from the permit
requirements imposed by the adoption of a coastal construction control
line did not appear in the statutes or the administrative rules. The
court agreed with the hearing officer that the Department of Natural
Resources letter containing these limitations was an "illicit rule not
adopted in the manner required by law." 9'
The court further noted that "any agency statement is a rule
[under the APA294] if it purports in and of itself to create certain rights
and adversely affect others, or if it serves by its own effect to create
rights, or to require compliance, or otherwise to have the direct and
consistent effect of law."29 The court read the Department of Natural
Resources letter as easily qualifying as a rule under the APA, because
it "implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, describes proce-
dure or practice requirements of the [administrative] agency, and im-
poses requirements or information not specifically required by statute
or by existing rule."2 96 As such, the letter was an invalid exercise of
delegated authority, because it was not adopted through the rule mak-
ing process mandated by the APA.2 97 This opinion is of special note
because the language indicates that these requirements could only be
imposed through the rule making process. Thus, it implicitly rejects the
possibility that these requirements could be imposed through the
nonrule policy route.
During the last legislative session the hesitancy of the courts to
require administrative agencies to engage in rule making rather than
292. Id. at 194-95 (extensively quoting the specific language of the letter). The
Department of Natural Resources imposed these limitations to assure that exemption
from the coastal construction control line permit requirements "was obtained in good
faith and that the builder intends to go forward with the construction in a timely man-
ner." Id. at 195.
293. Id. at 196.
294. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1989).
295. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d at 196.
296. Id.
297. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1989); see also supra notes 74-79 and accom-
panying text.
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rely upon nonrule policy was addressed. The legislature amended the
APA to require administrative agencies in most circumstances to adopt
policy positions298 through the rule making process." An administra-
tive agency can escape the rule making preference only if 1) the policy
at issue is not a matter within the scope of the definition of a rule,300 or
2) it is not feasible or practicable to currently adopt the policy through
the rule making process.301 The burden is on an administrative agency
to prove that it should be exempt from the rule making preference.302
If a hearing officer determines that an administrative agency should
have adopted the nonrule policy or statement as a rule, then the admin-
istrative agency "shall immediately discontinue all reliance upon the
statement or any substantially similar statement as a basis for agency
action." '0 If an administrative agency nevertheless continues to rely
upon the nonrule policy or statement in agency action, then the person
whose substantial interests were affected by the agency action may re-
cover attorney's fees and costs,304 unless an administrative agency is
engaged in a good faith attempt to adopt the nonrule policy or state-
ment as a rule. 05
These amendments to the APA should impact on the administra-
tive process in four ways. First, the threat of attorney's fees and costs
awards should create a substantial incentive for administrative agencies
to promulgate their policy positions through the rule making process.
298. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4,
at 450-54.
299. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at
450-54.
300. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4,
at 450-54.
301. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.535(1)(a), (b) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra
note 4, at 450-54.
302. If the party meets its initial burden of showing that it is substantially af-
fected by the nonrule policy or statement which meets the definition of a rule, but has
not been adopted as a rule, then an administrative agency has the burden of offering
persuasive proof that the nonrule policy or statement is not within the scope of the
definition of rule and/or that it is not feasible or practicable to adopt it as a rule at this
time. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(b) (1991); see FLA. STAT. § 120.535(2)(a) (1991). See
generally Dore III, supra note 4, at 450-54.
303. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(4) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at
450-54.
304. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(6) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at
450-54.
305. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.535(5), (6) (1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4,
at 450-54.
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Second, the courts should no longer tolerate the use of nonrule policies
by administrative agencies, except in very rare circumstances, because
administrative agencies will no longer be able to merely assert it is not
feasible or practical to adopt a policy as a rule; they will have to prove
it. 306 Third, there should be a dramatic increase in the use of the rule
making process1 7 and challenges to proposed and promulgated rules.308
Fourth, once administrative agencies have promulgated most of their
nonrule policies and statements as rules, the legislature should be able
to better exercise its oversight function and assure that administrative
agencies are exercising their delegated authority in a manner consistent
with the legislative purpose and intent.30 9
B. Adjudicatory Structure and Procedure
The courts decided several cases during the survey period which
generally concerned the structure of the adjudicatory process and the
procedures used.
In Southeast Grove Management Inc. v. McKiness,310 the court
reversed and remanded a nonfinal administrative order, in part, be-
cause the hearing officer improperly allocated the burden of persuasion
and failed to appreciate that the hearing concerned an administrative
order which had already been rendered, not the original complaints."
In such a case, the party requesting the hearing has the "burden of
showing by competent, substantial evidence that . . [the] findings [in
the administrative order] were incorrect."3 13
306. See Burris IV, supra note 4, at 683-85. See generally Dore III, supra note
4, at 450-54.
307. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. in H.R. BILL
No. 1879 (Fla. May 22, 1991). See generally Dore III, supra note 4, at 450-54.
308. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1991) (administrative challenges to proposed
rules); FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (administrative challenges to adopted rules). See gener-
ally Dore III, supra note 4, at 450-54.
309. See Burris IV, supra note 4, at 667-73. See generally Dore III, supra note
4, at 450-54.
310. 578 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
311. Id. at 886-87. The court found that the notice given concerning the com-
plaints and right to request an administrative hearing was sufficient even though it
never mentioned whether a hearing request was made-the right to a hearing on the
complaint was waived. Id. at 887 n.6. The other issues concerned estoppel claims. See
id. at 885-86.
312. Id. at 887 (also noting that the factual findings in the order carried a rebut-
table presumption of correctness).
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The courts in two cases addressed the question of when adminis-
trative agencies and private parties could successfully use procedural
errors as a basis for seeking default orders. In Coon Clothing Co. v.
Eggers,"'1 the court noted that public policy considerations required
that, whenever possible, the merits of a case should be the basis for its
resolution, rather than procedural default mechanisms. When notice of
an administrative hearing arrives only three working days prior to the
hearing, there was evidence that the party was absent from the place
where the notice was served, and there was no evidence of any
prejudice to the administrative agency arising from the delay in the
response by the party, then a default order should not be entered, and
the case should be reopened with a hearing.814
Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co.3 15 is
consistent with the Eggers case. Puckett Oil Co. concerned under what
circumstances it was appropriate for a hearing officer to enter a sum-
mary final order.3 16 In this case, the hearing officer entered a "sum-
mary final order awarding $15,000 in attorney's fees and costs to Puck-
ett," because the Department of Environmental Regulation failed to
respond in a timely fashion to the petition filed by Puckett Oil, waiving
its right to a hearing on the petition and admitting that there was no
material issue of fact involved in resolving the petition.3 17 The court
held that the hearing officer erred in doing so. The court found that the
use of the word "shall" in the administrative rule establishing the time
for filing a response to a petition was not designed to create a circum-
stance where every failure to respond in a timely fashion should be
treated as depriving the hearing officer of jurisdiction to entertain a
request for permission to file a late response to the petition. Rather, the
mandatory language was used for the purpose of only generally provid-
ing for "the orderly conduct of business." 8' In such cases the use of
the word "shall" was not intended as mandatory, but directory. Be-
cause the word "shall" was used in this way, the trier of fact retained
jurisdiction to determine whether to exercise his or her "discretion to
313. 560 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
314. Id. at 1357-58.
315. 577 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
316. The court avoided deciding under what circumstances a party should be
permitted to escape any adverse consequences for failing to timely respond to a
petition.
317. Id. at 990-91.
318. Id. at 991.
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extend the time for the filing of a responsive pleading." 319 The hearing
officer cannot refuse to exercise its discretionary authority to grant an
administrative agency permission to file an untimely response as a
means of sanctioning the administrative agency for failing to strictly
adhere to the rules.
Of course, there are circumstances where it is appropriate for a
hearing officer to conclude that the administrative agency's failure to
file a response was a waiver of its right to a hearing.320
But, in order for waiver to be applied based on the passage of time,
we consider it essential for a showing to be made that the party
against whom waiver is asserted has received notice sufficient to
commence the running of the time period within which the re-
sponse is required. Thus, if it is clearly established that a party has
received notice informing him or her of the requirement of taking
certain action within a specified period of time, and such party de-
lays for a protracted length of time in taking the required action,
319. Id. The court noted that any contrary reading of the rule would require it to
hold that the rule was an ultra vires exercise of delegated authority. Id. at 991-92. The
court stated:
[N]o statutory authority, either expressly or reasonably implied therefrom,
empowered DOAH to set a jurisdictional time limitation on the right of an
agency to respond to a petition for fees and costs. To the contrary, we
consider that the division's power to permit a late-filed response is reasona-
bly implied from the very statutes that rule 221-6.035 referenced as au-
thorizing its adoption: Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1989), specifically
subsection (1)(b)4, authorizing parties "to respond, to present evidence
and argument on all issues," and sections 57.111(4)(c) and (d), allowing a
state agency against which a small business party has prevailed to oppose
an application for attorney's fees and costs by affidavit, and requiring the
hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application.
Clearly the two statutes, which the rule was designed to implement, imply
that the agency shall be given a fair opportunity to defend against an ap-
plication for fees and costs. We find nothing in the statutes reasonably
suggesting that if an agency fails to comply with the time limitations re-
quired for its response, a summary final order, regardless of any mitigating
circumstances, must thereafter be entered.
Id. at 992; see supra notes 38-81 and accompanying text.
320. In circumstances in which no response whatsoever has been filed, the
division obviously has the right, in its supervision of orderly administrative
proceedings, to conclude that a party has waived his or her right to re-
spond, as more fully discussed infra, and to thereafter enter a summary
final order, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 221-6.030.
Puckett Oil, 577 So. 2d at 992.
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we consider that the party may be deemed to have waived his or
her right to so act.821
However, because waiver of a right to a hearing should not be lightly
implied, it should be imposed only where a party clearly has waived its
right to a hearing, or any delay in the filing of a timely response results
in prejudice to another party's interests.3 22
The hostility of the courts toward the use of procedural default
mechanisms for resolving cases also can be seen in the one case during
the survey period that concerned the legal sufficiency of notice given by
an administrative agency. In Baker v. Office of the Treasurer,23 a fire-
fighter, Baker, appealed the final order which revoked his fire-fighter
certification, claiming that he was not given appropriate notice of an
opportunity to seek a hearing challenging the allegations in the com-
plaint. The State Fire Marshal sent Baker notice of the complaint by
certified mail. The notice was returned to the Marshal's office, noting a
forwarding address. The Marshal again mailed the complaint to the
forwarding address, but it was returned. The Marshal then employed a
private investigator who looked for Baker at the first address and also
checked an address listed in the telephone book, none of which led him
to Baker. The Marshal, after taking these steps, published notice of the
complaint against Baker in the Orlando Sentinel on four consecutive
Wednesdays. Baker never did respond to these notices, and a final or-
der revoking his certification was issued by default.
Baker claimed that the State Fire Marshal's office failed to make
a diligent search before resorting to notice by publication. The APA
provided that an administrative agency, prior to revoking any license
based upon an administrative complaint, shall serve the person with
notice of the complaint either by personal service or certified mail. If
both personal service and certified mail service are unsuccessful, then
the agency may publish notice in an appropriate newspaper.$2 4
The resolution of whether the State Fire Marshal's office properly
resorted to the use of notice through publication turned on whether the
private investigator made a diligent search for Baker. 23 The court
found that the private investigator's affidavit did not demonstrate what
321. Id. at 993 (citation omitted).
322. Id. at 993-94.
323. 575 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
324. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(7) (1989).
325. Baker, 575 So. 2d at 728.
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steps he had taken in attempting to locate Baker. Rather, the affidavit
evidenced a mere conclusory statement that the investigator had visited
one address in an attempt to locate Baker, and that his present address
remained unknown. Based upon the affidavit, the court could not know
what steps the private investigator took in attempting to locate Baker's
other addresses.2 6
The court held that "the requirements of the statute authorizing
service by publication were not met in this case in that there was an
absence of diligent inquiry and a conscious effort to locate appellant
reasonably employing knowledge known by or readily available to the
appellee." 327 Because there was no proof that notice by publication was
necessary in this case, Baker was denied his opportunity to request a
hearing and contest the allegations contained in the complaint. 328
Two cases during the survey period concerned the question of
when the jurisdiction of the administrative agency or hearing officer
was terminated. New v. Department of Banking and Finances29 con-
cerned an agreement reached between New and the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services just prior to the commencement of
a section 120.57 formal hearing. The agreement provided for repay-
ment of an overpayment of certain amounts via an electronic funds
transfer. The hearing officer closed the file and discontinued the hear-
ing at that point. However, the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services was unable to persuade the Comptroller that it had law-
fully appropriated funds for the purpose of making its portion of the
repayment, and therefore, the settlement agreement was not
implemented.
The court noted that a settlement agreement did not deprive a
hearing officer of jurisdiction when the hearing concerning the case was
merely discontinued as a result. The hearing officer loses jurisdiction
over the matter only after the case is dismissed. When, for reasons un-
forseen by the parties at the time, the settlement agreement was not
implemented, then the case must be re-opened, and the formal adminis-
trative hearing process should be resumed for the purpose of entering
326. Id. at 729. The court noted that there were several obvious steps which
should have been taken including seeking his address from his employer, the City of
Orlando Fire Department. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 729-30. The court ordered that the case be remanded and a hearing
date set in compliance with the requirements of the APA.
329. 554 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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an order adopting the terms of the settlement agreement. 8 0 The Comp-
troller erred in unilaterally entering a final order requiring repayment
by New.s38
In Kalbach v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices,13 1 the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and
Kalbach "had agreed that the arrearage owed for [child support] as of
March 22, 1988, was $1,020.40. ' s33 This was adopted as a finding of
fact in the final order by the Department. In a subsequent letter, the
Department asserted that the correct arrearage amount for child sup-
port "was actually $2,084.97 as June 15, 1988. ' ' 3M After a second
hearing, the hearing officer determined that the Department was bound
by its earlier finding that the arrearage in child support was $1,020.40,
even though this figure was in conflict with the circuit court's order
concerning child support obligations. The Department rejected this
finding in its final administrative order, and held that any error in the
determination of arrearages in child support, whether the error is an
over- or under-statement, should be corrected at the point in time when
the error is discovered.
The court rejected this position, finding that after an administra-
tive order became final and the time for judicial review had passed, the
Department of Health of Rehabilitative Services was precluded from
modifying the order. "While administrative agencies do have inherent
power to reconsider final orders that are still under their control ... [,
where the] order .. .passed out of . . . [their] control . .. [it] be-
330. Id. at 1207. This may appear nonsensical. However, it is necessary so that
the parties can seek enforcement of the settlement agreement in court.
331. The court noted that the Comptroller incorrectly concluded there were no
appropriated funds available to repay the amount of the overpayment. Id.
The court also granted New's motion for attorney's fees and costs because,
the agency's actions which precipitated this appeal was gross abuse of
[the] agency's discretion. The Comptroller who was a mere party to a
valid section 120.57 proceeding took charge of the proceedings and without
jurisdiction or authority entered a void order adversely affecting the sub-
stantive rights of New. It was necessary that she appeal the order in order
to protect her rights.
Id. The Division of Administrative Hearing was directed to hold a hearing on the mat-
ter of the appropriate amount of attorney's fees and costs if the parties were unable to
agree on the amount. Id. at 1208.
332. 563 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
333. Id. at 810.
334. Id.
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came final and was no longer subject to modification."335 The only oc-
casion when the agency might successfully argue for an exception to
this general rule occurs where it is able to demonstrate that modifica-
tion of the order is necessary due to a "change in circumstances or any
demonstrated public need or interest." 36 No such showing was offered
in this case.
It is clear that the APA requires an administrative agency to
maintain an accurate transcript of any section 120.57(1) hearing. 37 In
Citrus Central v. Gardner,338 the court noted that when circumstances
required a hearing de novo to be held, because the record of the origi-
nal hearing was not available, then "the presentation of new and addi-
tional evidence, by which the matter might be determined as if it had
not been previously addressed" was admissible.33 9
Further, in E.H. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vice, 40 a hearing was held by the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services pursuant to section 120.57(1), but because the court re-
porter who kept the transcript of the record had left the jurisdiction,
and all efforts by the parties to contact the court reporter had failed, no
record was available for the appeal. 41 The remedy in such a case was
for both parties, along with the hearing officer, to submit their recollec-
tions of what transpired at the hearing, and this would constitute the
record on appeal.342 An administrative agency was not considered exon-
erated from this duty by mere allegations that it made a good faith
attempt to preserve the record. While in this case the failure of the
agency to maintain the transcript of the proceeding did not result in its
being unable to meet its burden of showing that there was substantial
and competent evidence to support its decision, in some future case it
may well do so.""
Generally, under the APA, ex parte communication is prohib-
ited.344 But in Citizens of Florida v. Wilson,45 the court noted that
335. Id.
336. Id. at 811; cf. supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text.
337. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(7) (1989); see supra notes 123-44 and accompa-
nying text.
338. 569 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
339. Id. at 937.
340. 571 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
341. Id. at 50.
342. Id. at 51; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 9.200(b)(4).
343. E.H., 571 So. 2d at 51.
344. FLA. STAT. § 120.66 (1989).
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this prohibition was not designed to forbid contact between Public Ser-
vice Commission members and their staff during the course of a rate
hearing. The Court found that section 120.66 was limited to circum-
stances where a hearing officer was involved, or after an administrative
agency had received a recommended order. Neither of these circum-
stances were present in this case. The court also noted that the commu-
nication occurred during the course of a public hearing and, therefore,
lacked the characteristic of an ex parte communication which generally
is contact made outside of the public hearing context.846
C. Licensinge47
In Patmilt Corp. v. Department of Business Regulation," ' the
court held that where the Department of Business Regulation had
orally agreed to accept a lesser penalty than revocation of a license,
and where the licensee relied upon that oral agreement, the Depart-
ment of Business Regulation cannot enter a default order revoking the
license because of the Department's perception that the licensee was
late in submitting a completed copy of the written agreement based
upon the prior oral agreement. The process used by the Department
was not fair and constituted a material error, because it failed to give
the licensee specific notice of the possible consequences of not timely
submitting an executed copy of the written agreement.34 9 The court in-
dicated that the Department may adopt such an approach if it provides
adequate notice to a licensee so that the licensee knows it must submit
the agreement in a timely fashion, or, in a timely fashion, request an
administrative hearing, or otherwise risk having waived the right to a
hearing.350
345. 569 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1990).
346. Id. at 1270.
347. Several other cases concerning licensing are discussed elsewhere in this arti-
cle. See, e.g., supra notes 70-73, 103-113, 266-76 and accompanying text.
348. 581 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
349. Id. at 998-99. The court also noted that the written agreement provided by
the Department of Business Regulation stated that if the agreement was not accepted
by the director, then it would constitute notice of a request for an administrative hear-
ing on the matter.
350. But see supra notes 313-28 and accompanying text.
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D. Contract Bidding
Only one decision during the survey period directly concerned the
contract bidding process. Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply Co.
v. Department of General Services5 1 concerned an appeal from a final
order issued by a hearing officer awarding attorney's fees to the De-
partment of General Services and Marpan Supply because Mercedes
Lighting had filed a "frivolous bid protest. ' 52 Mercedes Lighting's low
bid was rejected, because it did not include a list of in-state service
representatives, as required by the invitation to bid issued by the De-
partment of General Services. Mercedes Lighting contended that it
filed a bid with in-state service representatives named,'35 or, in the al-
ternative, that the omission of an in-state service representative from
the bid was a minor irregularity which could be waived.35 4
The hearing officer rejected both contentions finding that naming
of manufacture's sales employees could not reasonably be understood
as having designated an in-state service representative, and holding
that the minor bid irregularity claim was waived, as it was not asserted
in a timely fashion.355 The hearing officer characterized the protest as
frivolous, because it had no basis in law or fact. The hearing officer
specifically found that Mercedes Lighting had simply forgotten to in-
clude the in-state service representative information in its bid, and that
the bid protest was filed merely to provide an opportunity for it to cor-
rect this oversight. The hearing officer considered this an inappropriate
use of the bid protest process35 6 and awarded attorney's fees and costs
to the parties to the bid protest. 5
The court, when interpreting under what circumstances attorney's
fees and costs could be awarded under section 120.57(l)(b)5, drew
351. 560 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
352. Id. at 273.
353. Mercedes Lighting maintained that the names were found among the plant
manufacturer's sales employees listed in their bid. Id. at 274.
354. Id.
355. The hearing officer found that Mercedes Lighting would gain an advantage
if it was allowed to re-open its bid to correct the deficiency, because it could choose to
withdraw its bid by failing to correct the deficiency-an opportunity not offered to
other bidders on the contract.
356. Id. at 275. The hearing officer did not find that the bid protest was insti-
tuted for the purpose of creating unnecessary delay or to establish an advantage.
357. Mercedes Lighting, 560 So. 2d at 276. "The hearing officer entered a final
order granting the Department $24,312.00 in fees plus costs, and Marpan $20,281.00
plus costs." Id.
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upon the policy arguments underlying Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 58 The APA provision concerning awards of attorney's
fees and costs provided that an award should occur only when the ac-
tion was filed for an improper purpose, such as a frivolous bid protest.
The APA provision did not require that the party or attorney signing
the papers, which were the basis for the administrative action believe
that "the paper is well-grounded in fact, and is . . .warranted by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law."35 9
The court reasoned that if the legislature intended to have these
factors considered in the decision process concerning awards of attor-
ney's fees, it would have listed them explicitly in section
120.57('1)(b)5.3 60 The court found that the hearing officer erred in con-
cluding that the bid protest was frivolous, because there was no clear
binding precedent which established a position contrary to that asserted
by Mercedes Lighting during the bid protest process. 6 A critical ele-
ment in this decision process was that the administrative agency always
had an opportunity to change its mind as a result of the hearing in the
case before it. The fact that the hearing officer ultimately chose to re-
ject the position advocated by Mercedes Lighting was not sufficient jus-
tification for holding that the bid protest was frivolous, especially where
there was a reasonably clear legal justification for bringing the pro-
test. 62 In dicta, the court noted that there were other remedies availa-
358. Id. at 276-77.
359. Id. at 277; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)5 (1989)
The signature of a party, a party's attorney, or a party's qualified repre-
sentative constitutes a certificate that he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper and that, to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper pur-
poses, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous pur-
pose or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
360. Mercedes Lighting, 560 So. 2d at 277. The court noted that it is appropri-
ate for the legislature to make clear its intent if it wished to have the two-prongs of
Rule 11 apply in this statutory circumstance. The court's imposition of this require-
ment in this instance would violate the tenets of the separation of powers doctrine. Id.
at 277-78.
361. Id. at 278. The Department of General Services did not move to dismiss the
bid protest petition "on the grounds that it was baseless or filed for an improper pur-
pose." Id. at 274.
362. The court noted that a decision by a hearing officer should not normally be
given the effect of stare decisis, as in the case of judicial decisions, because such deci-
sions turn on the specific facts of each case and are easily distinguishable. It would be
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ble to a hearing officer besides an awarding of attorney's fees and costs.
A hearing officer also had authority to order a pleading struck if it was
filed for an improper purpose, or to order it withdrawn or amended. 63
E. Emergency Rules and Orders
In Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v.
Lewis,364 the now infamous Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna-
tional 68 (BCCI) appealed the final administrative order by the Comp-
troller denying BCCI's petition for renewal of a license to operate an
office in Miami, Florida. 66 Despite a very checkered past operation,3 67
the Comptroller granted BCCI a renewal of its Miami office license for
the year ending on March 4, 1990. In that renewal order, the Comp-
troller stated that "BCCI has satisfactorily demonstrated that the stat-
utory requirements for renewal of its license have been met." 3' 8
After this renewal was granted, BCCI and the Comptroller en-
tered into another agreement further detailing monitoring and compli-
ance requirements. In early January 1990, BCCI entered a guilty plea
to money laundering charges and agreed to pay a civil forfeiture of
approximately $15,000,000. Although the plea agreement was subject
to a gag order, the Comptroller was given permission to review the
terms of the plea agreement and the details of BCCI's compliance with
its terms. In February 1990, BCCI timely filed another application for
renewal of its license for the Miami office. Notice of the renewal was
published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 2, 1990.
contrary to the purpose of the bid protest proceedings, as these were designed to pro-
vide "a person, whose substantial interest ha[d] been determined by agency action, an
opportunity to attack the agency's position by appropriate means, subject to judicial
review under § 120.68, Florida Statutes." Id. at 278. But see Burris IV, supra note 4,
at 693-97.
363. Id. at 279.
364. 570 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
365. BCCI has been labeled the sleaziest bank in the world by both Time and
Newsweek. See 138 TIME July 29, 1991, at 42-47.
366. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 384.
367. BCCI was indicted in October of 1988, had been subject to an emergency
order calling for it to cease all unsafe and unsound banking practices and activities,
and had entered into a subsequent agreement with the Comptroller in which BCCI
promised to operate using safe and sound banking practices, to cease violation of any
laws, to maintain adequate monetary reserves, and to make periodic reports concerning
compliance with these requirements. Id.
368. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 384.
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"On March 5, 1990, three days after publication, Lewis issued a final
order denying the renewal of BCCI's Miami agency license."3 69 The
order concluded that "(a) the [$15,000,000] civil forfeiture affect[ed]
the financial condition of BCCI so as to constitute an unsafe and un-
sound banking practice; (b) the activities described in the indictment
constitute[d] criminal violations of law; and (c) renewal of the Miami
agency license [was] not in the public interest. ' 70 The Comptroller no-
tified BCCI that it could challenge the order through an administrative
hearing process or by seeking appellate review within thirty days.
Under the APA, summary orders should be issued only in an
emergency situation. In all other situations, the APA requires that a
party which will be adversely effected should be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard before any final order or action is taken.3 71 The
court re jected any claim that the legislature had totally abrogated a
pre-deprivation hearing right of applicants for a banking license. The
court found that the APA guaranteed an applicant, as well as any
other person, the opportunity to request a hearing within twenty-one
days of publication of the notice of the license renewal request. 1 The
court concluded that "[t]his statute, by its own terms, gives an appli-
cant, as well as other parties, [twenty-one] days to request a hearing.
We find nothing in the statute which authorizes the [D]epartment [of
Banking and Financing] to issue a final order prior to giving the appli-
cant a reasonable opportunity to request a hearing. 3 73 If an adminis-
trative agency chooses to rely upon the presence of an emergency to
justify summary action, then it must explain how the circumstances
present an "immediate danger to the public health, safety or wel-
fare. '" 37' In this case, the Department of Banking and Financing failed
to properly demonstrate, on the face of the order, that such an emer-
gency existed as required by a section 120.59(3).?
In Allied Education Corp. v. Department of Education,37 6 the
court noted that a cease and desist order entered against a post-second-
ary vocational school and ordering that it cease operations, presented
an appropriate circumstance for interlocutory judicial review, "because
369. Id. at 385.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. FLA. STAT. § 120.60(5)(a)2 (1989).
373. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 385.
374. FLA. STAT. § 120.59(3) (1989); see FLA. STAT. 120.60(8) (1989).
375. BCCI, 570 So. 2d at 386.
376. 573 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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review of final agency action would not provide an adequate rem-
edy."'377 The court entered an order quashing the cease and desist order
without prejudice, because the Department of Education did not allege
and was unable to substantiate "any threat or danger to the public
health, safety, or welfare." '78 The court rejected the attempt by the
Department of Education to remedy these defects by alleging and of-
fering evidence on these issues during the hearing conducted by the
Division of Administrative Hearings as untimely, because these allega-
tions and findings should have been set forth in the emergency order
itself.3 79
In dicta, the court noted that Florida Statute section 246.2265,
which delegated to the Department of Education the authority to sus-
pend the license of educational institutions in an emergency,380 did not
require the Department of Education to comply with any of the proce-
dural safeguards which normally are applicable when an emergency
suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license is imposed.38' Without
these procedural safeguards, the "emergency action taken by an agency
prior to providing an opportunity for the effected person(s) to be heard
would run afoul of well-established constitutional guarantees of proce-
dural due process."38 ' In order to assure that section 246.2265 was not
unconstitutional, the court found that the procedure provided for in the
APA for emergency suspension of a license was required in any action
under the section. The court found that the action of the Department
of Education did not comply with this procedure, because its cease and
desist order "did not set forth specific facts and reasons for finding an
immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare, nor did it
state why the action taken was only that necessary to protect the public
interest, nor did it give reasons for concluding that the procedures uti-
lized were fair under the circumstances. 383
377. Id. at 960. The court noted that Allied Education sought interlocutory re-
view through a notice of appeal process. This was not considered the proper method for
invoking the appellate court's jurisdiction based on an interlocutory circumstance. Al-
lied Educational should have filed a petition for review of a non-final agency action
pursuant to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(c). The court treated the notice of appeal filed by
Allied Educational as such a notice for purposes of this case. Id. at 960 n.1.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 961.
380. FLA. STAT. § 246.2265 (1989).
381. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(9) (1989); FLA. STAT. § 120.60(8) (1989).
382. Allied Educ. Corp., 573 So. 2d at 961.
383. Id. at 961. The court also noted that Allied Education was not offered an
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Similar principles constrain the power of administrative agencies
to issue emergency rules.384 The decision in Little v. Coler385 concerned
a challenge to emergency rules promulgated by the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services.8 86 Under the APA, in order for an
emergency rule promulgated by an administrative agency to be valid,
the agency must publish "the facts and reasons for finding an immedi-
ate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for
concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. '38 7
In this case, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in
its published notice concerning these emergency rules. stated that the
reduction in appropriations for the aid to families with dependent chil-
dren program required an immediate implementation of cost reduction
plans, or the program would have insufficient funds to continue opera-
tion until the end of the fiscal year. The Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services asserted in its notice that the process being
adopted was fair, because it was impossible to promulgate a permanent
rule in time to implement the savings required by the reduced
appropriation. 88
The court held that reduction in appropriation for the program
qualified as an emergency circumstance under the APA.389 The court
found that the possibility of a transfer of funds from state trust funds
by the Governor, if an excess of those funds existed, was not a sufficient
basis for holding that no emergency existed as result of the reduced
appropriation. 9 The emergency rules were justified as long as they
were needed to assure compliance with the appropriate statutes gov-
evidentiary hearing concerning the matters alleged in the emergency cease and desist
order. Id.
384. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9) (1989).
385. 557 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
386. The court noted that initially the case was properly before it, because when
a petitioner asserts that emergency rules will have a real and substantial impact on him
or her, then rules may be challenged in a direct appeal to the court. Id. at 158; see FLA.
STAT. §§ 120.54(9), .68 (1989).
387. Little, 557 So. 2d at 158.
388. Id. The reductions implemented by the rules chiefly concerned methods by
which the amount of benefits paid out would be reduced through delays in the first
benefit payments to new applicants. Id. at 159.
389. Id. at 160.
390. Id. at 159. The court specifically found that the transfer of such funds was
far too contingent to be relied upon in avoiding the possible shortfall in the funding of
the program as it was currently constituted. Id.
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erning the program."' The failure of the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services to notify, as suggested by Florida Administra-
tive Code Rule 28-3.037, major wire services and other effected persons
of the purpose of the emergency rule was not a basis for invalidating
the emergency rules which were ultimately promulgated. The language
of rule 28-3.037 is not mandatory, so providing these types of notice is
a matter left to administrative discretion. Discretionary decisions of
this nature should be overturned by the courts only when an abuse of
discretion has occurred. The court found no evidence in this case to
support the claim that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services abused its discretion.892
F. What Counts As Evidence In An Administrative
Proceeding?
Part of what makes the hearing processes under the APA unique
is that the traditional complex rules of evidence do not constrain what
evidence may be admitted at a hearing. "Irrelevant, immaterial, or un-
duly repetitious evidence shall be excluded, but all other evidence of a
type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the con-
duct of their affairs shall be admissible, whether or not such evidence
would be admissible in a trial in the courts of Florida. ' 393 Under this
statutory scheme, hearing officers have "considerable discretion in de-
termining what evidence should be admitted at an administrative hear-
ing." 394 However, there are limits to this discretion both as to the ad-
mission and exclusion of evidence.
For example, in Conservancy, Inc. v. A. Vernon Allen Builder,
Inc., 95 the court held that it was reversible error for the hearing officer
to exclude evidence of secondary impact in determining cumulative im-
pact of a dredge and fill permit. The court found that this was relevant
non-repetitive evidence on a critical issue. 9 However, in Faucher v.
391. Little, 557 So. 2d at 160.
392. Id.
393. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1989). But see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Roop,
566 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that administrative proceed-
ings under Chapter 120 are exempted from the rules of evidence, but that the workers'
compensation system of adjudication is governed not by the APA, but by the Florida
Rules of Evidence).
394. Burris II, supra note 4, at 755; see also Burris III, supra note 4, at 623.
395. 580 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
396. Id. at 779.
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R.C.F. Developers,39 7 the court noted that when medical records and
documents are not legible, then such medical documents and records
"cannot be regarded as competent and substantial proof of anything,
and will be disregarded in the evaluation of the evidence in the record
on appeal." ' 98 The court was clearly indicating that such information
should never have been admitted as evidence.
1. Hearsay
Hearsay evidence is generally admissible in an administrative pro-
ceeding, but the use of hearsay evidence to support an administrative
agency decision is significantly restricted under the APA. 99 Standing
alone, hearsay evidence cannot constitute competent substantial evi-
dence, but it can "be used for the purpose of supplementing or explain-
ing other evidence."' 00 In Doran v. Department of Health and Rehabil-
itative Services, °1 the court held that "[tihe documents presented
before the hearing officer were hearsay and did not come within any
recognized exception which would have made them admissible in a civil
action."'0 2 Because the documents offered in this case were uncorrobo-
rated hearsay evidence, the APA provides that such evidence cannot by
itself constitute competent and substantial evidence in a case.' 0 3 Be-
cause there was no other evidence offered in this case to prove the criti-
cal disputed factual issues, the order of the Office of Public Assistance
Appeals Hearings was reversed.' 0 However, if the hearsay evidence of-
fered had been admissible in a civil action, then it may have by itself
397. 569 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
398. Id. at 798 n.2.
399. Cf. Nowicki v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 558 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1990). In Nowicki, the court noted once again that judges of compensation
claim are required to follow the rules of evidence more closely than hearing officers in a
normal APA adjudicatory proceeding. In such a case, documents which are hearsay
must be excluded from evidence unless they are qualified for admission under one of
the hearsay exceptions. Id. at 183.
400. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1989). "The use of hearsay evidence in this
limited manner, supplementing or explaining other evidence, is often erroneously cited
by boards or commissions in reversing the decisions of referees [or] hearing of-
ficers . . . ." Burris III, supra note 4, at 624.
401. 558 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
402. Id. at 88.
403. See FLA. STAT. § 120.58(l)(a) (1989).
404. Doran, 558 So. 2d at 88.
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constituted competent substantial evidence. 03
G. An Agency Must Follow Its Own Rules
Administrative agencies may not take action which is inconsistent
with their own rules.? 6 Generally, if an administrative agency does so,
then the reviewing court must remand the case to the agency for pro-
ceedings consistent with the agency rules. 0 7
The court used this basic principle in resolving the issue presented
in Florida Optometric Ass'n v. Department of Professional Regula-
tion.4 0 8 In Florida Optometric Ass'n, the court considered whether the
Board properly determined that the petition for intervention was filed
untimely. The structure of the APA and the Florida Administrative
Code clearly envisions that a person who may be affected by declara-
tory statements must be offered a clear point of entry into the formal
proceeding, allowing that person to contest the possible resolution of
the matter to be addressed.
The court noted that this required a notice which was "sufficient
to give persons with standing to initiate [section] 120.57 proceedings a
clear point of entry to either initiate [section] 120.57 proceedings or
intervene in already existing proceedings directed to the same agency
decision. ' 40 9 Because no statute or rule superseded the notice timing
requirements found in Administrative Code Rule 28-5.111,
the Board was required to comply with the requirements of Rule
28-5.111 in giving notice of the declaratory statement proceedings.
The published notice of the declaratory statement petition obvi-
ously failed to comply with Rule 28-5.111, in that it neither speci-
fied the time limit for requesting a hearing, nor referenced the rele-
vant procedural rules. Further, even if the published notice of the
petition for declaratory statement had complied with rule 28-5.111,
the optometrists' petition would have been timely, because it was
filed just eleven days following the April 21, 1989 publication [of
405. See FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1989); Burris III, supra note 4, at 625.
406. See Phibro Resources Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 579 So. 2d
118, 123 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court was troubled by the failure of the
Department of Environmental Regulation to follow its own rules concerning consent
orders. Id.
407. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12)(b) (1989).
408. 567 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
409. Id. at 935.
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the notice concerning the declaratory statement proceeding]. 10
The court also noted that normally, petitions for declaratory state-
ment do not concern anyone other than the particular petitioner, be-
cause they are limited to the petitioner's circumstance only. In such a
case, there is no right to a section 120.57 hearing. But if a petition for
a declaratory statement is not so narrowly drawn, it will affect "the
substantial interest of other parties," or have the potential to affect the
substantial interest of other parties so that an opportunity for a section
120.57 hearing must be offered in order to provide them with a clear
point of entry into the declaratory statement proceeding.41'
However, when the deviation from the requirements of the admin-
istrative rules has been slight or minor, then the courts have been un-
willing to reverse an administrative agency decision. Cases along this
line apparently rely on a harmless error rationale to justify the decision
not to reverse.' 12 In State v. Donaldson,13 the court noted that the
410. Id. Further, the court noted that there was no indication here that the filing
of the petition for intervention was occurring after a waiver of the right to a clear point
of entry had occurred. The court also stated that the optometrists could not have been
held to have waived their right to a clear point of entry, because they never received
adequate notice under Rule 28-5.111 that a section 120.57 hearing was going to be
held concerning the declaratory statement petition. Id.
411. Id. at 936. The court declined to address the issue of whether the declara-
tory statement sought in this case would be invalid due to the attempt to promulgate a
rule via a non-rulemaking process. In doing so, the court noted that,
although the line between the two is not always clear, it should be
remembered that declaratory statements are not to be used as a vehicle for
the adoption of broad agency policies. Nor should they be used to provide
interpretations of statutes, rules or orders which are applicable to an entire
class of persons. Declaratory statements should only be granted where the
petition has clearly set for specific facts and circumstances which show
that the question presented relates only to the petitioner and his particular
sets of circumstances. Thus, petitions which provide only a cursory factual
recitation or which use broad undefined terms . . . should be carefully
scrutinized. Similarly, petitions by associations rather than individuals,
should be inherently suspect. When an agency is called upon to issue a
declaratory statement in response to a question which is not limited to
specific facts and a specific petitioner, and which would require response of
such a general and consistent nature as to meet the definition of a rule, the
agency should either decline to issue the statement or comply with the
provisions of section 120.54 governing rulemaking.
Id. at 937.
412. Cf. Krischer v. School Bd., 555 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In
Krischer, the court held that a technical violation of the notice requirements provided
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legislature did not intend for minor deviations from the requirements
set forth in the administrative rules concerning storage and mainte-
nance schedules for a breathalyzer machine, which do not impact on its
reliability, 1 " to prohibit the use of the test results in court."15
H. Rule Making Process
Generally, courts will rigorously enforce the procedural require-
ments of the rule making process. In Martin County Liquors v. De-
partment of Business Regulation,"16 the Division of Alcoholic Bever-
ages and Tobacco challenged the decision of the hearing officer who
"found the Department's requirements that applicants for quota liquor
licenses provide documentation supporting financial arrangements and
demonstrate 'right of occupancy' are an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority.""' 7 The hearing officer found that the attempt to
for in the Florida statutes did not require reversal of an otherwise appropriate order
terminating a teacher's employment absent a showing that the teacher was prejudiced
by the failure to comply with the notice requirements. There was more than adequate
documentation that the teacher had received numerous notices concerning her inade-
quate performance, and that she was offered many opportunities to attempt correction
of this unsatisfactory performance. Any technical violation of the notice requirement
was considered harmless error. Id. at 437; see also School Bd. v. Weaver, 556 So. 2d
443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In Weaver, the court noted that when an adminis-
trative agency failed to timely act upon a recommended order, such failure was not
grounds generally for reversal of the final order. A violation of the time frame for
rendering a final order as provided for in the APA did not require reversal "if the
fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action taken is found to have been
impaired by virtue of the statute's violation." Id. at 446. The court found in this case
that there was no evidence showing that the delay "impaired the fairness of the pro-
ceeding nor the correctness of the action." Id.
413. 579 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1991).
414. The court agreed that when no evidence was offered by the prosecution that
the breathalyzer machine was reliable, then the results of the breathalyzer test must
not be admitted. Id. at 729.
415. Id.
416. 574 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The rule challenge was filed
under section 120.56. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1989). This case also involved a section
120.57 formal hearing in which the rule was applied concerning quota liquor licenses to
deny the application of Martin County Liquors, Inc. Id. at 172.
417. Id. at 172. Martin County Liquors, Inc. was denied its liquor license be-
cause it had failed to file with its application a right of occupancy certification for the
location where it planned to operate its business. Martin County Liquors filed a rule
challenge concerning the Department of Beverage Regulations rule 700L and 710L,
alleging that "they were not filed with the Office of Secretary of State, as well as the
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impose the requirements of rule 700L was an invalid exercise of dele-
gated authority, because it was not filed with the Secretary of State, as
required by the APA.41 8 The hearing officer also concluded that section
302 of the manual was an attempt to promulgate a rule without com-
plying with the rulemaking process, and was an invalid exercise of dele-
gated legislative authority.4 19 The court agreed that the failure to file
rule 7001L with the Secretary of State's office rendered it an invalid
exercise of delegated legislative authority. The court found that this
was a material failure to follow the applicable process concerning rule
making. 10
In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida
Medical Center,421 the court addressed the issue of what remedy was
available when a proposed rule, which was substantively amended, was
renoticed by the administrative agency rather than beginning the rule
making process anew. While the APA provides that an administrative
agency may adopt rules "only after the public has been notified of the
content of proposed rules and reasonable opportunity for public com-
ment has been given, 4 2 it also provides that an administrative agency
in several circumstances need not begin the rule making process again
validity of [section] 302 of the Division's, a policy and procedure since it constituted a
rule and was not properly promulgated as such." Id. at 173.
418. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(11), (13)(a) (1989).
419. Martin County Liquors, Inc., 574 So. 2d at 173.
420. Id. The court noted in dicta that there was no statutory requirement con-
cerning the items listed in rule 700L, but that if the agency had properly promulgated
such requirements through its rule making authority, they could be legally imposed on
all applicants. Id. The court also found that the manual provision of section 302 was an
attempt to impose the requirements of a rule on license applicants without complying
with the rule making process:
Applicants for quota liquor licenses are initially approved or disapproved
based on the requirements established in the DABT's policy section 302.
No other standard definition of the complete application exists, and it is to
be applied uniformly and generally to the public at large. It clearly does
not fall within the exceptions under section 120.52(16)(a). Thus, we find
that DABT's assertion that section 302 was irrelevant to their denial of
Mari:in County Liquors' application because their field office accepted the
incomplete application to be without merit. DABT's policy section 302
meets the definition of rule pursuant to section 120.52(16), and because it
was not promulgated as such, it constitutes an invalid exercise of delega-
tive legislative authority.
Id. at 174.
421. 578 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
422. Id. at 354.
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because it amended a proposed rule.423 Rather, all that is required in
those circumstances is that the amended proposed rule be renoticed.
The court noted that administrative agencies may,
make changes during the course of the rulemaking process without
the necessity of beginning the process anew, so long as the changes
(1) are supported by the record of public hearings held on the rule,
(2) are merely technical and do not affect the substance of the rule,
(3) are in response to written material contained in the record and
submitted to the agency within [twenty-one] days following the
first publication of notice of the proposed rule, or (4) are in re-
sponse to a proposed objection by the Administrative Procedures
Committee.424
423. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(13)(b) (1989); see J.B. Coxwell Contracting, Inc. v.
Department of Transp., 580 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In Coxwell, the
court noted that under the APA, an administrative agency need not re-notice its pro-
posed rule before promulgating, it even if it was amended, so long as the rule amend-
ment was adopted as "a result of testimony presented at a public hearing prior to the
rule's adoption." Id. at 623-24. The court rejected the rule challenge and held that this
was exactly what happened in this case. Id.
424. Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 353. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(13)(b)
(1989) provides:
After the notice required in subsection (1) and prior to adoption, the
agency may withdraw the rule in whole or in part or may make such
changes in the rule as are supported by the record of public hearings held
on the rule, technical changes which do not affect the substance of the
rule, changes in response to written material relating to the rule received
by the agency within 21 days after the notice and made a part of the
record of the proceeding, or changes in response to a proposed objection by
the committee. After adoption and before the effective date, a rule may be
modified or withdrawn only in response to an objection by the committee
or may be modified to extend the effective date by not more than 60 days
when the committee has notified the agency that an objection to the rule is
being considered. The agency shall give notice of its decision to withdraw
or modify a rule in the first available issue of the publication in which the
original notice of rulemaking was published and shall notify the Depart-
ment of State if the rule is required to be filed with the Department of
State. After a rule has become effective, it may be repealed or amended
only through regular rulemaking procedures.
See also FLA. STAT. § 120.54(11)(a) (1989) which provides:
After the final public hearing on the proposed rule, or after the time for
requesting a hearing has expired, the adopting agency shall file any
changes in the proposed rule and the reasons therefor with the committee
or advise the committee that there are no changes. In addition, when any
change is made in a proposed rule, other than a technical change, the
[Vol. 16
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However, it is equally clear that the APA provides: "[S]ubstantially
affected persons [must have] a reasonable opportunity to challenge pro-
posed rules prior to their adoption."' 25
When an administrative agency materially amends or modifies the
proposed rule after the time for challenging the rule has run"26 and the
opportunity for public comment has passed,'2 7 then interested persons
are effectively deprived of any meaningful point of access to the rule
making process. The court held such a result is contrary to the funda-
mental structure of the APA rule making process, because it would
permit an administrative agency to circumvent all meaningful public
input into the rule making process, as well as foreclosure any challenge
to the validity of the proposed rule prior to its promulgation.2 8 Clearly,
adopting agency shall provide a detailed statement of such change by cer-
tified mail or actual delivery to any person who requests it in writing at the
public hearing. The agency shall file the change with the committee, and
provide the statement of change to persons requesting it, at least 7 days
prior to filing the rule for adoption.
425. Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 354 (emphasis omitted).
426. The APA provides:
(4)(a) Any substantially affected person may seek an administrative deter-
mination of the invalidity of any proposed rule on the ground that the
proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
(b)The request seeking a determination under this subsection shall be in
writing and must be filed with the division within 21 days after the date of
publication of the notice. It must state with particularity the provisions of
the rule or economic impact statement alleged to be invalid with sufficient
explanation of the facts or grounds for the alleged invalidity and facts suf-
ficient to show that the person challenging the proposed rule would be sub-
stantially affected by it.
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1990).
427. Under the APA,
[i]f the intended action concerns any rule other than one relating exclu-
sively to organization, procedure, or practice, the agency shall, on the re-
quest of any affected person received within 21 days after the date of pub-
lication of the notice, give affected persons an opportunity to present
evidence and argument on all issues under consideration appropriate to in-
form it of their contentions . . . .The agency may schedule a public hear-
ing on the rule and, if requested by any affected person, shall schedule a
public hearing on the rule.
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). Thus, any affected person has an absolute
right to a public hearing on a proposed rule, if a timely request was made.
428. lAin agency need only publish notice of an innocuous proposed rule,
wait 21 days so that the time for demanding a public hearing under
120.5.4(3) or petitioning for a determination of invalidity under 120.54(4)
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in this case the amendment of the proposed rule was substantial, be-
cause it fundamentally changed the criteria for awarding certificates of
need. 29 Therefore, the rule making process must begin anew and the
parties must be offered an adequate point of entry. 30
In Florida Medical Center, the court also noted that any time an
administrative agency publishes notice of a change in a proposed rule, a
substantially affected person has a new twenty-one day period within
which to file notice of a rule challenge under section 120.54(4) claim-
ing that the administrative agency violated the limitation imposed by
section 120.54(13)(b) on the amendment or modification of a proposed
rule.481 Any successful challenge to the amended proposed rule under
this process will require the administrative agency to withdraw the
amended proposed rule, or begin the rule making process anew."3" The
court specifically found that this reading of the time frame for filing a
section 120.54(4) challenge to a proposed rule was required, because
the post-promulgation rule challenge provisions are not as complete or
adequate a set of safeguards as the pre-promulgation rule challenge
provision under section 120.54(4) .4
has passed, and then simply change the rule however it wishes. The fact
that such changes might be in excess of the limitations of Section
120.54(13)(b), and might bear no resemblance to the original proposed
rule, would not matter, at least so far as the public right to be heard prior
to rule adoption. In our view, such a holding would not comport with the
legislative intent. Rather, it would effectively defeat the legislative pur-
poses undergirding Section 120.54.
Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 354 (emphasis in original).
429. The original proposed rule provided that certificates of need should be is-
sued in a manner to assure that "unnecessary duplication of services" did not occur in
the area of adult cardiac catheterization programs. Id. at 353. The amended proposed
rule dropped this focus and substituted a concern for "fosterling] competition among
[adult cardiac catheterization] providers." Id.
430. Id. at 354-55.
431. Id. at 355.
432. Florida Medical Ctr., 578 So. 2d at 355. The court found that competent,
substantial evidence existed that the proposed rule amendment in this case was
designed to give effect to private negotiations between the administrative agency and a
substantially affected person who had filed a section 120.54(4) challenge to the original
proposed rule. These negotiations and the subsequent amendment of the proposed rule
were not within the permitted scope of amendments authorized under section
120.54(13)(b). Id.
433. Id. at 355. Judge Miner dissented because once the rule became effective,
as it had in this case, section 120.56 should have been used to bring a rule challenge,
not section 120.54(4). Id. (Miner, J., dissenting). If the limitations found in section
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In an unusual case concerning a challenge to an administrative
rule, the court addressed the question of when the Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings could legitimately reject a rule challenge as a pretext
for circumventing the prohibition against prisoners filing section 120.57
petitions challenging the administration of rules by prison officials. 43 4
In Ramadanovic v. Department of Corrections,35 a prisoner chal-
lenged a rule adopted by the Bureau of Prisons. His rule challenge was
dismissed by the Director of the Department of Administrative Hear-
ings, because it did not comply with the requirements of section 120.56
for a rule challenge. The court found that when Ramadanovic made
specific allegations in his petition about how the rule was being applied
to his particular circumstance, it was not cause to hold that the petition
was an attempt to file a section 120.57(1) petition in the guise of a
section 120.56 rule challenge. The court noted that any rule challenge
petition under section 120.56 must "state with particularity facts suffi-
cient to show the person seeking relief is substantially effected by the
rule. '43 6 Thus, the fact that Ramadanovic's petition contained allega-
tions about how the rule applied to him was not sufficient evidence to
show that he had filed a section 120.57(1) claim in the form of a sec-
tion 120.56 rule challenge.437
1. Economic Impact Statement
In Cataract Surgery Center v. Health Care Cost Containment
Board, s3 the court, in what it admitted was the most flagrant dicta,43 9
120.54(13)(b) on amending a proposed rule were violated, then a basis for declaring
the rule invalid in a section 120.56 rule challenge existed. Id. at 356.
434. Prisoners are prohibited under the APA from participating in any adminis-
trative proceeding other than rule challenges. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)(d) (1989).
435. 575 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
436. IFLA. STAT. § 120.56(2) (1989) quoted in Ramadonovie, 575 So. 2d at 1335.
437. Ramadanovic, 575 So. 2d at 1334-35. The court remanded the case to the
Department of Administrative Hearings "for entry of an order stating with specificity
grounds warranting dismissal of Ramandanovic's petition, or for further proceedings on
petition, pursuant to section 120.56(2)." Id. at 1335.
438. :581 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
439. The court held that the proposed rules were invalid ultra vires acts. See
supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text. The discourse on the adequacy of the eco-
nomic impact statement was wholly unnecessary. The issue should have been dismissed
as one which the court need not reach, as it did concerning at least one other issue
raised by the parties. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360 n.l. Not only did the
court not need to decide the issue in order to resolve the case, it also acknowledged that
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noted that the inadequate economic impact statement was a possible
independent basis for declaring the proposed rules invalid. The court
found that the economic impact statement prepared by the Health
Care Cost Containment Board was grossly insufficient and violated the
APA rule making requirements concerning such statements. The court
correctly noted both the purpose of an economic impact statement and
the limited circumstances under which any defect in an economic im-
pact statement justified holding a rule or proposed rule invalid:
The purpose of an economic impact statement is "to promote
agency introspection in administrative rulemaking; to ensure a
comprehensive and accurate analysis of economic factors, which
factors will work together with social factors and legislative goals
underlying agency action; to direct agency attention to key consid-
erations and thereby facilitate informed decision making."
Preparation of an economic impact statement is a procedural re-
quirement, and any defect in its preparation will not defeat an oth-
erwise valid rule as long as evidence proves that an agency fully
considered the economic impact of its action or if it is established
that the agency's proposed action will have no economic impact
... [or the] deficiencies in the economic impact statement [did
not] impair the fairness of the rulemaking proceedings. "4
The hearing officer in this case determined, after an extensive con-
sideration of the evidence, that the weight of the evidence demon-
strated that any deficiencies in the economic impact statement were
harmless error. The court rejected this conclusion, because the Health
Care Cost Containment Board had "ignored its statutory duty" when it
failed to evaluate whether there would be substantial ongoing costs in
complying with the proposed rules."41 The court found that "these costs
were reasonably ascertainable[,] . ..the board took no action to dis-
cover that information .. . [and] had the board been fully aware of
these costs, that knowledge may have had an impact on the board's
decision as to what data to require and what method to utilize in col-
probably no one had standing to raise the issue. As the court noted, "it is unnecessary
for us to rule on this issue or the standing of the appellants in regard to the small and
minority business issue." Id. at 1365.
440. Id. at 1363-64 (quoting Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Wright, 439 So. 2d 937, 940 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
441. Id. at 1364.
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lecting that data."" 2
The court also criticized the Health Care Cost Containment Board
for failing to follow the required procedures to assess whether the pro-
posed rules would have an impact on small and minority businesses. By
failing to determine whether such an impact existed, the Health Care
Cost Containment Board effectively circumvented the APA rule mak-
ing requirement that when such an impact exists notice must be sent to
the Small and Minority Business Advocate, the Minority Business En-
terprise Assistance Office, and the Division of Economic Development
of the Department of Commerce," 8 and further, that each of these en-
tities must be given an opportunity, prior to final agency action on the
proposed rule, "to present evidence and argument and to offer alterna-
tives regarding the impact of the rule on small business.' The court
believed that these procedural requirements were not designed as a fu-
tile process offering little or no hope for the amendment of the proposed
rule, because the administrative agency must adopt the proposed alter-
natives or file with the Administrative Procedures Committee a written
statement explaining why it did not adopt the alternatives."8 By failing
to properly assess any impact on small and minority businesses, the
Health Care Cost Containment Board "precluded these parties from
providing input essential to protecting small businesses" as mandated
by the statute." 6
This aspect of the decision in Cataract Surgery Center is a classic
example of a court offering its opinion on an issue which was totally
irrelevant to the resolution of the case. It was particularly offensive in
this case, as the discussion of the small and minority businesses re-
quirements was totally gratuitous, because the parties before the court
in all probability lacked standing to raise the issue. Finally, the court
did not offer a persuasive explanation of why it should reject the fac-
tual findings of the hearing officer on the economic impact statement
issues. While the court concluded that the Health Care Cost Contain-
442. 1d.
443. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b) (1989).
444. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b)l (1989); see Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d
at 1364. The author knows of no case, nor did my informal survey of individuals who
practice in the area disclose any cases, where any of these entities has offered any
comment as a result of receiving notice.
445. See Health Care Cost Containment Bd., 581 So. 2d at 1365 ("It cannot be
assumed that the Board would have rejected the input from these representatives.");
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b)2-3 (1989).
446. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1364-65.
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ment Board had failed to make any reasonable attempt to develop a
legitimate economic impact statement, the hearing officer found suffi-
cient evidence to reach a contrary result. The court, in rejecting the
findings of the hearing officer on these factual issues, was engaged in
substitution of judgment.
The APA provides that judicial review of factual issues is very
limited:" "
If the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency in a
proceeding meeting the requirements of [section] 120.57, the court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The court
shall, however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the
agency if it finds that the agency action depends on any finding of
fact that is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the
record.4 8
In this case, the court ignored the limited scope of judicial review, or
attempted to avoid it by characterizing the factual issues as a question
of law-whether the Health Care Cost Containment Board had filed an
economic impact statement. The former was as gross a violation of the
requirements of the APA as the court accused the Health Care Cost
Containment Board of committing, while the latter was a subterfuge
given the fact that the Health Care Cost Containment Board had pre-
pared an economic impact statement.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Preservation of the Right to Review
The APA449 and the Florida Constitution'5" guarantee the right to ju-
dicial review of administrative decisions. However, this right is not ab-
solute,'51 and there are several ways in which a party may lose or
447. See infra notes 552-75 and accompanying text; Burris III, supra note 4, at
633-36.
448. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1989).
449. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.69 (1989).
450. See FLA. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 9, 18, 21; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1).
451. Any party seeking judicial review must satisfy standing requirements. Fail-
ure to do so is generally, but not always, fatal to obtaining judicial review. See Cat-
aract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1365 (discussing issue concerning the adequacy of
the economic impact statement without first determining whether any party had stand-
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waive, either intentionally or unintentionally," 2 its right to judicial re-
view," 53 or fail to qualify for judicial review.
If a party failed to timely request or fulfill the statutory prerequi-
sites for judicial review, then the right to judicial review may be lost. 4 4
However, in Stewart v. Department of Corrections,8 5 the court noted
that even though a party had failed to timely file a notice of appeal
concerning an administrative order, it should not preclude the judicial
review process from going forward. The court found that such time
limitations, especially where, as here, there was only a one day viola-
tion, may be avoided by the application of the doctrine of equitable
tolling. In such a case, the burden was on the party seeking the benefit
of the equitable tolling doctrine to show either "excusable ignorance of
the limitations" or a lack of prejudice to the administrative agency
arising from the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. The court
found that there was no evidence here that the administrative agency
had been prejudiced, and permitted the late filing of the notice of ap-
peal to preserve the rights to judicial review. 56
Besides a timely filing of a petition for judicial review, other fac-
tors must also be satisfied before judicial review can occur. In Rabren
v. Department of Professional Regulation,457 the court noted that in
order for judicial review to be available, the following must be shown:
ing to raise the issue); City of Destin v. Department of Transp., 541 So. 2d 123, 127
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding, in part, that the Department of Transportation
waived its right to question whether the City of Destin had standing to invoke a formal
hearing under the APA by not raising the issue before or during the formal hearing.)
452. See Prestressed Decking Corp. v. Medrano, 556 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. 1st.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (When a party fails to properly raise an issue as part of the
administrative hearing process, the hearing officer is precluded from considering that
issue in its recommended order.).
453. Without a stay of enforcement of the administrative agency decision, judi-
cial review may result in a correction of a wrong that may not have an adequate rem-
edy. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.68(3), .69(5) (1989); Stables v. Rivers, 559 So. 2d 440
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that filing a motion for protective order did not
constitute an automatic stay for any scheduled depositions).
454. Markham v. Moriarty, 575 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, Abundant Life Ctr. v. Markham, 112 S. Ct. 440 (1991) (per curiam); see also
Machin v. Lumber Transp., Inc., 556 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that while there may be circumstances under which the requirements for timely
filing notice of appeal may be tolled, a judge of compensation claims cannot grant a
time extension when he no longer has jurisdiction over the matter).
455. 561 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
456. Id. at 16; cf. supra notes 313-28 and accompanying text.
457. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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"(1) the action is final; (2) the agency is subject to the provisions of the
APA; (3) he was a party to the action which he seeks to appeal, and
(4) he was adversely affected by the decision."' "5
During the survey period, several decisions considered the question
of what constitutes final administrative agency action. In Friends of the
Hatchineha, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation,"" the
court noted that before a person is entitled to a formal administrative
hearing "there must be final agency action affecting the petitioner's
substantial interests, coupled with a disputed issue of material fact. ' 60
A variety of decisions can satisfy this requirement of final agency ac-
tion. In Friends of the Hatchineha, Inc., the court held that a letter
granting an agricultural exemption constitutes final agency action when
it was used to justify the dismissal of a complaint filed by the Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation concerning the building of an access
road or driveway through wetlands.461 The court found that the De-
partment of Environmental Regulation "exercised its discretion by de-
termining that no permits were required. The exercise of such discre-
tion constituted final agency action.' 62
Palm Springs General Hospital v. Health Care Cost Containment
Board " concerned an agreement between the Health Care Cost Con-
tainment Board and Palm Springs General Hospital on how medicaid
reimbursement pays should be calculated. This agreement was the ba-
sis for termination of the administration hearing concerning the dis-
pute. However, after the matter was removed from the hearing officer's
docket, the Health Care Cost Containment Board notified Palm
Springs General Hospital by letter that it would not honor the written
agreement settling the dispute. Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc.
sought judicial review of the decision contained in the letter notifying it
that the Health Care Cost Containment Board would not honor the
written agreement concerning this matter.' 6' The court held that al-
though the letter was a form of informal administrative agency action,
it was final for purposes of judicial review. The court reversed and re-
458. Id. at 1288.
459. 580 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
460. Id. at 269.
461. Id. at 271. The court properly noted that a long line of cases had estab-
lished that a decision by an administrative agency that it lacked jurisdiction was a form
of final agency action. Id. at 271-72; see supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
462. Id. at 272.
463. 560 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
464. Id. at 1348-49.
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manded the matter to the Health Care Cost Containment Board for
implementation of the settlement agreement."65
Under some circumstances, even interlocutory orders may be con-
sidered final administrative agency action. In Holland v. Courtesy
Corp.,6 the court noted that where a matter was decided which effec-
tively precluded consideration of any other issues in the case, even
though the order may resemble a nonfinal decision, it shall be treated
as final for purposes of seeking judicial review. "[Iln the classic sense,
• . . [an interlocutory] order . . . is a final order . . . [when] it dis-
posed of all matters then pending before the . . . [judge of compensa-
tion claims or administrative hearing officer]. ' '"40
B. Scope of Hearing Officer's Authority Over Factual Issues,
Penalties and Questions of Law
The dichotomy between factual and legal issues directly effects
how courts approach the judicial review process, especially when an
administrative agency's final order overturned the recommended order
of a hearing officer .4' The APA provides that the discretion of an ad-
ministrative agency to reject the factual findings and penalty recom-
mendation of a hearing officer in a recommended order is very limited.
The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions
of law and interpretation of administrative rules in the recom-
mended order, but may not reject or modify the findings of fact
unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete
record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings
of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that
the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply
with essential requirements of law. The agency may accept the rec-
ommended penalty in a recommended order, but may not reduce or
increase it without a review of the complete record and without
stating with particularity its reasons therefor in the order, by citing
465. .d. at 1349-50. The court also awarded attorney's fees to Palm Springs
General Hospital, finding it was a gross abuse of discretion for the administrative
agency to renounce the settlement agreement. It remanded the case to the Division of
Administrative Hearings for determination of the appropriate amount of attorney's
fees. Id. at 1350 n.2.
466. 563 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
467. 1d. at 789-90.
468. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)10 (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.68(7) (1989).
1991]
87
Burris: Administrative Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
to the record in justifying the action. 69
A number of cases addressing these issues during the survey period
demonstrated how administrative agencies continue to struggle with the
limited scope of their discretion in these areas.
In Clay County Sheriffs Office v. Loos,7 0 the court held that the
Unemployment Appeals Commission erred in finding that a memo pro-
vided a basis for overturning the factual conclusions reached by the
appeals referee. The memo, from the sheriff to all personnel, indicated
that any employee who did not receive permission to enroll in a train-
ing course would have been required to pay for the training course,
rather than the Department. The appeals referee denied unemployment
benefits to Loos who was terminated from his position as a deputy sher-
iff, because he attended a radar training course in direct disobedience
of a superior officer's denial of his request to attend such a course, as
set forth in the memo.7 1
The Unemployment Appeals Commission found that the memo
created confusion on the part of employees concerning whether they
would suffer any other disciplinary action besides having to pay for the
training course themselves. 4' The court found that there was compe-
tent substantial evidence to support the appeals referee's finding that
direct disobedience of the order of a superior officer not to attend this
training program showed an intentional and substantial disregard by
the employee of his duty and obligation to the employer, as defined by
a superior officer's command. 4' The memo was considered by the ap-
peals referee and the Unemployment Appeals Commission was merely
substituting its factual judgment for that of the appeals referee-a
practice forbidden by the APA.'7 '
469. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)10 (1989); see FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)10 &
n.1 (1991) (further restrictions on the discretion of an administrative agency to reject
the findings of a hearing officer).
470. 570 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
471. The appeals referee found that Loos had engaged in misconduct by enroll-
ing in the course in the face of instructions to the contrary, and that successful comple-
tion of the course would have increased the employee's salary by $20 per month. Id. at
395. Misconduct is defined by statute as "carelessness or negligence of such a degree
. . . as to . . . show an intentional and substantial disregard . . . of the employee's
duties and obligations to an employer." FLA. STAT. § 443.036(26) (1989).
472. Loos, 570 So. 2d at 395.
473. Id. at 395-96.
474. The court also concluded that the Unemployment Appeals Commission
erred in concluding that as a matter of law, the definition of misconduct did not cover
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Kan v. P.G. Cook Assocs.475 was another example of an adminis-
trative agency overstepping its authority by reweighing or reevaluating
the evidence heard by the hearing officer or appeals referee. In this
case, the Unemployment Appeals Commission reversed a decision of
the appeals referee which had granted Kan unemployment compensa-
tion benefits. The appeals referee found that Kan was promised addi-
tional training, if necessary, to enable him to meet his employer's ex-
pectations concerning the number of bicycles he should assemble per
hour. The employer had failed to provide the additional training, and
as a result, Kan's earnings were substantially diminished. In such a
circumstance, the appeals referee found that a reasonable "average
able-bodied qualified worker" would give up his employment as a re-
sult. 47 '6 The Unemployment Appeals Commission found that Kan un-
derstood that the initial eighty hours of instruction would permit him to
assemble the requisite number of bicycles per hour, and that his em-
ployer had never guaranteed him a minimum wage. Because of these
factors, which the Unemployment Appeals Commission believed were
overlooked by the appeals referee, it reversed and held that Kan was
not entitled to unemployment compensation.
The court reversed the decision of the Unemployment Appeals
Commission. The court noted that the Commission may reverse the de-
cision of an appeals referee concerning factual findings only if it could
demonstrate that such factual findings were not supported by compe-
tent substantial evidence.47 The court found no indication in the record
that any information had been improperly ignored or overlooked by the
appeals referee, and the decision of the appeals referee was supported
by competent substantial evidence. As a result, the court found that the
Commission had improperly reweighed the evidence in overturning the
appeals referee's order.47 8
In Freeze v. Department of Business Regulation,479 a final order
by the Department of Business Regulation, revoking an alcoholic bev-
erage license, was reviewed by the court. The court noted that the De-
partment of Business Regulation had "no authority to reject the find-
the circumstance that the hearing officer found present in this case. See id.
475. 566 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
476. Id. at 933 (quoting Uniweld Prod., Inc. v. Industrial Relations Comm'n,
277 So. 2d 8,27, 829 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
477. Id. at 933.
478. Id. at 934.
479. 556 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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ings of fact of the hearing officer which were supported by competent,
substantial evidence. Factual issues susceptible of ordinary methods of
proof that [were] not infused with policy considerations . . . [were] the
prerogative of the hearing officer as finder of fact."' 8 An administra-
tive agency errs when it rejects "the hearing officer's findings of fact
and . . . substitut[es] its own where there was conflicting evidence, or
sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer's findings. An agency
may not reject the hearing officer's findings unless there is no compe-
tent, substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be
inferred.""8"
The court reviewed the evidence concerning whether smoking
pot 82 on the porch of the establishment occurred, and affirmed the
hearing officer's findings of fact on this issue, stating that the Depart-
ment of Business Regulation had properly relied on it in its final order.
As to the other factual findings, the court merely asserted that the De-
partment of Professional Regulation improperly rejected the hearing
officer's findings, because it did so based upon credibility of the testi-
mony offered. In doing so, the Department exceeded its review author-
ity and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the hearing of-
ficer.' 83 While these errors required the court to remand the case, the
court clearly indicated that the same penalty may be imposed for the
"pot smoking" incident. 4
480. Id. at 1205 (citations omitted).
481. Id. (emphasis in original).
482. Also known as marihuana.
483. Freeze, 556 So. 2d at 1206.
484. Id. Judge Gershon, in his dissent, argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence to prove that the owners of the establishment had notice of illegal drug transac-
tions, or that consumption of illegal drugs was occurring on the premises, because there
was no evidence that either of the owners were present at the time these transactions
occurred, or that their employees were aware of these illegal transactions. Id. Further,
the Department of Business Regulation erred in disagreeing with the hearing officer's
findings that the owners were incapable of determining whether marijuana was being
used on the premises, and that the owners had taken adequate steps to diligently police
the possibility of such use. "Clearly, the Department rejected the hearing officer's find-
ings and substituted its own findings based upon its re-evaluation of the evidence. Just
as clearly, the Department had no authority to reject the hearing officer's finding of
fact because the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence." Id. at
1207. Judge Gershon concluded by stating that the Department of Business Regulation
erred in substituting its judgment on these factual issues, and that the case should be
remanded with instructions to reinstate the alcoholic beverage license of these individu-
als. Id.
[Vol. 16
90
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/3
Burris
In Greseth v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices,4 5 an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services was suspended for "willful violation of rules, regulations, or
policies of the Department."486 The hearing officer found that Greseth
was the only investigator in her unit which was supposed to have three
investigators, and that she was overworked in terms of her case
assignments.
In the case of L.Y.'s report, Greseth relied on the initial report
from the hospital, after it had been confirmed by L.Y.'s grand-
mother that the baby would not be released for at least two weeks.
Therefore, from the information available to Greseth, the baby was
not in immediate danger. Greseth intended to contact the hospital
to verify the information on January 9, but became ill and was out
of work for a week. 87
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services policies re-
quired their investigators to contact the mother of the child within
twenty-four hours of the abuse report, or to initiate an out-of-town in-
quiry if the parties involved in the abuse report were not in the vicinity.
Greseth was also required by Department policy "to contact the hospi-
tal and clarify the abuse report during her initial investigation.' 88
"The hearing officer concluded that Greseth did not wilfully violate
policies because she was assigned, with the Department's knowledge, to
more cases than she could physically handle.' 8 9 The hearing officer
485. 573 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
486. Id. at 1005. Greseth was assigned a neglect child report for investigation.
The concern was that the child was being medically neglected by its parents. The
child's grandmother contacted Greseth and informed her that when the child was re-
leased from the hospital, both the mother and baby would live at the grandmother's
residence. The grandmother further reported that the child would not be released from
the hospital for some time. Greseth reported these facts to her supervisor and asked for
advice on how to proceed. The supervisor did not respond to her inquiry, and soon
thereafter, Greseth became ill and was absent from her job for a period of nine days.
During this time, the supervisor failed to review her files or in any way take steps to
provide for further investigation of her files during her absence. Upon returning to
work, Greseth soon learned that baby L.Y. had been released from the hospital the day
before she had become extremely ill. The baby subsequently died, and the death was
considered "unrelated to any action or inaction on Greseth's part, or for that matter, as
a result from any neglect on the part of the mother." Id. at 1005-06.
487. Id. at 1006.
488. Id.
489. Id.
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further found that Greseth had acted appropriately, based upon the in-
formation she had available, in determining that the case of L.Y. was
low priority because of the fact that the child was hospitalized, and
that she did not act negligently in reaching such a decision.
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services accepted
the hearing officer's findings of fact, but concluded that Greseth had
actually acted either negligently or willfully in violating these policies
by not making "a few phone calls which it claimed would have satisfied
[the] regulations.""9" The Department remanded the case to the hear-
ing officer for consideration of mitigating circumstances. The hearing
officer again noted that there was insufficient evidence that Greseth had
acted either willfully or negligently in violating the Department's pol-
icy, given her case load, the need to prioritize the cases, and the lack of
her supervisor's assistance, and recommended that Greseth receive the
lightest suspension possible.
Greseth argued that the Public Employees Relation Commission
acted improperly in agreeing with the Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services that her conduct constituted negligent or willful
violation of Department policy. "An administrative agency may not re-
ject the hearing officer's findings unless there is no competent, substan-
tial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred.""9"
The court noted that decisions concerning whether negligent or willful
misconduct had occurred are findings of fact traditionally within the
scope of a hearing officer's discretion, absent a showing that there was
a lack of competent and substantial evidence to support them. The ad-
ministrative agency may not simply reweigh the evidence and reach
contrary conclusions where the record does provide competent and sub-
stantial evidence to support the hearing officer's findings on these two
issues. 492
The court held that the administrative agency could not avoid this
limitation on the scope of its authority to overturn the hearing officer's
recommended order by merely labeling its contrary findings of fact as
conclusions of law. "Substituted factfinding, thinly disguised as a con-
clusion of law, is wholly improper. ' 493 There was no indication that the
Public Employees Relation Commission was making a decision "in an
490. Greseth, 573 So. 2d at 1006.
491. Id.
492. Id. (citing Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277,
1281-82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
493. Id. at 1006-07.
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area of special expertise, and therefore [the court] need not defer to
. . . its special knowledge."49 " The record amply supported the hearing
officer's finding that Greseth did not engage in negligent or willful con-
duct given the case load that she was assigned, lack of support from
her supervisor, and her unexpected illness. The court reversed and re-
manded the case to the Public Employee Relation Commission so that
it could enter an order "vacating her suspension and granting her lost
wages, attorney's fees, and expenses as a result of the proceeding
below." 495
Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 96
concerned the appeal of a final order issued by the Public Employees
Relation Commission which accepted the decision by the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services to suspend the employee for
twenty days, even though the hearing officer had found that no penalty
should be imposed in the case. The hearing, officer had issued a recom-
mended order finding that the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services had failed to prove that Smith was negligent in carrying
out her duties.497 The Public Employees Relations Commission ac-
cepted the hearing officer's findings of fact, but disagreed with the
hearing officer's inference that such facts demonstrated non-negligence
on Smith's part. The court found that while it may have been a close
case, the inferences reached by the hearing officer were reasonable.
Where reasonable people may differ over the issue of what inferences
should be drawn, then the Public Employees Relation Commission
must affirm the decision of the hearing officer. In such cases, the find-
ings of the hearing officer are considered supported by competent and
substantial evidence. 9 8
While on most occasions the restrictions on administrative discre-
tion found in section 120.57(1)(b)10 are violated by administrative
agencies improperly overturning factual findings made by hearing of-
ficers, in a few cases, administrative agencies erred in refusing to over-
turn the factual findings of a hearing officer when it was appropriate to
do so.499 Department of Professional Regulation v. Wise5°0 concerned
494. Greseth, 573 So. 2d at 1007.
495. Id.
496. 555 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
497. Id. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services found that Smith
had failed to make arrangements for children so that they would not have to spend the
night in the screening area of the Dade County Juvenile Detention Center.
498. Id. at 1256.
499. Cf. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. Department of Health &
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the appeal of a final order by the Board of Medicine which dismissed
disciplinary complaints against Dr. Wise. The Board specifically relied
on factual findings made by the hearing officer. The complaint against
Dr. Wise alleged that he had influenced several female patients to have
sexual relations with him. Dr. Wise maintained that these events had
never occurred.
At the hearing, five former patients testified on how Dr. Wise had
influenced them to have sexual relations with him. Over the objection
of the Department of Professional Regulation, the hearing officer per-
mitted Dr. Wise to offer evidence concerning the entire sexual history
of each witness. The hearing officer ultimately concluded in his recom-
mended order that "the testimony of the former patients was not
clearly convincing," 50 1 and recommended that no disciplinary action be
taken against Dr. Wise. The hearing officer offered no explanation as to
why the testimony of the former patients did not constitute clear and
convincing evidence.
After an initial review of the hearing officer's recommended order,
the Board of Medicine remanded the case to the Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings for reconsideration in light of whether the sexual his-
tory of the patients should have been admitted. On remand, the same
hearing officer concluded that the evidence of sexual history was rele-
vant as to credibility, and explained why, in light of this information,
he found that the former patients did not present credible clear and
convincing evidence of misconduct by Dr. Wise. The Board of
Medicine again reviewed the officer's recommended order, and con-
cluded that the findings of fact were, in part, based upon what it con-
sidered to be inadmissible evidence. However, in light of the Division of
Administrative Hearings' position, it concluded that it had no choice
but to accept the hearing officer's recommended order, and dismissed
the complaint.
In Wise, the court held that admission of the sexual history evi-
dence was reversible error. 50 2 The court found that the testimony con-
Rehabilitative Servs., 559 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a
record may not provide competent, substantial evidence to support a hearing officer's
factual findings when he misread the application being reviewed).
500. 575 So 2d 713 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
501. Id. at 714.
502. The Department of Professional Regulation also argued that the determina-
tion of admissibility of evidence was a question of law which, under the APA, was left
to the administrative agency. The Board of Medicine was correct in its initial review of
the hearing officer's decision, and in remanding the case to the Department of Admin-
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cerning the sexual history of the patients was irrelevant and did not
bear on their credibility.503 The court noted that "evidence of a witness'
relationship with a person other than the accused, standing alone,
ha[d] no probative value in the credibility determination. '"50 4 The only
time that sexual history would be relevant in determining the credibil-
ity of a witness was when the defendant claimed that it explained the
witness' motive for testifying falsely against him. Because the sexual
histories in this case did not concern sexual relationships with Dr.
Wise, they were not relevant to any claim that the witnesses were moti-
vated to testify falsely against him. The sexual relationships related in
these histories were completely unrelated to those which occurred with
istrative Hearings for the exclusion of what it viewed as irrelevant testimony, because
the Board of Medicine was acting within the scope of its delegated authority and not
interfering with the factual finding process by the hearing officer. When the case was
remanded to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Division erred in refusing to
comply with the direction from the Board of Medicine concerning the admissibility of
the irrelevant sexual history evidence. Id. at 716-17. The court refused to address this
issue because it was moot given its resolution of the admissibility issue. The court noted
it would have been a different case if the Department had petitioned the court for a
writ of mandamus when the Division of Administrative Hearings refused to comply
with its request on remand. Id. at 717.
However, the position of the Department of Professional Regulation on this issue
was not sound for three reasons. First, the hearing officers are generally the triers of
fact, and if anybody in the APA administrative process has expertise on admissibility
questions, it would be the hearing officers who deal with these issues on a day-to-day
basis, not the administrative agencies performing their review function prior to issuing
final orders. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65(4) (1989) (requiring hearing officers to be exper-
ienced members of the Florida Bar); FLA. STAT. § 120.58 (1989) (hearing shall be
conducted by the presiding officer, in most cases a hearing officer). Second, if adminis-
trative agencies do have the authority to overrule the decisions of hearing officers on
admissibility questions, then their role as the initial finders of fact would be substan-
tially undermined, and potentially, the APA preference for using initial fact finders
who are independent of the administrative agencies would be functionally destroyed.
See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(a) (1989). Third, it would become another device for ad-
ministrative agencies to use in attempting to avoid the limited scope of their discretion
to reject the factual findings of hearing officers. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(10) (1989).
503. The court rejected the Department of Professional Regulation's position
that the rape shield statute prohibited admission of evidence concerning the patient's
sexual history. FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1989). The court noted that the rape shield stat-
ute was designed to reach only prosecutions under the criminal statutes. FLA. STAT. §
794.011 (1989). Because this was not a criminal prosecution for sexual battery, the
rape shield statute was not applicable to this administrative hearing which concerned
whether Wise should be disciplined by the Board of Medicine. Wise, 575 So. 2d at 715.
504. Wise, 575 So. 2d at 715.
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Dr. Wise.505 It was therefore error for the hearing office to admit this
irrelevant evidence in such a case,506 and the court ordered the case
remanded to the Board of Medicine.
505. Id. The court noted that the Department of Professional Regulation agreed
by stipulation to the admission of medical records which did contain information con-
cerning the sexual histories of the witnesses for purposes of proving that they were Dr.
Wise's patients. This did not in any way waive the Department of Professional Regula-
tion's objection to the use of these medical histories in trying to impeach the credibility
of the patients. The court also noted that the medical records did not contain much of
the information which was brought out at the hearing, and therefore the records could
not be said to have been the source of most or even the majority of the objectionable
testimony. Id.
506. The court went on to note that just because irrelevant testimony had been
permitted in the hearing, reversal of the Board of Medicine's decision is not necessarily
justified. "Where unfairness has not otherwise infected the fact-finding process, find-
ings which are founded solely upon evidence which is competent and substantial will
not be disturbed on appeal." Id.; FLA. STAT. § 120.68(8) (1989). It was clear in this
case that the irrelevant testimony concerning the witnesses' sexual history played a
critical role in the hearing officer's determination of their credibility. This precluded
the court from being able to determine whether there was competent, substantial evi-
dence supporting the hearing officer's findings independent of the irrelevant testimony.
"Under these circumstances, we cannot say with any certainty that the improper ad-
mission of irrelevant evidence did not impair the fairness or correctness of the fact-
finding process. We, therefore, determine that remand for clarification of the recom-
mended findings is required." Wise, 575 So. 2d at 716. The court also noted that the
Board of Medicine, given the status of the record with the irrelevant testimony playing
what was apparently a key role, was also precluded from finding whether the hearing
officer's determinations were supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id.
507. The court remanded,
with directions that the Board further remand the case to the hearing of-
ficer. The hearing officer shall review the record from the hearing previ-
ously held before him and enter a new recommended order, either on the
record before him, taking into account only the legally relevant evidence
previously admitted, or he may, at his option, consider additional evidence
in deciding the issue. We direct that the new recommended order shall set
forth a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record
supporting the findings of fact.
Id. at 717. The court also found that the Department of Professional Regulation was
correct in arguing that the factual finding by the hearing officer that "the testimony of
L.H. was no more persuasive in this case than it was before the psychiatric society, was
not supported by competent substantial evidence." Id.
Judge Ervin, in his concurring opinion, noted that the court should have resolved
the question of whether the Board of Medicine had the power, on the initial remand, to
direct the Division of Administrative Hearings that it not consider certain evidence
which it had concluded was irrelevant. Id. at 717-18. Normally, an administrative
agency may:
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Perhaps the most controversial APA restriction on administrative
agency authority to overturn a hearing officer's conclusions concerns
recommended penalties.50 8 The restriction "generally denies ... [an
administrative] agency authority to vary the penalty once it accepts the
hearing officer's factual conclusions as supported by substantial compe-
tent evidence." 50 9
In Bradley v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commis-
sion,51° after an administrative hearing, the hearing officer recom-
mended that Bradley, a certified correctional officer, receive a six
month suspension of his certificate. The Criminal Justice Standards
and Training Commission rejected this recommended penalty, and re-
voked Bradley's correctional officer certificate. The Commission offered
adopt the recommended order as its final order, or the agency, in its final
order may reject or modify the recommended conclusions of law, but only
if it determines from the record and states with particularity that the find-
ings were either not based on competent, substantial evidence, or that the
proceeding in which the findings were based did not comply with the essen-
tial requirements of law.
Wise, 575 So. 2d at 718. Judge Ervin indicated that absent a showing of prejudice on
the part of the hearing officer, it was not appropriate for administrative agency to re-
mand a case for a new hearing or reevaluation of the record by another hearing officer.
However, Judge Ervin noted that nothing in this scheme precluded the Board of
Medicine from remanding to the hearing officer for clarification of the recommended
order, if it determined that it was unable to, based upon the original recommended
order, determine whether there were erroneous conclusions of law or whether the rec-
ord adequately supported the findings of fact by the hearing officer. Judge Ervin noted
that there was no specific statutory authorization for this clarification remand, but he
believed ihat it was a reasonable inference to be drawn from section 120.57(1)(B)l0)
and section 120.59(2) of the APA. Id. This was so because without the remand, the
Board would have been unable to determine "whether the recommended order would
have been entered without such evidence, could hardly be expected to comply with its
statutory obligation either to adopt, reject, or modify the submitted findings of fact, or
to recite its final order explicit and concise statements of underlying facts of record in
support of its findings." Id. at 718-19. He noted "that [administrative] agencies have
the same authority as appellate courts to remand for clarification in circumstances
where it is uncertain whether a finder of fact would have reached the same result if the
evidence which the finder of fact incorrectly admitted had not been received." Id. at
719. The Board of Medicine was correct in remanding the case for clarification.
508. "The [administrative] agency may accept the recommended penalty in a
recommended order, but may not reduce or increase it without a review of the complete
record and without stating with particularity its reasons therefore in the order, by cit-
ing to the record in justifying the action." FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(10) (1989).
509. Burris III, supra note 4, at 629.
510. 577 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (motion for certification).
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no new grounds or policy reasons for why it rejected the hearing of-
ficer's recommended penalty. In fact, the, Commission's decision was
based solely on the factors specifically considered by the hearing officer.
The court found that this was a classic case of the administrative
agency imposing a higher penalty by substituting its judgment for that
of the hearing officer. The only basis for the substitution of judgment
offered by the Commission was that it simply disagreed with the hear-
ing officer's assessment of the seriousness of the offense committed by
corrections officer Bradley. Under the APA "[a]n [administrative]
agency should not reject the recommended penalty without properly re-
jecting, amending, or substituting at least one recommended finding of
fact or conclusion of law." '511 The Commission thus violated this dictate
by enhancing the penalty in this case.51"
Bajrangi v. Department of Business Regulation"1 3 also concerned
the validity of a punishment imposed in a final administrative order.
Bajrangi was charged by the Department of Business Regulation with
having sold an alcoholic beverage to an underage individual without
first requesting identification. The Department issued a notice of viola-
tion, and requested that Bajrangi "show cause why his license should
not be suspended or revoked.""1 " After a formal administrative hearing,
"[tlhe hearing officer. . . found as fact that[,] '[t]he usual penalty for
a licensee selling to an underage person is [a] $1,000 civil penalty ac-
companied by a [twenty] day license suspension.' "515 However, in the
section of the hearing officer's recommended order concerning conclu-
sions of law, he found that there were no rules promulgated concerning
appropriate penalties for a first offense violation. Lacking such rules or
guidelines from the administrative agency, the hearing officer con-
cluded that a twenty day suspension and $1,000 fine were inappropriate
for a first offense, and not supported by any evidence or argument. The
hearing officer instead recommended a penalty consisting of a three day
511. Id. at 639.
512. The court acknowledged that this decision was in conflict with Allen v.
School Board where the Third District Court of Appeal approved of an administrative
agency imposing a penalty beyond that imposed by the hearing officer, even though the
agency had fully adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
571 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). The court certified the question to the
Florida Supreme Court, noting that its decision and that of the Fifth District Court of
Appeal conflicted with the decision in Allen. Bradley, 577 So. 2d at 639.
513. 561 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
514. Id. at 411.
515. Id. at 412.
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license suspension and a $1,000 fine.516
The final order entered by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco adopted the decision of the hearing officer, except that it
found a three day license suspension inappropriate, and it imposed the
twenty day suspension originally suggested. The Division characterized
the hearing officer's conclusion concerning the appropriate number of
days for license suspension as a conclusion of law. The Division found
in fact that there were penalty guidelines in existence, and pointed to
the Raney's testimony asserting that the appropriate penalty for a first
time offense was a twenty day suspension and $1,000 fine.517
Since 1984, the APA has provided that an administrative agency
"may no longer reduce or increase a recommended penalty without a
review of the complete record and without stating with particularity its
reasons in the order, by citing to the record 'in justifying the ac-
tion.' "5" Thus, the court read the decision by the supreme court in
Department of Professional Regulation v. Berna 19 as merely reaffirm-
ing thait the APA required an administrative agency to state on the
record valid reasons for disregarding the recommended penalty con-
tained in the hearing officer's recommended order. The decision in
Bernal did not indicate when an administrative agency's "rationale for
increasing a penalty [was] 'legally insufficient' or 'valid' and there is
some disagreement concerning the circumstances in which an appellate
court should invalidate agency orders that alter penalties recommended
by hearing officers."52 In this case, it appeared that the Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco and the hearing officer "simply disa-
gree[d] about the appropriate penalty for the . . . single act of sale of
a beer to a minor." 5 1 Such disagreement did not fall within the area
where an administrative agency's expertise can be used to justify im-
posing an enhanced penalty. Any other scheme would threaten the in-
dependence of the hearing officer, which the APA envisioned.5 22
516. Id.
517. Id. at 411-12.
518. Bajrangi, 561 So. 2d at 413 (emphasis in original).
519. 531 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1988).
520. Bajrangi, 561 So. 2d at 414; Department of Professional Regulation v.
Bernal, 521 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1988).
521. 561 So. 2d at 415.
522. The APA makes clear that:
[T]he virtue of neutrality is greater than the virtue of expertise. Given that
the hearing officer and the agency should always be working from the
same record, the circumstances under which the agency would be justified
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Both Bradley and Bajrangi demonstrated continued approval of a
two track approach to an administrative agency overturning recom-
mended penalties. To overturn the recommendations, the administra-
tive agency can state the particular reasons for rejecting it and cite to
support in the record for its position, or the agency can claim it is a
policy matter within the agency's expertise. The former is an approach
which parallels that adopted for rejecting factual findings by a hearing
officer. An administrative agency can review the complete record and
state with particularity its reasons for deviating from the hearing of-
ficer's recommended penalty. However, if the agency merely disagrees
with the assessment of the seriousness of the offense by the hearing
officer in a particular case, then it is not an adequate justification for
rejecting the hearing officer's recommended penalties.
The latter approach closely resembles a non-rule policy in that it
permits a general claim of expertise to establish a policy which justifies
imposing a penalty not recommended by the hearing officer. The dan-
ger posed by this approach is three fold:
First, it opens the door for [administrative] agencies to rejecting
recommended penalties as long as they used the magic words 'gen-
eral policy disagreement' to characterize why they rejected the rec-
ommended penalty of the hearing officer. This may be permitted
even though the nature of the penalty to be imposed in a case is
generally a fact specific determination. Second, it invites a general
abuse of the law/fact dichotomy by approving of the characteriza-
tion of what in most cases is a factual issue as a legal or policy
matter.528
Third, it permits an administrative agency to avoid providing adequate
explanation and documentation of a nonrule policy governing the na-
ture of penalties to be imposed for certain administrative offenses.524
While an administrative agency's discretion to reject a hearing of-
ficer's findings of fact is limited, no such constraint is imposed on its
discretion regarding findings concerning questions of law. In Ritenour
in substituting its judgment concerning the appropriate penalty for that of
the hearing officer should not arise except where one or more of the hear-
ing officer's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law are prop-
erly rejected, substituted or amended by the [administrative] agency.
Id.
523. Burris III, supra note 4, at 632-33.
524. See supra notes 258-309 and accompanying text.
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v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,25 a referee, after hearing ex-
tensive testimony, concluded that the employee had not voluntary left
her employment, but rather, had been forced out for good cause due to
the irrational if not abusive treatment.52 The Unemployment Appeals
Commission reversed the appeals referee, holding that given the facts
of the case, the good cause legal standard had not been met.52
The court stated that the appeals referee was the trier of fact in
unemployment compensation cases. It was thus the duty of the appeals
referee to weigh and reject conflicting evidence. On this basis, questions
of whether a person left his or her employment voluntarily clearly were
questions of fact, including whether a person left for good cause. How-
ever, before questions of fact can be properly addressed, the appeals
referee :must correctly understand the legal standard of good cause.
This focuses on the question of whether the circumstances "would im-
pel the average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his employ-
ment."528 Thus, the court stated:
While the appeals referee found that a good cause to terminate
existed because of the employer's irrational or abusive conduct,
there was no finding (except perhaps by inference) that this irra-
tional, abusive conduct would cause the average, able-bodied, qual-
ified worker to quit his or her employment.529
It was this very question of what the average person would do in
response to the conduct of the employer which caused the Unemploy-
ment Appeals Commission to reverse the findings of the appeals refe-
ree. This was considered a legal error by the appeals referee. Under the
APA, it is clearly permissible for an administrative agency to overturn
an erroneous legal interpretation adopted by an appeals referee or hear-
ing officer.530 "The commission in this case, basing its decision on the
appeals referee's facts, concluded that the appeals referee's conclusion
of law was erroneous. The legislature had given the Commission that
authority." 531
525. 570 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
526. Id. at 1107.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(10) (1989).
531. Ritenour, 570 So. 2d at 1108.
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Harloff v. City of Sarasota 32 concerned an appeal of a final order
of the Southwest Florida Water Management District which granted
Harloff a consumptive use permit for water allowances which were sub-
stantially less than the amounts he had requested.53 The District ac-
cepted the factual findings of the hearing officer,5" ' but rejected the
hearing officer's legal conclusions and adopted those which had been
advocated by its staff.535
The issue before the hearing officer was whether the District had
properly determined the extent to which Harloff should have been per-
mitted to withdraw water in order to safeguard the interest of the City
of Sarasota which had a pre-existing water use permit.8 6 Chapter 373
of the Florida Statutes required that an applicant for a water use per-
mit demonstrate the following: 1) that the use must be a reasonable
and beneficial one; 2) that granting the application will not interfere
with any pre-existing permitted water use; and 3) that granting the
permit would be consistent with the public interest.537 Everyone in-
532. 575 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
533. Id. at 1328.
534. The hearing officer found that the City of Sarasota had maintained a
wellfield since 1966 adjacent to Harloff's farm land. Until January 1991, the wellfield
was permitted by the Southwest Florida Water Management District to withdraw be-
tween six and seven million gallons per day. Id. at 1325-26. Since 1966, the water table
at the wellfield site had been substantially lowered. By 1989, the water table dropped
to such an extent that the wellfield could not pump the maximum number of gallons
per day authorized by District. This threatened the continued viability of the wellfield
until steps were taken to adequately preserve the water table level in the future.
Harloff used a semi-closed ditch irrigation system in order to water his 8,500 acres
of farm land. A drip irrigation system, which would have been more expensive to oper-
ate, would have resulted in substantial water savings, but the officer made no finding as
to whether it was economically feasible for Harloff to adopt this system. Harloff re-
quested that District grant him a permit authorizing him to withdraw 26 million gal-
lons per day as a seasonal average and 32 million gallons per day as a seasonal daily
maximum with 15 million gallons per day as an annual average. The District granted
him 15.6 million gallons per day as a seasonal average, 21 million gallons per day as a
daily maximum, and 11.1 million gallons per day as an annual average. The District's
staff had specifically found that the Harloffs withdrawal of water would effect the
continuing viability of the wellfield for the City of Sarasota. Id. at 1326.
535. The staff recommendations were specifically rejected by the hearing officer.
536. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1326.
537. See FLA. STAT. § 373.019(4) (1989) (A "'reasonable-beneficial use' means
the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization
for a purpose and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public
interest."); FLA. STAT. § 373.223 (1989).
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volved agreed that Harloff's agricultural enterprise was a reasonable
and beneficial use. However, the City of Sarasota contested whether
the request was consistent with the City's existing permit for water
use.53 8 The City also alleged that any threat to the City's existing water
use posed by Harloff's request would be inconsistent with the public
interest.5 39
The hearing officer concluded that if Harloff's request for water
consumption was granted, substantial damage to the functional ability
of the City's wellfield would result. Despite this factual finding, "the
hearing officer recommended that Mr. Harloff receive a consumptive
use permit for the entire allowance of water that he had requested. 540
The District rejected this legal conclusion based upon the findings of
fact, and ruled that Harloff had failed to establish that his requested
consumptive use would not interfere with any existing permitted water
use, and that the requested use was not inconsistent with the public
interest.
The court "affirm[ed] the decision because the District's board
was free to substitute its own legal conclusions for those of the hearing
officer, so long as competent substantial evidence supported the substi-
tuted legal conclusions. "541 The final order of the District essentially
required that Harloff substantially curtail his agricultural activities, or
alter those activities, in order to provide adequate protection to the
wellfield permitted for water supply to the City of Sarasota."' The
court found that the District failed to point to or explain what legal
error was committed by the hearing officer.
Nonetheless, the court concluded "[o]n full review of the record,
however, we are convinced that the District correctly found errors of
law in the hearing officer's proposal and that the District's final order
[was] supported by competent, substantial evidence."5 ' The court rea-
soned that while an administrative agency may be required to ade-
quately explain its reasons with particularity concerning any rejection
of a proposed penalty, there was no such requirement when an agency
rejected a conclusion of law that did not involve the imposition of any
538. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1326-27.
539. Id. at 1327.
540. Id.
541. Id. at 1325.
542. Id.
543. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1327.
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penalty. 4" The court noted that the District had been granted broad
powers by the legislature to implement the water management plan for
that area. An essential element in the exercise of those powers was that
they be carried out in a logical and consistent fashion.
If the legal interpretation of these policies were left to various
hearing officers, the concepts would inevitably receive different
meanings before different hearing officers. Because agency boards
are charged with the responsibility of enforcing the statutes which
govern their area of regulation, courts give great weight to their
interpretation of those statutes.5 45
Thus, determinations of what constitutes a reasonable and beneficial
use, an interference with existing permanent water use, or what is in
the public interest are matters which involve important policy ques-
tions. It would be impossible to maintain consistent policies if individ-
ual hearing officers were allowed to exercise their discretion in inter-
preting the legal concepts and their meaning. 46 The court noted that
such decisions involved both questions of law and fact. However, the
court determined that "[a]n agency's decision on such a mixed question
is entitled to 'increased weight when it is infused by policy considera-
tions for which the agency has special responsibility.' -" The court
concluded that the District, in reaching its decision, concerning the
scope of permitted water use that Harloff was entitled to, engaged in
an interpretation of the statute, not a substitution of its judgment con-
cerning factual matters.54 8
The court went on to note that the hearing officer made two errors
in interpreting the scope of the law:
First, the hearing officer's recommended order appears to place the
burden of proof on the City or the District staff to establish that
Mr. Harloff's requested permit would interfere with the water sup-
ply at the ...wellfield. The statute, however, clearly places the
burden on Mr. Harloff to prove that his request would not
interfere.549
544. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)10 (1989).
545. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1327.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 1328 (quoting Santaniello v. Department of Professional Regulation,
432 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
548. Id.
549. Id.
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In light of this allocation of the burden of proof, Harloff failed to
demonstrate that his requested permit use would not substantially in-
terfere with the continued viability of the wellfield and the City of Sar-
asota's preexisting use permit.55 While the court did not explicitly find,
it clearly indicated that Harloff had failed to carry his burden of per-
suasion on this point.
Second, the hearing officer erred in concluding that the City of
Sarasota should take steps to improve the ability of a wellfield to re-
trieve water from the lowered water table. This may well have been an
issue if the City of Sarasota's permit for use of the wellfield was before
the District, but it was not an issue when considering Harloff's request
for a water use permit. The statute made it clear that the City's prior
permit for water use was entitled to non-interference in its current con-
dition, and that the hearing officer erred in imposing any additional
burden on the City to modify the wellfield in order to permit Mr.
Harlofl" to use water at the level he requested."'
C. Deferential Judicial Review of Factual Issues
The competent and substantial evidence standard of judicial re-
view for factual determinations made by administrative agencies 552 is
designed to restrain reviewing courts from reweighing the evidence and
substituting their judgment for that of the administrative agency on
factual issues.553 "[Clourts will not review conflicting evidence, or
550. Harloff, 575 So. 2d at 1328.
551. Id.
552. The competent and substantial evidence standard of judicial review does not
apply in every case. It is limited to those records developed in hearings which meet the
requirements of section 120.57. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1989). If the record of the
administrative hearing is destroyed, then generally the appropriate remedy is to vacate
the order and remand to the agency for a de novo hearing. Gay v. Department of State,
550 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
553. See, e.g., Department of General Serv. v. English, 534 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (courts are prohibited from making credibility judgments or
substituting their own judgment for that of the administrative agency, hearing officer,
or referee). The prohibition against reweighing of the evidence also applies when there
has been no administrative agency hearing. In such a case, the reviewing court may
order an administrative agency to conduct a "factfinding proceeding under this act" in
order to resolve disputed factual issues necessary to determining whether an adminis-
trative agency's action in the case was valid. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(6) (1989). After an
administrative agency has made the necessary factual findings, the reviewing court is
restricted to setting aside, modifying, or ordering agency action when "the facts compel
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make any determination with respect to the weight of the evidence, as
these are usually matters for administrative agency determination."5 "
This is a very deferential standard of judicial review which generally
requires courts to construe the record in the light most favorable to the
administrative agency decision. 555 Also, the courts will not permit par-
ties, during the judicial review process, to supply facts not found in the
administrative record. 56 In Hillsborough County School Board v. Wil-
liams,55 7 the court noted that a disputed factual issue which was not
resolved at the hearing may not be "supplied at the appellate level." 58
In such a case, the reviewing court must remand the case to the admin-
istrative agency for a determination of the disputed factual issue. 5 9
The burden is on the party attacking the agency's factual determi-
nations to demonstrate that these determinations are not supported by
competent substantial evidence in the record.560 This burden cannot be
a particular action as a matter of law, or it may remand the case to the agency for
further examination and action within the agency's responsibility." FLA. STAT. §
120.68(11) (1989). Because this standard of judicial review appears to foreclose any
judicial overturning of the factual determinations made by an administrative agency, it
is even more of a deferential standard of review than that imposed on the court under
the competent and substantial evidence standard. While this approach is both time
consuming and in some cases wastes the limited resources of administrative agencies
and the courts, it does insure that an administrative agency has made the initial factual
determinations and that the reviewing court is not free to reject the administrative
agency's factual determinations or independently evaluate the record to reach its own
factual conclusions.
554. Rolling Oaks Utils. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 533 So. 2d 770, 772 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (clarified on rehearing).
555. See Faucher v. R.C.F. Developers, 569 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (noting that in reviewing a record under the competent and substantial
evidence standard of review, the evidence should be interpreted and construed in light
of the whole record for the purpose of "findfing] as much consistency as possible in the
testimony of the various witnesses, and determine what irreconcilable conflicts remain
in the evidence").
556. Cf. Palm Beach Community College v. Department of Admin., 579 So. 2d
300, 302-03 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (where parties to an adminis-
trative proceeding have agreed to a stipulated set of facts, then it was reversible error
for the administrative agency to base the decision on new findings of facts).
557. 565 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
558. Id. at 854.
559. See Schultz v. Mr. Donut of Am., 564 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
560. Administrative "[algency determinations may be set aside if the . . . court
finds that the agency's conclusions are derived from findings of fact not supported by
competent record evidence." Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am. v. Department
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met if the administrative record is not before the court, or if the admin-
istrative agency never resolved the disputed factual issue. In City of
Sarasota v. AFSCME Council 1979,51 the court noted that a party
seeking judicial review of a decision by an administrative agency had
the burden of providing the court with an appropriate record so that
the judicial review process could go forward. When a party is seeking
judicial review of an administrative order relating to an automatic stay,
"[a]t a minimum . . . this court [should receive] . . . a copy of the
final order, any pleadings regarding the stay and the lower tribunal's
order on the stay.""' Without a record for review, the court must af-
firm the administrative agency's decision to deny the automatic stay,
because it had no basis for determining that the decision was an abuse
of discretion." 3
Similarly, in Rabren 11,56' the court noted that it was the duty of
the Department of Professional Regulation, as the party seeking judi-
cial review in this case on the issue of the appropriateness of the recom-
mended penalty, to provide a transcript of the proceedings. Because it
failed to do so both before the Board of Pilot Commissioners and also
on appeal before the court, there was no basis for overturning the rec-
ommended penalty, because an administrative agency is prohibited
from "deviating from the recommended penalty without reviewing the
'complete record . ... " ,,51 The failure to provide a transcript in such
a circumstance cannot be characterized as harmless error, because
there may well have been evidence in the record indicating whether
these docking facilities should or should not have been characterized as
independent ports within the Tampa Bay port area.5 66
The net result is that in most cases, the reviewing courts write
opinions demonstrating how agency factual determinations were ade-
quately supported by the record. 567 For example, in Manasota-88, Inc.
v. Agrico Chemical Co.,568 the court noted that the decision of the De-
of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 559 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Rolling Oaks Utils., 533 So. 2d at 772.
561. 563 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
562. Id. at 830.
563. Id. at 830-31.
564. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
565. Id. at 1289-90; see FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)10 (1989).
566. Rabren II, 568 So. 2d at 1290.
567. See Martin County Liquors v. Department of Business Regulation, 574 So.
2d 170, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
568. 576 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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partment of Environmental Regulation was supported by substantial
competent evidence, and that it would not reweigh such evidence. Ac-
cordingly, no factual error was committed by the Department in this
case.
569
Also, Citizens of Florida v. Wilson,570 after extensively reviewing
the testimony of the only witness before the Public Service Commis-
sion, the supreme court concluded that the record provided competent
and substantial evidence in support of the Commission's decision con-
cerning the facts, and that its order was not arbitrary as a matter of
law. In doing so, the court reaffirmed that the competent and substan-
tial evidence standard of review should be applied in reviewing the
records of hearings before the Public Service Commission. This stan-
dard of judicial review prohibited the court from reevaluating or re-
weighing the evidence heard by the Commission. This prohibition was
considered to extend to any inferences that should have been drawn
from the testimony that the Commission heard during the course of the
proceedings. 571
These cases, and others, do not imply that convincing a court to
reject an administrative agency's findings of fact is an impossible
task.5 72 However, they do require a record that clearly demonstrates
that the factual findings of the administrative agency were not sup-
ported by competent substantial evidence, which is a relatively rare
circumstance.673
Burd v. Division of Retirement5 74 is a classic example of the type
of record which will convince an appellate court to reject an adminis-
trative agency's findings of fact. In Burd, the court noted that it was
appropriate for it to reverse and remand an administrative order when
the fact finder overlooked unrefuted testimony on the central factual
issue in the case. In such cases, there was no inappropriate substitution
of judgment by the court on a factual issue, but rather an appropriate
reversal, because the factual finding of the administrative agency was
569. Id. at 782-83.
570. 569 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1990).
571. Id. at 1270.
572. One of the best arguments is that the administrative agency improperly re-
jected the factual findings of the hearing officer. See supra notes 468-551 and accom-
panying text.
573. Far too often the courts are presented with arguments by counsel which
essentially are requests for the courts to reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credi-
bility of witnesses.
574. 581 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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not supported by competent substantial evidence. 75
D. Deferential Judicial Review of Questions of Law
The power of an administrative agency to interpret a statute or
rule could be viewed as an invasion of the core judicial function of
interpreting the law.576 However logical this extreme position may be,
it has never enjoyed much support. 57 7 The principle is well settled "that
administrative agencies are necessarily called upon to interpret stat-
utes. ''5 78 Courts have gone even further; not only can an administrative
agency interpret statutes, "agency determinations with regard to a stat-
ute's interpretation will receive great deference [from reviewing courts]
in the absence of clear error or conflict with legislative intent. ' 57 9
The . . . general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide dis-
575. See id. at 974; cf. Faucher v. R.C.F. Developers, 569 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) In Faucher, the court noted that in order for the judge of com-
pensation claims to reject the medical opinions offered by doctors who testified during
the course of the hearing, an adequate demonstration on the record must be made that
such opinions were based upon false or incomplete medical history given by the claim-
ant to these doctors. In order to demonstrate this, the record must reflect that questions
were addressed to the doctors "specifically inquiring about the effect of the false or
admitted information on the doctor's previously expressed opinion." 569 So. 2d at 801.
But see id. at 804 (Nimmons, J., dissenting).
576. Perhaps the most famous statement along these lines is found in Marbury v.
Madison; "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
577. Rather, the position has been that the courts must always retain the power
to determine whether the administrative agency acted within the scope of its delegated
authority. See supra notes 38-81 and accompanying text; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) ("The judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
578. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160,
1162 (Fla. 1989).
579. E.g., Martin County Liquors v. Department of Business Regulation, 574 So.
2d 170, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Florida Sugar Cane League v. State, 580
So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("We are disinclined to disturb their
conclusions based on the established principle that [administrative] agency policy de-
terminations should be accorded deference by a reviewing court."); accord Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.1 1 ("The court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construc-
tion, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had
arisen in a judicial proceeding.").
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cretion in the exercise of their lawful rule making authority, clearly
conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' gen-
eral statutory duties. An agency's construction of the statute it ad-
ministers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned
unless clearly erroneous. [Moreover,] [t]he agency's interpretation
of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the
most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible
interpretations.5 80
This approach generally results in the courts affirming agency interpre-
tations of statutes.58 Similarly, a court will defer to an administrative
agency's interpretation of its rules "unless the interpretation is clearly
erroneous." 582 The classic circumstance that will satisfy this standard
of judicial review occurs when a court finds that an administrative
agency's interpretation was "contrary to the plain and unequivocal lan-
guage" of the statute or rule.583
E. Nondeferential Judicial Review of Questions of Law
Courts most often abandon the deferential approach of judicial re-
view when it involves an administrative agency's interpretation of the
law.5 84 During the survey period, the courts consistently held that two
circumstances justified abandoning the usual deference given to admin-
istrative agency resolution of questions of law. 585 First, if the adminis-
580. Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
581. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 636-38. The degree of deference courts
should extend to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute has been much
debated in both the federal and state courts. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-
45, the Supreme Court explained its current position on this question.
582. Eager v. Florida Key Aqueduct Auth., 580 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam); see also Meridian, Inc. v. Department of Health & Re-
habilitative Servs., 548 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
the court must affirm an administrative agency's interpretation of agency rules unless
"arbitrary, capricious, or not in compliance with the ... [relevant statutory
provisions]).
583. See id.; see also Town of Palm Beach v. Department of Natural Resources,
577 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
584. The courts in some cases have abandoned the deferential approach of judi-
cial review of factual issues. See Burris III, supra note 4, at 635-36; Burris II, supra
note 4, at 776-78.
585. There are few examples of other circumstances when the courts will not
defer to an agency interpretation of the law. See Cataract Surgery Ctr. v. Health Care
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trative agency's interpretation of a statute or administrative rule was
contrary to express language or purpose, then the court will not hesi-
tate to overturn the interpretation.586 Second, if the interpretation
adopted by the administrative agency would result in the court's decla-
ration that the statute was an impermissible delegation of authority or
that the administrative rule was an ultra vires act, then, if-it is reasona-
ble to do so, the court will reject the administrative agency's interpreta-
tion and impose one which avoids these problems." 7
In Elmariah v. Department of Professional Regulation,588 the
court considered the issue of whether the hearing officer correctly con-
cluded that the false and deceptive statements made by Dr. Elmariah
in his application for staff privileges at various hospitals were not suffi-
ciently related to the practice of medicine to justify disciplinary action
by the Board of Medicine. The Board was delegated the authority to
discipline doctors for "making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent repre-
sentations in the practice of medicine . . . .""' The Board rejected the
hearing officer's conclusion and found that staff privileges "directly re-
lated to the practice of medicine or to the attempt to practice
medicine." '
The court noted that:
Although it is generally held that an agency has wide discretion in
interpreting a statute which it administers, this discretion is some-
what more limited where the statute being interpreted authorizes
sanctions or penalties against a person's professional license. Stat-
utes providing for the revocation or suspension of a license to prac-
tice are deemed penal in nature and must be strictly construed,
Cost Containment Bd., 581 So. 2d 1359, 1364-65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); St.
Johns N. Util. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 549 So. 2d 1066, 1069-70 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (noting that an "agency bears the burden of providing a reasonable
explanation for inconsistent results based upon similar facts;" if the explanation is rea-
sonable, then the court must affirm the agency's interpretation); Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 537 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
a court in reviewing constitutional challenge to an agency decision will give no defer-
ence to the agency's resolution of such constitutional claims).
586. See, e.g., Town of Palm Beach v. Department of Natural Resources, 577
So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
587. See Department of Envtl. Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So. 2d 988
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
588. 574 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
589. FLA. STAT. § 458.331(k) (1983).
590. Elmariah, 574 So. 2d at 165.
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with any ambiguity interpreted in favor of the licensee.59 1
The practice of medicine for purposes of Florida Statutes Chapter 458
is defined as "the diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription of any
human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental
condition."592 While common sense may have indicated that staff privi-
leges bore some relationship to the practice or the attempt to practice
medicine, the court found that the statutory definition of the practice of
medicine clearly prohibited the Board of Medicine from punishing a
doctor for this type of misconduct, because the responses did not con-
cern any form of a diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for
any human disease, and as such could not form the basis for discipli-
nary action.59 3
F. Judicial Review of Agency Rule Making Activity
While much of the decision in Cataract Surgery Center v. Health
Care Cost Containment Board" " may be criticized,5 95 the court did
avoid the pitfalls associated with trying to apply the new paradigm for
judicial review announced in Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation.596 In Cataract Surgery Center, the
court echoed the decision of Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of
Environmental Regulation" " when it noted that the standard of judi-
591. Id.
592. FLA. STAT. § 458.305(3) (1983).
593. The misrepresentations made by Dr. Elmariah were somehow related to his
practice or attempt to practice, but it cannot be said that they were made "in" the
practice of medicine. Elmariah, 574 So. 2d at 165; see FLA. STAT. § 458.331(k)
(1983).
594. 581 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
595. See supra notes 438-48 and accompanying text.
596. 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
597. 365 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 74 (Fla
1979). In Agrico Chemical Co., the court described the conceptual approach and stan-
dard of judicial review for administrative agency rule making activity:
Given a proposed rule within the general area of regulation delegated by
the legislature to an [administrative] agency, the test of arbitrariness is the
same for the proposed rule as it would be for a statute having the same
effect.
Rulemaking by an [administrative] agency is quasi-legislative action and
must be considered with deference to that function . . . .The challenge
[to a proposed rule] under [FLA. STAT. ]§ 120.54(4) is a two-step process:
The challenge is first heard before an administrative hearing officer whose
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cial review applied when determining the validity or invalidity of an
administrative agency's rules or proposed rules is very deferential.
An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to
great weight and is not overturned unless clearly erroneous. An
agency is given broad discretion in the exercise of its lawful author-
ity and the burden is on a petitioner to demonstrate that a rule is
arbitrary and capricious. 598
However, such broad administrative agency discretion in the rule
making context was not recognized in Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department
of Environmental Regulation5" where the court embraced the Adam
Smith Enterprises' two tier approach,600 and through its application
order "shall be final [administrative] agency action." That final [adminis-
trative] agency action is subject to judicial review. Both the hearing officer
(acting in a detached quasi-judicial capacity) and this Court should deter-
mine from the evidence presented whether or not there is competent, sub-
stantial evidence to support the validity of the rule.
Thus, in a [section] 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the
legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the pro-
posed rule is encompassed within that grant. The burden is upon one who
attacks the proposed rule to show that the [administrative] agency, if it
adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the
rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the
requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the pur-
pose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the require-
ments thereof are arbitrary or capricious.
A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or
irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or
despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon com-
petent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been de-
scribed as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.
The requirement that a challenger has the burden of demonstrating [ad-
ministrative] agency action to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of
administrative discretion is a stringent one indeed. However, the degree of
such required proof is by a preponderance of the evidence . ...
Id. at 762-63 (citations omitted).
598. Cataract Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d at 1360-61.
599. 567 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 164 (Fla.
1991).
600. ]In Adam Smith Enters.,
[the] court indicated that the standard of judicial review applied in evalu-
ating the validity of a rule depends on how the issue reached the courts. If
judicial review is conducted pursuant to a direct appeal from an adopted
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demonstrated the dangers inherent in the technique of judicial review
urged on the courts in Adam Smith Enterprises. The decision in
Manasota-88, Inc. involved a challenge to the Department of Environ-
mental Regulation amended rules concerning discharge source stan-
dards for groundwater. The primary standards addressed health-threat-
ening contaminants, and the secondary standards addressed aesthetic
factors in judging the effect of a discharge into a groundwater
source."' The amended rules exempted "all existing dischargers from
compliance with secondary standards unless [the Department of Envi-
ronmental Regulation] determined that compliance was necessary to
protect groundwater used or reasonably likely to be used as a potable
water source. '6
0 2
However, even in these latter cases, an exemption was available if
the discharger could "demonstrat[e] that the economic, social, and en-
vironmental costs of compliance outweighed the economic, social, and
environmental benefits of compliance . . . [as long as it involved no
violation of] secondary standards at any private or public water supply
agency rule using the informal rule making procedures, then the standard
of judicial review is arbitrary and capricious. This is a less stringent stan-
dard of judicial review of the factual record than the competent substantial
evidence which is applied in the review of adjudicatory decisions. "Under
th[e] arbitrary and capricious standard . . . an agency is . . . subjected
only to the most rudimentary command of rationality. The reviewing court
is not authorized to examine whether a rulemaker's empirical conclusions
have support in substantial evidence. Rather, the arbitrary and capricious
standard requires an inquiry into the basic orderliness of the rulemaking
process, and authorizes the courts to scrutinize the actual making of the
rule for signs of blind prejudice or inattention to crucial facts. [This re-
quires] the reviewing court . . . [to] consider whether the agency: (1) has
considered all relevant factors; (2) has given actual, good faith considera-
tion to those factors; and (3) has used reason rather than whim to progress
from consideration of these factors to its final decision." However, if judi-
cial review of an administrative rule arises out of the context of adjudica-
tory proceedings used during the rule making process, then the agency's
quasi-legislative rule making process is converted to an adjudicatory pro-
cess and the standard of judicial review for factual conclusions supporting
the rule is the competent substantial evidence standard. This occurs be-
cause the hearing officer's factual conclusions become the basic record for
the court to review.
Burris III, supra note 4, at 645-46 (citations omitted) (quoting Adam Smith Enters.,
553 So. 2d at 1273).
601. Manasota-88, Inc., 567 So. 2d at 896.
602. Id.
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well beyond the discharger's property boundary."603 Manasota-88, Inc.
and other environmental groups were parties participating in the rule
making process. After the amended rules were adopted, they sought
judicial review of their validity. °4
The court noted that because of this procedural posture of the
case, there was no administrative adjudicatory hearing record. In such
cases, the standard of judicial review required that the rule be "reason-
ably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and ...not
arbitrary or capricious." 60 5 In such circumstances, all the reviewing
court need do is determine that the administrative agency addressed
"all [the] relevant factors .. .[in] good faith . ..and . . . used rea-
son rather than whim to progress from consideration of these factors to
its final d.ecision."606 The critical question was what constituted an ade-
quate record in a case where no section 120.57 formal adjudicatory
hearing was held.
On this point, the court ruled that a record in such cases consisted
of:
(1) the agency's initial proposal, its tentative empirical findings,
important advice received from experts, and the description of the
critical experimental and methodological techniques on which the
agency intends to rely; (2) the written or oral replies of interested
parties to the agency's proposals and to all the materials considered
by the agency; and (3) the final rule accompanied by a statement
both justifying the rule and explaining its normative and empirical
predicates. 07
[A] statement of the relevant facts considered by the rulemaker
• ..[which] should reveal "if and how the rulemaker considered
each factor throughout the process of policy formation," detailing
for the reviewing court "the actual attention [the rulemaker] gave
to the factors, and explain[ing] his final disposition with respect to
each of them." 608
603. Id. at 896-97.
604. Id. at 897; see FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1989).
605. Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063,
1067 (Fla. 1984)).
606. Manasota-88, Inc., 567 So. 2d at 897 (quoting Adam Smith Enterps., 553
So. 2d at 1273).
607. Id. at 898 (citations omitted) (quoting Adam Smith Enterps., 553 So. 2d at
1270).
608. Id. (quoting Adam Smith Enterps., 553 So. 2d at 1273).
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The court found that there was no detailed explanation of the consider-
ation of each factor or evidence offered concerning each, and the reason
for the ultimate disposition in the record. The court ordered the case
remanded, because, albeit not explicitly stated, the inadequate record
prevented the court from performing its judicial review function. The
court also held that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated au-
thority, because the rule was not supported by an adequate record on
file with the Secretary of State.609 The APA requires that an adminis-
trative agency file "a summary of the rule, a summary of any hearings
held on the rule, and a detailed written statement of the facts and cir-
cumstances justifying the rule."'610
The problem with the reasoning and result in Manasota-88, Inc. is
four-fold. First, the APA does not require administrative agencies to
provide a detailed statement of how each factor was precisely consid-
ered. This requirement was a judicial invention. All the APA on its
face or in the legislative history require is a statement of the facts
found and the circumstances justifying the rule. The court erred in
reaching a contrary conclusion. The statements filed with the rule
should enable the court to determine that all the relevant facts were
considered, as well as that the rule had adequate support in the record
at least for application of the deferential "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review. By requiring more, the court must have envisioned
applying a non-deferential version of the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of judicial review. 611 Further, this case must call into question
thousands of rules which do not have this type of detailed statement of
consideration and resolution of the appropriate factors on file as part of
the rule making record.
Second, the Manasota-88, Inc. decision is another example of the
courts creating a serious disincentive for administrative agency use of
the rule making process. If the rule making process requires an admin-
istrative agency to provide a detailed examination of the evidence pro
and con for each factor considered, an expensive and onerous process,
there would be no reason to prefer it over developing public policy
609. Id. In some cases the filing must be made in the office of the head of the
administrative agency. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1 1)(b) (1989).
610. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1l)(b) (1989).
611. A more diabolical explanation would be that the court may foresee continu-
ally remanding to matter to the administrative agency for more detailed factual find-
ings on the assumption that eventually, the administrative agency will figure out either
that the court is opposed to the rule or wants it adopted only after a drawn out hearing.
See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989).
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through -the use of nonrule policy orders. In fact, because the adjudica-
tory process limits participation, it may will be that it is a more man-
ageable process than that imposed by Manasota-88, Inc.."'
Third, even assuming an administrative agency has adequately de-
tailed its decisions during the rule making process, it is extremely un-
likely that the facts disclosed will provide new relevant information
which will persuade the court to find that the administrative rule is
invalid under the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.
This is so because the court is even more deferential toward adminis-
trative agency findings of fact than the competent substantial evidence
standard of judicial review.
Fourth, the approach offered by the court will paralyze the infor-
mal rule making process because of the uncertainty over the question of
what constitutes an adequate record. Administrative agencies will opt
to hold hearings resembling a section 120.57 proceeding in order to
avoid prolonged litigation over the issue of the adequacy of the state-
ment in support of the rule. This will waste the limited resources of
both the administrative agencies and the courts.
G. Unenlightening Judicial Review613
During the survey period, the courts continued, on occasion, to
render opinions which provided little or no guidance on the nature of
the issue decided, and little or no explanation for why the court
reached its decision. Particularly troubling are those opinions where the
courts provided only a brief cursory discussion of a case, and summa-
rily concluded that an agency's factual findings either did or did not
satisfy the competent and substantial evidence standard of judicial re-
view. For example in Garcia v. Department of Professional Regula-
tion,61 4 the court, after briefly restating the facts as found by the Secre-
tary of the Department of Professional Regulation, summarily
concluded that the "findings . .. [we]re sufficient to establish an im-
mediate danger to the public."61 5
Similarly, in Kan v. P.G. Cook Associates,616 the court recited in
conclusory fashion that the appeals referee heard the evidence, and
612. Burris IV, supra note 4, at 667-73, 677-85.
613. Burris I, supra note 4, at 407-10; Burris II, supra note 4, at 779-81.
614. 581 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
615. Id. at 961.
616. 566 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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that the record provided competent and substantial evidence to support
the findings of fact as reached by the appeals referee.
The shortcoming of . . . [this type] of opinion[] is "that the
court[] ha[s] not engaged in any articulation of the reasons why
these records are sufficient or insufficient to support an agency's
factual findings." Such a failure is inconsistent with the vision of
how a reviewing court would determine the adequacy of the factual
record under the APA. Under the APA an appellate court is re-
quired to "deal separately with disputed issues of agency proce-
dure, interpretations of law, determinations of fact, or policy within
the agency's exercise of delegated authority." The function of [the]
appellate court[] is limited in each of these categories. The only
way to know if an appellate court has remained true to its limited
role is by reviewing its explanation. Where there is no explanation
or it is an unenlightening explanation, one merely stating a conclu-
sion, then there is no basis for making this judgment. Th[is] type[]
of opinion[] [is] also inconsistent with the general role appellate
court opinions are designed to play in our legal system, providing
"a reasoned justification for the result . . . [by] testing the decision
against experience and against acceptability, buttressing it and
making it persuasive to self and others." Such "justification and
elaboration are expected in . . . [any] mature legal system." This
requirement guards against judicial fiat and assures that the law is
known and knowable rather than a body of hidden principles."'
While there may be a few circumstances when it is, for policy reasons,
impractical for the court to provide a full explanation of why it reached
a decision, it occurs far too often in Florida, solely because, for some
unknown reason, the court is unwilling to offer a full explanation of its
reasons for a decision.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
With perhaps the exception of the Adam Smith Enterprises deci-
sion, there has been relatively little fundamental change in administra-
tive law in recent years. However, this period of relative calm and sta-
bility concerning the basic principles of administrative law is about to
pass. The recent amendment to the APA, designed to curtail the use of
nonrule policy, 61 and the likelihood of amendment of the APA rule
617. Burris III, supra note 4, at 650-51 (citations omitted).
618. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(16), .535 (1991).
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making process, as a result of the current executive and legislative ef-
forts reconsidering that process, will restructure the administrative pro-
cess in Florida. 19 It will take time for the courts to have an opportu-
nity to examine the new structure. Until then, there will be some
heated arguments over the scope of change brought about, and the
meaning of specific provisions in the new processes. The recent deci-
sions in Chiles62 and Locke62" ' based upon separation of powers also
raise questions which may fundamentally affect the power of the legis-
lature to control executive branch exercise of delegated authority and
the scope of powers which may be delegated to administrative agen-
cies.622 The next five years will be a time of uncertainty in the adminis-
trative law area, as well as an interesting and challenging time for
those who are practicing in this area of the law.
Sadly, during this period we will not have the benefit of the
thoughtful insights of Professor Dore who recently passed away. Pro-
fessor Dore was part of the original group who drafted the new APA in
1974. She zealously followed its implementation and the adoption of
many amendments to the APA in subsequent years. When called upon
she never hesitated to take the time from her busy schedule to offer
advice to the legislative and executive branches of the government. She
also did not hesitate to criticize and praise court decisions concerning
the Florida administrative process. She devoted much of her profes-
sional life to trying to improve the administrative process as well as
other aspects of Florida law. She was never shy about sharing her opin-
ion and was always a source of witty and informative stories concerning
how mary of the changes in Florida law occurred. She will be missed
by all, even those who disagreed with her on many issues.
619. See Dore III, supra note 4, at 454-55 & n.114.
620. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E & F, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S699 (1991).
621. Locke v. Hawkes, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 5716 (1991).
622. See supra notes 5-37, 243-52 and accompanying text.
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